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ABSTRACT 
Eyre, William Francis. Ph.D., Purdue University, May, 2009. Privacy, Surveillance 
and the Real ID Act. Major Professors: Joshua Boyd and Victor Raskin. 
 
 
American  society  in  the  present  day  is  grappling  with  issues  of  privacy  and 
surveillance. These issues, the technologies involved, and implications for the 
organization and function of American society are examined in this dissertation.  
 
Public Law 109-13 contains the Real ID Act, and the implementation of this act 
has  far-reaching  ramifications  for  Americans’  privacy.  The  Real  ID  Act,  an 
exemplar of recent laws regarding privacy and surveillance, serves as a basis for 
discussing the development of a surveillance society and its potential harm to 
American citizens. 
 
The  dissertation  begins  by  framing  the  evolution  of  the  concept  in  American 
society, exploring anti-terror legislation as the latest assumption of extraordinary 
powers  by  the  state  in  times  of  war  and  national  emergency,  and  comparing 
previous abridgements of enumerated Constitutional rights in such times. It next 
discusses the implication of the Real ID as an insecure collection of databases, 
and then it examines the effect of Real ID on American citizens’ privacy as a 
national identification card. States have resisted the implementation of the act on 
the bases that the act constitutes an unfunded mandate and damages privacy.  
 
The new surveillance system erodes personal privacy and creates a threat to 
privacy and autonomy from both criminals and the government, or sometimes 
(due to insider abuse of data) both. The dissertation details the possibility of how  
            vii 
 
Real ID information access can be used against people in ways both legal and 
illegal,  with  comparisons  to  Great  Britain;  it  also  questions  whether  the 
government  is  even  capable  of  handling  increased  information  resources  or 
whether such resources only provide more opportunities for improper access and 
misuse of personal data.   
 
For  most  people,  the  developing  surveillance  state  may  only  pose  potential 
danger  until  someone  is  identified  as  a  target,  but  its  potential  chilling  effect 
threatens  participatory  democracy  and  the  expression  of  legitimate  political 
dissent.  The goal of this dissertation is to increase awareness of the incremental 
erosion of privacy rights which, once surrendered, become increasingly difficult to 
regain.  It also aims to question some of the security assumptions that justify this 
erosion. 
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CHAPTER 1. SURVEILLANCE TODAY 
1.1. A Day in the Life 
 
It’s an average day. Average Joe the Plumber and Jane Doe live in a high-rise 
condominium in Chicago and start the day by clicking on the morning news. Their 
television  is  fed  using  a  cable  box,  TiVo  or  satellite  connection  to  the  High 
Definition  Television  (HDTV).  Using  the  cable  or  satellite  TV  causes  the 
television signal provider to know what channels they have on the TV at any 
time,  down  to  the  second,  and  allows  the  provider  the  ability  to  record  in  a 
computer log file those preferences. Additionally, if the individual has a DVR, the 
time and duration, as well as the content of the show being viewed, are also 
known to TiVo or whatever company administers the DVR software updates and 
management (Charny, 2004).  
 
DVRs allow a two-way communication for the purpose of helping users select the 
next show they will like. For this goal to be achieved, the shows the users watch 
must  be  known  to  the  preference  prediction  algorithm  on  a  computer.  This 
algorithm will help determine recommendations to the users based on that users’ 
past viewing (This recommendation scheme rests on the assumption that the 
individual actually watches and enjoys the shows that appear on his/her screen.). 
The  “recommendations  for  future  viewing”  feature  is  implemented  using  an 
algorithm  which  determines  the  genre  and  subject  matter  of  shows  the  users 
appear to like (using a rational choice theory model in which it can be assumed 
that users will only view the shows they like and not select and view shows they 
do  not  like).  The  algorithm  then  fits  the  users’  past  selections  to  a  set  of 
preference scoring criteria, picking shows and/or movies matching those scoring     2 
 
criteria and recommending the resultant list to the viewer. This is similar to the 
manner  in  which  Amazon  makes  recommendations  for  books  ("Million  dollar 
Netflix," 2006).  
 
This information has commercial value and is stored. It also has value in that it 
can give insight into individual interests. This could help content programmers, 
and whatever organization has the resources, understand the psychology of the 
viewer. 
 
In  a  similar  fashion,  the  HDTV  itself  uses  a  bi-directional  data  reception  and 
transmission protocol (Svensson, 2008). This feature of HDTV was written into 
the specification to enable users to use video teleconferencing.  
 
If Joe or Jane were to hook up their computer to the display, it could act as the 
monitor (screen) for the computer and the Does could perform all the functions 
they would normally perform in terms of computing using this display. They could 
also  hook  up  their  Webcam  to  this  setup  which  would  provide  for  greater 
definition  when  communicating  with  people  at  the  other  end  of  an  Internet 
connection for a chat session. The corollary to this scenario involves the fact that 
everything displayed on the computer screen (the HDTV in this scenario) can be 
piped  as  data  to  the  other  end  of  an  HDTV  connection,  in  addition  to  the 
connection to the other end of the Internet connection; these would conceivably 
be two separate connections. These connections could be two dissimilar places, 
as the processor in the HDTV (the computer that converts HD digital signal to 
build the picture) has enough processing power to render the picture itself into a 
digital signal to send to wherever the TV is told to connect. 
 
In the very near future, the Does will not need a Webcam for the recording and 
broadcast of the goings on in the field of view of their television. Apple holds a 
patent which describes a television screen with sensors interlaced amongst the     3 
 
pixels  which  compose  the  display  portion  of  the  TV.  These  sensors  will 
reconstruct  the  photonic  input  they  receive  to  allow  the  TV  itself  to  act  as  a 
camera. Additionally, using smaller or larger subsets of the sensors will allow the 
TV/camera  to  provide  variable  focal  lengths,  meaning  that  the  TV  can  show 
close-ups and wide angle views with none of the traditional lens movement (or 
even  a  lens)  associated  with  zooming  in traditional  models  of  picture  capture 
(Fox, 2006). 
 
One or both of the Does might then sign onto the Internet and check email. The 
visited Web addresses and emails are recorded in the ISP’s database. Under the 
current United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyber-Initiative, 
established by classified presidential order, any communication that traverses a 
federal government network may be recorded by the National Security Agency 
(NSA)  or  DHS  without  the  necessity  of  accessing  the  ISP’s  database 
(Nakashima, 2008). The reason for recording this information is in order that the 
United States is protected from terrorist cyber-attacks. All visits to government 
sites (i.e., IRS, CDC, DoJ, etc.) are recorded and NSA monitors and records all 
communications  including  Internet,  voice  and  email  (Bamford,  2008,  p.179). 
AT&T also monitors the contents of Internet communications in real time (Singel, 
2007). 
 
Each  click  on  an  ad  or  link  proffers  a  new  piece  of  information  for  the  ISP’s 
database. The addresses of Web sites visited as well as the content of those 
sites are also, in the default configuration of the most used Web browsers, stored 
on the user’s hard disk. The reason for this storage is that the browser can speed 
display of data (text and graphics) from the “cache.” ("Deleting Web," 2006) It 
also leaves a permanent, barring user intervention, record of everything the user 
had “seen” (Once again certain assumptions are necessary; that the user did not 
click on a link which maliciously redirected a user to a site not described by the     4 
 
link, and that those links which were clicked correctly offered sites and pages that 
the user viewed and enjoyed.). 
 
In the Does’ high rise condo’s hallway there is a camera. So when they exit the 
door to the condo, their images are recorded by a camera in the hallway. At other 
times, when they have visitors, those individuals too are photographed entering 
and  leaving.  The  elevator  provides  a  camera  image  from  the  camera  in  the 
ceiling. As well the lobby and egress have surveillance cameras, or in the case of 
going  into  the  parking  garage,  the  elevator  lobby  and  the  exit  are  under 
surveillance. 
 
Average Joe works in the suburbs and drives to work from the city. Jane works in 
the city’s center (‘the Loop’ in Chicago’s case) and takes mass transit.  
 
Some transit systems have migrated away from paper tickets which can be paid 
for with cash to “Smart Cards” ("About smart cards," 2009). These cards require 
that processing occur based on the commuter’s entry and exit points as well as 
the time those checkpoints were encountered. This processing is performed in 
order  to  automatically  deduct  the  amount  of  the  travel  from  an  account.  The 
account must be filled with money and this can be accomplished using a credit 
card. The ostensible purpose of the Smart Cards is to save money for the transit 
system and eliminate the fraud involved with people passing transfers to each 
other in order to get free rides (Godfrey, 2008). 
 
Once the credit card is used for the purpose of payment, the transit card number 
and the credit card number are linked. Log entries must be made and kept of all 
transactions  at  each  stage,  and  therefore  all  the  data  associated  with  an 
individual’s transit system travels are known forever and can be mined or viewed 
any time thereafter ("Intelligent transportation," 2005, pp. 5-6). Data mining is the 
technique of using databases as input for algorithms that search for patterns and     5 
 
identify characteristics and generators of patterns in which the data analysts’ end 
users are interested. 
 
In Joe’s case, that of a commuter driving to work, the fact that he owns a car is 
registered with his state’s motor vehicle bureau. This registration of the vehicle 
on  its  own  can  be  considered  a  minor  issue  in  terms  of  surveillance  for  the 
reason  that  vehicle  registration  has  been  required  for  many  years.  
Massachusetts was the first state to issue registration tags in the United States in 
1903 (Tortora, 1998) and this can be thought of as merely having been a tax 
which  must  be  credited  to  the  proper  vehicle  registrant.  For  surveillance 
purposes, the vehicle’s plate number can be associated with an individual owner. 
If Joe stops for gas and pays with a credit card, the transaction is logged into 
multiple databases (O'Harrow, 1998, 2005). 
 
There are now RFID readers along highways. The T.R.E.A.D. Act rules mandate 
RFID  chips  to  be  embedded  in  tires,  and  uniquely  numbered  RFID  tags  in 
individual tires to specific vehicles ("Intermec to support”, 2002). The stated goal 
of the Act is to facilitate recall efforts in the case of recalls of defective tires by 
matching each tire to the vehicle and by extension, the owner. As Joe drives to 
work, he may encounter one or more of these RFID readers, and the time and 
location of the encounter can then be logged into a database (Warrior, McHenry, 
& McGee, 2003).  
 
The other technology that can be used to track vehicles is the Tire Pressure 
Monitoring  System  (TPMS).  TPMS  is  a  technology  that  the  National  Highway 
Traffic  Safety  Administration  has  mandated  will  be  implemented  in  all  new 
passenger cars and trucks starting in 2007. The purported raison d’etre of the 
sensor  is  to  detect  whether  tires  are  under-inflated  (Kerr,  2007).  The  sensor 
transmits  a  unique  ID  number  to  the  on-board  system,  mostly  on  one  of  two 
assigned radio frequencies, 315MHz or 433MHz. These signals can be picked up     6 
 
at a distance with a directional antenna, and the initial ID number assignments 
are made by the auto manufacturer, so these are recorded in the database(s) in 
which all of the other part numbers associated with that car are recorded. Some 
sensors are embedded in the wheel assembly, and the tire must be removed to 
access them. These devices have batteries which last 7 to 10 years. Another 
option is to use a valve stem sensor, which behaves in a similar fashion (Kerr, 
2007; “Spy my ride”, n.d.).  
 
Concurrently,  all  cell  phones  now  at  a  minimum  have  location  assisting 
technology,  and  newer  cell  phones  have  assisted-GPS.  The  assisted-GPS 
cannot be turned off and will work even if the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) 
card is taken out of the phone or switched with some other phone’s SIM card 
(K.C. Jones, 2007a). (The SIM card contains the numeric codes which identify 
the phone as one’s own for billing and service. The SIM card also contains a 
subset  of  the  phone  book  data  and  text  messages,  including  deleted  text 
messages,  associated  with  the  phone.  This  information  can  be  recovered 
forensically, so the system can even know exactly where the user was when 
having sent any given message ("Sim card," n.d.). Therefore, as Joe is driving 
along,  because  of  the  two  way  communication  that  defines  a  cell  phone,  his 
location  is  logged  by  the  cell  phone  company,  as  often  as  every  couple  of 
seconds if the cell phone company sets up that phone’s tracking in that way. This 
type  of  location  and  tracking  mechanism  is  ostensibly    in  order  that  if  Joe 
becomes  lost  or  missing,  the  cell  phone  tracking  records  can  be  used  to 
reconstruct his movements, and then to find him ("Missing persons," 2008, pp. 8, 
VI.A.14.). 
 
Many new cars have on-board computers which record information. Some of this 
information regards the condition of the engine and various on-board systems. 
These on-board computers can also keep continuous records of the car’s speed 
at any given time. There are 30 data points that the federal government is going     7 
 
to require of all electronic data recorder (EDR) equipped cars. The EDR will be a 
requirement for all new cars sold starting in the 2013 model year. As of 2008, 
many manufacturers have started equipping their cars with EDRs. In most cases 
the EDRs write over old information as new information comes in, the overwrite 
time  being  variable,  but  mainly  engineered  so  that  the  30  data  points  are 
available  in  the  event  of  a  crash,  in  that  the  insurance  company  and  law 
enforcement can determine what the car was doing just prior to a crash. 
 
In some cars, a vehicle status data recorder, which does not overwrite data and 
is always on, is included. The ostensible reason for installing this device is for 
manufacturers to determine if and when a driver violates the warranty, and what 
part (or parts) is (are) affected by the behavior which would void the warranty, 
such as racing (Gritzinger, 2008). 
 
In addition, the onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) device communicates 
using a digital signal allowing the car’s location to be precisely fixed at any given 
moment.  This  is  a  two-way  communication  which  causes  real  time  location 
information to be written to a database, and this information can be stored, or 
referenced through a tracking database. Various commercially available products 
facilitate the storage and retrieval of GPS-generated locational data, and they are 
used for various purposes. Police and intelligence agencies use GPS tracking on 
suspects’ vehicles, with and without warrants (Hubbard, 2008).  Likewise, car 
dealers who sell vehicles to customers who the dealer feels may one day need to 
have  their  car  repossessed  sometimes  have  GPS  tracking  devices  on  the 
vehicles  and  do  not  tell  their  customers  about  this  “feature”  (Vijayan,  2008). 
Some systems have components associated with the GPS that can be controlled 
from a PC. For instance, the person controlling the system, in addition to knowing 
where the car is at any time, could disable the starter ("GPS vehicle," 2008). 
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If there is a toll booth along the way to work, Joe will pass through the toll booth. 
Several  tollway  systems  offer  toll  transponders  which  have  the  toll  amounts 
automatically taken from an account which the driver charges with a credit card. 
Each  transponder  is  uniquely  numbered  so  that  the  correct  amount  can  be 
debited for toll payment. The time and ID number of the transponder are written 
to a database for billing and to settle disputes. More recently the toll records have 
been used, not just for criminal investigations, but also in civil cases such as 
divorces, to prove the car was not where the lying spouse said it was at whatever 
time was in question (Newmarker, 2007).  
 
The  same  toll  lanes  which  offer  this  convenience  also  have  cameras.  The 
cameras photograph the vehicles that pass through the transponder lanes, and 
the reason given for having the cameras is to prevent fraud and misuse, and of 
course send tickets to those without transponders ("E-Z Pass," 2006). The fraud 
could  consist  of  such  instances  as  someone  manufacturing  a  counterfeit  toll 
transponder  programmed  with  someone  else’s  correctly  guessed  or  deduced 
transponder  ID  number,  or  something  as  simple  as  the  use  of  a  stolen 
transponder (assuming the owner did not notice and report it, as when it would 
have been reported the toll passing capabilities would be shut off like a light at 
the  central  computer.).  Also,  in  terms  of  fraud  and  abuse,  people  (not  Joe, 
because  he  is  a  law-abiding  citizen)  might  move  the  transponder  between 
vehicles,  switching  the  transponder  between  vehicles  without  registering  and 
identifying  the  vehicle  carrying  the  toll  transponder  to  the  tollway  authority. 
Transponders  can  also  be  hacked,  with  the  bad  guy  able  to  read  another 
individual’s  legitimate  transponder  and  then  use  the  transponder  code  (Mills, 
2008). 
 
If Joe did not have a toll transponder he will, on the passage through toll booths 
in many cases, still have his travel recorded by a camera. Many toll booths used 
by people who pay with cash can also read the toll transponders. The cameras     9 
 
are trained on cars traveling through in those lanes ostensibly to combat fraud 
and abuse and for crime prevention in general. These cameras can also be used 
in patrol cars. 
 
The  leading  manufacturer  of  license  plate  readers  (LPR)  is  Remington-Elsag, 
and the Mobile Plate Hunter 900 has cameras mounted on the squad car and 
connected  to  a  database  for  checking  the  plates  which  the  optical  character 
recognition (OCR) software identifies. The system can read up to 900 plates per 
minute from up to 50 feet with 95 percent accuracy (Vlahos, 2008). Checking the 
plates once they are read is a trivial computer database lookup problem. 
 
When  Joe  arrives  at  a  garage  in  an  urban  area,  the  car  is  photographed  on 
entering the garage, and he punches the button for a ticket which contains a 
magnetic stripe. When Joe exits the garage, if payment is made with a credit 
card, his identity is associated with the garage ticket (which contained the entry 
time and by inference a cross-reference to the pictorial record of entry) and the 
car’s visit to and length of stay at the garage is written to a database. The stated 
reason  given  for  this  type  of  observation  involves  physical  security  (Haas  & 
Giovis, 2008).  
 
If Joe was to park on a city street in a downtown urban area and gets a ticket for 
staying in the space for longer than amount of time than for which he paid the 
parking  meter,  that  information  is  entered  into  a  database  ("Parking  ticket," 
2008).  There  is  a  pervasive  surveillance  effect  of  parking  patrol  police 
department  employees  patrolling  the  streets  with  handheld  computer-like 
wireless devices, but that was the old way. Today, the fact that many cities have 
instituted laws which require that cars which have more than a certain number of 
outstanding  tickets  logged  against  them  are  to  be  booted,  i.e.,  fitted  with  the 
“Denver  boot.”  The  new  way  is  that  the  parking  patrol  canvasses  the  streets 
using 26 vans, each equipped with LPRs and checking cars on both sides of the     10 
 
street at 1,000 cars per hour. The license plates of the cars are compared to a 
list of wanted license plates (Washburn, 2007). The most efficient mechanism is 
for the license plate of the parked car to be transmitted to a central database and 
compared there. There is nothing to prevent the time, location of the query from 
being logged in the database, and many reasons to expect that the recording of 
the encounter will take place. 
 
Many convenience stores, malls, commercial buildings and public thoroughfares 
now  have  digital  video  surveillance  cameras  trained  on  the  pedestrians  and 
patrons. The nine-inch black cube hanging behind the Starbucks team member’s 
head is a security camera (O'Harrow, 2005). So when Joe goes in before work to 
buy a cup of Starbucks, his image is recorded, and presumably, if he pays cash, 
his  preference  can  still  be  deduced  using  the  record  from  the  digital  video 
camera.  
 
If Joe or Jane were to withdraw cash from an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) 
on their morning break, the time and location, and picture from its camera is duly 
stored in a database ("Digital recording," 2004). The ostensible purpose of this 
type of surveillance is crime and fraud prevention and detection.  
 
At lunchtime, Joe buys something for his wife with a credit card, maybe for her 
birthday, maybe a purse she admired. That credit card transaction, including a 
detailed list of items purchased, is recorded. After Joe returns to his workplace 
after lunch, and he swipes a card for access to restricted buildings and areas, 
that information is recorded in a database. There is likely a camera recording the 
transaction,  and  at  any  time  in  the  future,  that  transaction’s  video  can  be 
accessed keyed on the financial transaction itself (Vlahos, 2008). There may be 
cameras  in  the  lobby  and/or  trained  on the  building  entrance  at  work.  Those 
cameras  will  record  his  return  to  work.  As  of  January,  2008,  there  were  an 
estimated  30  million  surveillance  cameras  in  the  United  States  recording  the     11 
 
goings on in public and publicly accessible commercial spaces. These cameras 
were recording 4 billion hours of images per week (Vlahos, 2008). 
 
At  work,  Joe  uses  a  computer  to  do  his  job.  Many  employers  have  installed 
monitoring software to ascertain what exactly Joe, and other employees like him, 
do on their computers. At the very least, the bandwidth providers know what he 
does on the Internet. Some corporations and government agencies employ key 
loggers, which record every key the computer user strikes. So when Joe sends 
his  wife  an  e-card  for  her  birthday,  the  boss  will  know.  Of  course  many 
employees avoid doing any personal business on the computers at work for the 
reason that they are monitored. The reason given by employers for using key 
loggers and other monitoring software is to measure employee productivity and 
monitor activity, perhaps to prevent the theft of insider secrets or other nefarious 
actions on the part of the employee ("Internet and computer," n.d.). This type of 
surveillance, however, is passé, as employers can merely state in the employee 
handbook  or  anywhere  they  publish  their  policies  that  the  employee  has  no 
reasonable expectation of privacy when using work related resources (Eureste, 
2008). 
 
Every  phone  call  is  logged  to  the  telecom’s  databases,  and  recently,  legal 
authority to conduct real-time wiretapping against wide swaths of the citizenry 
has been granted by the United States government to itself (Frederickson, 2008). 
This  authority  is  in  addition  to  the  warrantless  and  illegal  wiretapping  which 
occurred (Bamford, 2008, pp. 210-211). The scope of the illegal surveillance and 
the amount of data siphoned off will never be known. The FISA Reform Act gave 
the telecoms retroactive immunity for their illegal actions in violation of the FISA 
law as it stood in the face of court rulings against the government. As Mark Klein, 
the  AT&T  whistleblower,  who  was  never  called  to  testify  to  a  committee  of 
Congress, whose lawyer’s letters were never answered, said, “There will never 
be any hearings. It will die, and you’ll never find out what they did” (Goodman &     12 
 
Klein,  2008).  The  supposed  reason  for  wiretapping  Americans  and  making 
databases of the numbers they called and the numbers that called their numbers 
was  that  this  type  of  invasion  of  privacy  was  necessary  for  anti-terrorism 
purposes. So Joe Doe makes a phone call to his accountant, and the phone 
number he calls is entered into the database, and quite possibly the content of 
his conversation. If he calls his attorney, thinking he has attorney-client privilege, 
but his attorney has represented a Muslim on a visa from Egypt in a personal 
injury case, Mr. Doe may well find that his attorney –client privilege has been 
waived (without him knowing that that is the case). 
 
Joe Doe may call his banker, or broker, or travel agent, or his host at the casino. 
Because all of these individuals work at commercial entities which are classified 
as financial institutions under the terms of the PATRIOT Act II, his records, along 
with everyone else’s who has dealt with these institutions, can be seized by the 
federal government without a warrant (Wolf, 2007), and he could easily be made 
the target of wiretapping (Risen & Lichtblau, 2005). No one will ever know if his 
conversations are listened in on, because eavesdropping targets are classified. 
 
In  large  commercial  buildings  in  urban  areas,  those  entering  must  present  a 
driver’s license and sign a book in the lobby. There is nothing to prevent the 
names in those visitor logs from being entered into some type of database. Some 
would  say  the  security  types  would  be  remiss  if  they  did  not  record  the 
information.  The  accepted  reason  for  this  type  of  tracking  is  for  physically 
securing the building. 
 
Most public and commercial spaces in large cities are under video surveillance. 
In urban areas, intersections in high-crime areas and intersections deemed to 
have a high rate of accidents are under video surveillance. Cameras are used to 
issue traffic citations by mail for violations of red lights (Washburn, 2007). The 
feeds are sent to centralized “command centers” where human operators may be     13 
 
watching in real time. It is said that in heavily surveilled cities, such as Singapore 
or London, individuals’ images in the city centers may be captured as often as 
300 times per day (Murphy, 2007; Severance, 2007). The reason given for taking 
everyone’s  pictures  all  the  time  is  to  prevent  crime,  investigate  crime,  and 
provide  for  traffic  safety.  Currently,  there  are  plans  to  install  more  video 
surveillance cameras in urban areas in the United States for anti-crime purposes 
(“Big bucks,” 2008). 
 
When Joe leaves, the surveillance regimen marches on: cameras recording his 
walk to the garage, the garage logging his exit, the toll transponder and camera 
logging his passage, the RFID readers silently reading his tires’ RFID tags, the 
GPS and cell phone tracking systems marking his minute by minute progress, 
the computer in his car recording every acceleration, deceleration, stop and go. 
When he gets back to his high-rise in the city, more of the same – until finally the 
last thing he views before going to sleep, the least email he reads, the last Web 
page he views for that day, is recorded. 
On the weekend, every book Joe checks out of a library is recorded, although 
sometimes  the  government  has  trouble  collecting  that  information  legally 
(Kronholz, 2003; Reutty, 2007). For every airline ticket purchased and rental car 
agreement  entered  into,  the  data  is  recorded.  Every  time  Joe  writes  a  paper 
check, this information is logged into databases, and if the check is to the wrong 
person or for too much money, the Federal Government is informed through a 
separate channel and program (Bank secrecy act, 2006). 
 
Any time Jane signs up for a loyalty card (the cards which allow discounts on 
selected items when presented upon checking out), she is allowing a record of all 
of her purchased items to be stored in a database such that even if she pays 
cash for the purchases, every item purchased is associated with Jane ("Loyalty & 
stored," 2004). In many cases, the company issuing the card will want to learn 
the person’s name and address, phone number, and age. The marketing reason     14 
 
given by the merchant is to possibly mail sale papers to the loyalty card holder. 
This  begs  the  question  as  to  why  the  store  needs  all  of  this  information, 
especially the individual’s age, unless the question involves building a dossier 
(marketing profile) on the individual. 
 
If Joe and Jane gamble at casinos, the loyalty cards, when used in machines in a 
casino, allow an exact record to be made and kept of all of their gambling activity, 
down to the exact second and penny of wager and payout and the exact time, 
down to the second, that the wager was placed. In some casinos, the machines 
are networked and this information is available in real time. The reason given by 
the casinos for this type of surveillance is so that if a person is losing, the casino 
can offer that person some type of perk, in order that Joe and Jane feel better 
about  losing  their  money  and  will  return  more  readily  to  play  again  (Binkley, 
2004). 
 
If the individual trades in the stock market, all of the transaction information is 
stored and the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) knows what stocks 
people buy and when they buy those stocks. The ostensible purpose is to detect 
activity which would indicate insider trading activity (Countryman, 2003). 
Many of these transactional data elements are stored with and include significant 
amounts of what could be considered ancillary information associated with each 
transaction. For instance, when storing information about a cash purchase at a 
store conducted using a loyalty card, the data elements might include or easily 
link  to  the  individual’s  phone  number  or  age,  among  other  data  items,  which 
should not be strictly necessary for logging the transaction. The extra information 
makes correlation easier. Correlation is the key to linking databases together to 
get  the  maximum  amount  of  information  on  each  individual.  Correlation  is  an 
important  concept  in  data  mining  and  data  integration  in  surveillance 
applications. Correlation, in its most basic sense, is matching sets of data to each 
other based on common data elements in the data sets.     15 
 
If Joe and Jane travel to an international destination, they are outside the sphere 
of American surveillance, and subject to the surveillance apparatus of the country 
to which they travel. Some countries, such as Britain and China, have as much or 
more in the way of a surveillance apparatus (Hope, 2008; Klein, 2008). Most 
countries have less. 
 
In the case of recent voter purging incidents, non-correlations were claimed on 
the basis of as little as a single character being different between the subject’s 
name as it was input and the name listed in the voter database (Goodman & 
Weiser, 2006). This is in contrast to integration in the surveillance realm in which 
correlation  is  desired.  The  purpose  of  correlation  is  to  facilitate  integration 
between elements of information in such a way as to easily connect information 
to an individual even in cases of incomplete or inaccurate informational elements.  
 
Integration is the act of connecting data from various sources (Rao & Tripati, 
2008). The data may have characteristics with varying degrees of similarity, and 
may mostly match up byte for byte. When the keys, or main identifying fields, 
such as names or SSNs, of the data are identical in each of the databases being 
integrated,  the  job  of  integration  is  easy.  Most  of  the  types  of  information 
available  to  a  logically  centralized  database  have  various  inconsistencies, 
misspellings, different forms of a name, similar names and different addresses 
for the same individual, etc. With information integration, when a misspelling is 
encountered, other information can be compared, allowing for an identity match 
or association of an informational element in a greater percentage of cases. The 
process  by  which  this  type  of  information  matching  is  conducted  involves 
resolution or reconciliation of the data (Bhattacharya & Getoor, 2007).  
 
An  example  of  integration  might  be  the  following:  Joe  is  carrying  Jane’s  cell 
phone because his cell phone broke. He might have to borrow a friend’s (let’s call 
him  Jerry)  car.  So  when  Joe  is  driving  along,  the  RFID  readers  send  data     16 
 
showing that it is Jerry driving along. But the cell phone tracking shows a match 
for Jane. But Joe parks in his regular parking garage and swipes into work with 
his ID. At this point, the integrated system can then correct the location tracking 
database to indicate the correct individual’s movements (Joe’s). The integrated 
system will also note that Jane is somewhere else because her transit card was 
used on the transit system, in accordance with her patterns, and Jerry’s first car 
(he loaned Joe his second car) and Jerry’s cell phone are seen moving along 
Jerry’s normal route at the correct time. So even though the informational data 
points taken individually (cell phone, car) might have led to a mistake in tracking 
Joe, the integrated system can make the correct identification. This is the type of 
situation that becomes a selling point for VeriChip, the company that has gotten 
FDA  approval  for  implants  of  RFID  chips  in  humans.  In  cases  in  which  the 
systems  are  working  properly,  100%  accuracy  of  identification  of  the  correct 
human is possible (Greene, 2004). 
 
In the late summer of 2008, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), which is 
responsible for conducting surveillance using earth-orbiting satellites, has started 
working  with  DHS  to  aim  the  satellites  at  American  territory  and  American 
citizens. The program is known as the National Applications Office. Previously, 
privacy,  national  security  considerations  and  other  limits  on  the  federal 
government’s powers to conduct surveillance on American citizens prevented the 
use  of  military  satellites  to  conduct  surveillance  of  America  and  American 
citizens. The ostensible reason for the satellites looking down on America and 
Americans is to find weak points in security defenses and to conduct other anti-
terrorism  functions.  A  recently  released  GAO  report  noted  that  the  program 
“lacks  assurance  that  NAO  operations  will  comply  with  applicable  laws  and 
privacy  and  civil  liberties  standards”  (Gorman,  2008).  The  program  is  moving 
ahead nonetheless. 
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Beyond the details of tracking and surveillance of movement in public spaces, 
there are aspects to tracking and surveillance at a wider, integrated level. This 
integration involves commercially and publicly held data. 
 
Acxiom is one company that aggregates and integrates all manner of public and 
transaction  records.  Aggregation  is  the  procurement  of  large  databases  with 
information from one or more similar sources. The databases are then integrated 
with existent information in new, proprietary databases, or set up as standalone 
databases for easy access and searches, without being integrated per se. For 
example, collecting databases of property records, voter lists, driver’s licenses, 
vehicle  registrations,  employment  records,    marriages,  births  of  children, 
inheritances, lawsuits in which one has been engaged, everything on a credit 
record,  credit  card  statements,  schools  attended  and  degrees  held,  and  then 
combining these databases, or making the links between them seamless, fast 
and  easy  to  search  for  information  on  an  individual,  represents  aggregating 
information and then integrating it. This is what Acxiom does, and this information 
is combined into dossiers of individuals’ lives that are available to anyone to buy 
for $50 (Behar, 2004).  
 
Privacy advocates in the late 1990s had been alarmed at the amount and type of 
information  that  commercial  and  government  entities  were  amassing  on 
individuals. These privacy advocates were concerned that the manner in which 
and  amount  of  information  collected  represented  what  was  tantamount  to  an 
invasion  of  privacy.  At  the  time  there  were  calls  for  discussions  on  the 
appropriate manner in which to place limits on this informational aggregation and 
integration. However, the terrorist threat and the events of 9/11/2001 changed 
the context of the discussion and the discussion of privacy took a back seat to a 
discussion of the virtues of surveillance in The United States in contemporary 
American society.  
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Individuals  are  subject  to  surveillance  and  tracking  technologies  for  various 
reasons  with  varying  goals.  These  reasons  may  be  partially  constructed  with 
commercial components, have national security implications and/or engage law 
enforcement goals and are central to the rationale for collection and storage of 
tracking and surveillance data. The goals would follow from the rationale; more 
profit in the case of commercial considerations, and security and continuity of 
operations  in  the  national  security  and  law  enforcement  scenarios.  The 
ostensible reason of protecting the citizens is given as a reason for tracking and 
conducting surveillance against all citizens. Central to the question regarding the 
use  and  abuse  of  surveillance  and  tracking  methods  and  technologies  is  the 
concept of privacy.  
 
As illustrated with the Does, a person might go through the day and have her 
movements and activities tracked with the aid of a variety of technologies which 
provide convenience but sacrifice privacy. The simple use of common devices 
and  everyday  conveniences  makes  almost  all  of  the  Does’  actions  and 
movements  traceable--probably  without  their  knowledge  or  consent.  In  many 
cases, tracking and surveillance data are produced as second order effects, by-
products of the primary purposes of the technologies. In cases in which tracking 
is the central tenet of the technology, these technologies have as their primary 
selling point the safety of the individual. This is the case with the need to locate 
the  source  of  911  calls  from  cell  phones,  or  the  use  of  satellite  tracking  of 
vehicles in cases in which drivers go missing. The tracking component is sold to 
the consumer and in a philosophical sense to the public, under the pretense of 
making rescue efforts easier as well as easing the enforcement and prosecutorial 
efforts of law enforcement and the criminal justice system. 
 
A vast amount of data is available about any given person, and it takes only 
being labeled as a suspect or target for all of that data to be accessed. The     19 
 
questions of privacy and surveillance therefore revolve around the question of 
access to the data, by whom, and for what purpose. 
 
This dissertation will discuss the potential loss of privacy the average American 
citizen faces in daily life and the danger to American citizens’ privacy that the 
implementation of the Real ID Act represents. It will be argued that this danger 
far outweighs any increase in security that Real ID would provide. 
 
Supporters of the Real ID contend that it is the proper way to implement the type 
of secure ID that the 9/11 Commission recommended. Detractors are concerned 
that the implementation is insecure, that the costs are too high, that it represents 
an unfunded mandate to the states, that it represents a national ID card which 
Americans have resisted every time that suggestion was floated and that it will be 
used for more purposes than it was originally intended. 
 
The  frame  in  which  these  arguments  will  be  presented  consists  of  several 
elements of civil society that will impact or be impacted by the adoption and use 
of a Real ID. The first is the American concept of privacy and the manner in 
which  this  “right”  was  constructed  from  interpretations  of  the  Bill  of  Rights  in 
various  Supreme  Court  decisions  as  well  as  societal  norms  and  statutes 
addressing privacy. Aspects of privacy to be discussed include the expectation of 
privacy in communication, speech and association. The literature regarding pre-
9/11 and post-9/11 thinking about privacy is explored. 
 
The government’s reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has changed the focus 
of  the  privacy  debate  through  the  granting  of  extraordinary  powers  to  the 
government  to  fight  terrorism.  The  history  and  effect  of  various  laws  enacted 
during  times  of  war  and  national  emergency  will  be  surveyed.  Restrictions  of 
liberties such as the suspension of habeas corpus and the restriction of speech 
and  assembly  will  be  discussed  in  a  historical  context.  The  restrictions  on     20 
 
liberties in the past will then be compared with the restrictions on liberties that the 
PATRIOT Act and various government surveillance programs represent. 
 
The discussion then turns to terror, terrorists and terrorism and the role these 
play in the movement of society away from the idea of the fundamental liberty of 
the  individual.  It  questions  the  idea  that  the  safety  of  the  state  depends  on 
individuals giving up their constitutional rights. 
 
Assumptions  regarding  surveillance  and  the  role  surveillance  plays  in  the 
prevention of terrorism will be discussed, as well as some of the effects of the 
surveillance state on the individuals living under a surveillance regime. 
 
The dissertation examines the Real ID Act and its implementation according to 
the current rules enumerated by DHS, and it examines the role Real ID plays in 
making  the  country  safe  from  terrorism.  Simultaneously,  it  will  discuss  the 
privacy-destroying and surveillance aspects of the use of the Real ID. The role of 
databases in the Real ID implementation will be examined, as will as potential 
abuses of information by enemies and others. In this way, the reader can start to 
form an informed opinion as to whether the Real ID Act will or will not make 
American civil society safer and if the costs associated with a supposed new 
level of safety or (in)security are acceptable. 
1.2. Privacy 
 
What is privacy and how is it a right? Most individuals have an intuitive sense of 
what the construct of privacy contains. In Constitutional terms, privacy is not an 
enumerated right, yet it is something that individuals in contemporary American 
society have come to expect. The effect that technology has had on privacy and 
people’s  expectations  of  privacy  is  also  germane  to  the  current  societal 
consideration  of  the  concept  of  privacy.  Societal  norms  regarding  privacy  are     21 
 
important to consider, as the evolution of privacy as a right, and some would say, 
as a civil right (Radil, 1999), has progressed. The concept of privacy as a right in 
American society has developed historically throughout the years the Republic 
has been in existence as a logical extension of enumerated Constitutional rights. 
What does it consist of?  
 
Justice Brandeis famously said that privacy “is the right to be left alone” (Warren 
&  Brandeis,  1890).  Some  contend  that  privacy  has  to  do  with  having  some 
measure  of  anonymity  when  one  goes  out  in  public  (Slobogin,  2007).  Others 
might contend that it is the ability to keep information about various aspects of 
one’s life private to various groups of people with which the individual chooses to 
share the information. The latter contention goes to the theory of controlling the 
dissemination of one’s private information (Froomkin, 2000). 
 
Based  on  their  sense  that  individuals  and  institutions  in  power  will  seek  to 
expand  that  power,  the  Founders  ratified  the  first  ten  Amendments  to  the 
Constitution as the Bill of Rights (McWhirter & Bible, 1992). The Bill of Rights 
took  effect  in  December  of  1791. Among  the  rights  enumerated  in  the  Bill  of 
Rights are such guarantees as the First Amendment freedom of speech, First 
Amendment freedom of association and assembly, Fourth Amendment freedom 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination, Sixth Amendment rights to trial by jury and the right to a speedy 
trial  and  the  Eighth  Amendment  prohibition  against  cruel  and  unusual 
punishment ("Bill of Rights," 1791).  
 
These  rights  were  grounded  in  the  enlightened  philosophies  of  the  great 
European  thinkers  of  the  day  and  represented  a  breakthrough  in  the 
establishment  and  protection  of  the  rights  of  individuals  against  “bad” 
governments. Forms of bad governments in the European tradition generally took 
the form of feudal and despotic governments, although the shadow of theocracy     22 
 
in the form of the Catholic Church and Puritanism overlay much of the theory of 
governance of the time (McWhirter & Bible, 1992). 
 
Court decisions have shaped the discussion of privacy in the United States over 
the years. An early discussion in a law journal regarding privacy came in the form 
of a situation described by Warren and Brandeis regarding the making and use of 
an  image  of  an  individual  in  the  public  space  (Warren  &  Brandeis,  1890). 
Foreshadowing the invasion of privacy by the zealotry of today’s paparazzi, the 
authors  decried  the  gossip-mongering  of  their  time  thus,  “The  press  is 
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and decency. 
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a 
trade…”  (Warren  &  Brandeis,  1890,  p.  196).  The  authors  concluded  that  if 
individuals felt their privacy had been invaded, their remedy would be in the civil 
courts.  
 
One of the first modern decisions regarding privacy came in the form of Griswold 
v Connecticut (1965) (McWhirter & Bible, 1992, p. 96), which had to do with the 
rights of individuals to practice birth control in the privacy of their own homes. “In 
Griswold five justices were willing to find a constitutional right to privacy, two in 
the ‘penumbras’ of the Bill of Rights, three in the Ninth Amendment… With this 
decision  the  right  to  privacy  had  finally  found  its  way  into  the  constitution” 
(McWhirter & Bible, 1992, pp. 98-99).   
 
It is this lesser-quoted or used Ninth Amendment of the original ten amendments 
that are the Bill of Rights, which specifies: “The enumeration in the Constitution, 
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people” ("Bill of Rights," 1791). The Ninth Amendment forms the basis for 
Supreme Court decisions which formalized the right to privacy. Justice Goldberg 
determined that to not enforce the “unenumerated” rights that the Constitution 
specified would “disparage” those rights (Tushnet, 2008, p. 182).     23 
 
In Paul v Davis (1976), an individual who had been arrested but not convicted 
found his name and face on a flyer distributed by the police to shopkeepers in 
Louisville, Kentucky, with others labeled as known shoplifters. After the charges 
against  him  had  been  dropped,  he  sued  the  police  for  invasion  of  privacy. 
Ethically, the police were in the wrong on many counts, especially in the principle 
of a man being innocent until proven guilty, yet Judge Rehnquist ruled against 
the individual because Mr. Paul had brought suit under the wrong theory of law; 
he should have sued for defamation (Parent, 1983, p. 304). Thus, the law takes a 
narrow view of the definition of privacy and it is not necessarily in line with an 
intuitive understanding of privacy. 
 
The concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is a well developed concept 
in discussions of law. This “reasonable expectation” concept is used in relation to 
discussion  of  what  information  can  be  gathered  and  used  in  court  by  law 
enforcement, employers, and other actors with power over the individual based 
upon what the individual says or does where and under what circumstances the 
speech  or  action  occurs,  and  who  can  appropriately  discover  the  speech  or 
action. This concept of “reasonable expectation of privacy” was introduced as a 
Fourth Amendment protection in Katz v. United States in 1967 (389 U.S. 347). 
The case involved the contention of the government that since a pay phone was 
public, bugging the phone booth without a warrant did not impinge on Fourth 
Amendment protections (Slobogin, 2007, p. 12). The Court ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment  protected  people,  not  places,  and  that  if  society  considered  it 
“reasonable” that an individual was in a place and acted in a way that assumed 
that their actions or discussions were private, Fourth Amendment protection was 
implied. The Court drew the line at openly public behavior, so that any discussion 
in a restaurant or on a public street would not assume the guarantees of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
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The question became one of what information is appropriate for various parties to 
know and use and how the information should be used. The general tenor of this 
concept has to do with what information can be legally used against an individual 
in a court of law.  
 
In instances which would involve the Fourth Amendment, in the past there had to 
have been a probable cause finding that a crime probably had been, probably 
was being, or probably was about to be committed to eavesdrop or conduct other 
surveillance.  That  concept  of  law,  however,  is  now  considered  pre-9/11  in  its 
thinking  and  application.  The  PATRIOT  Act  and  subsequent  additions  and 
expansions would change all of that (Abele, 2005). The PATRIOT Act and the 
accompanying  Acts,  as  well  as  the  guidelines  under  which  the  FBI  operates, 
require  no  finding  of  that  nature  in  order  for  the  government  to  conduct 
surveillance against American citizens. The most recent FBI guidelines reported 
in the mainstream media indicate, according to Caroline Frederickson, director of 
the ACLU’s Washington legislative office, “…the FBI will be give carte blanche to 
begin  surveillance  without  factual  evidence…  These  guidelines  will  lead  to 
political  witch  hunts  and  more  unwarranted  investigations  of  political  enemies 
and peace groups.” The FBI will be allowed to employ techniques from the period 
that  led  up  to  the  Church  Committee  hearings,  e.g.,  recruiting  of  informants, 
infiltration, disguise, etc. (Johnson, 2008) 
 
The common misconception in contemporary American society is the saw that 
surveillance advocates trot out in which the desire for privacy is equated with a 
desire to hide some type of criminal or deceitful information or act. This is the 
“nothing to hide” argument for surveillance. This “nothing to hide” argument has 
been  described  as  the  “most  common  retort  against  privacy  advocates” 
(Schneier, 2006). Yet there are many instances in which criminal deceit is not 
reason for a person’s desire for privacy, but rather an individual choice.   
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Throughout the history of the Republic, there has been an acknowledgement and 
codification of the fact that privacy exists as a right and there are classes of 
instances of violations of that right to which the injured parties can seek remedies 
through  the  courts.  In  1905,  the  Georgia  Supreme  Court  in Pavesich  v.  New 
England Life Insurance Co. concluded that a “right of privacy in matters purely 
private is…derived from natural law” (Solove, 2006, p.13). 
 
These  dimensions,  of  information  availability  and  dissemination  about  an 
individual,  as  well  as  direct  observation  and  eavesdropping  of  an  individual, 
describe and frame the concept of individuals’ privacy. These dimensions have to 
do with aspects of individuals’ lives that may not be criminal, but may involve 
information that the individual does not wish to have commonly known. Whether 
or not a person has cancer, or a taste for some food that may not be popular in 
the  culture  or  locale  (think  of  a  vegetarian,  cast  into  small  town  life  in  cattle 
country in Wyoming), or any one of a number of informational items, that may not 
necessarily be criminal, the individual may still prefer for whatever reason to keep 
it private. It was a matter of natural right that was codified into law, in which 
eavesdropping  was  a  violation  of  common  law  even  in  Colonial  times,  with 
eavesdropping  defined  by  William  Blackstone  in  1769  as  “…listen[ing]  under 
walls or windows, or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse…” (Solove, 
2006, p. 4).   
 
In the years leading up to the events of 9/11/2001, the literature indicates that the 
progression  of  privacy  rights  of  individuals  was  in  the  direction  of  greater 
individual rights, choice and privacy. With the advent of computers and the ability 
to collect, store and aggregate large amounts of data, even pre-9/11, privacy 
rights were being marginalized in the quest for data useful to marketers. Privacy 
was  eroded  by  the  ability  of  actors  with  computers  and  databases  to  share 
information  easily.  Communication  and  tracking  technologies  have  served  to     26 
 
erode individuals’ privacy. The erosion has occurred due to the ascendance of 
perspectives driven by commercial and law enforcement considerations. 
 
A review of the literature showed that there are no neat boundaries which can be 
drawn around the issues surrounding individuals’ privacy and privacy rights as 
these issues touch on every aspect of an individual’s life, at all points every day. 
This observation is illustrated by the case of the Does in the opening just going to 
work in the morning. Some aspects of privacy engage First Amendment rights, 
some, the Fourth Amendment.  
 
Some of these privacy rights (association and speech and search and seizure) 
are  life  and  death  issues  under  the  PATRIOT  Act,  subsequent  acts,  and 
executive orders. The original PATRIOT Act, which has been greatly expanded 
with  the  passage  of  subsequent  laws,  allows  the  designation  of  groups  as 
terrorist  organizations,  even  though  these  may  have  been  peaceful  protest 
groups which an individual might have thought were protected by the Constitution 
and therefore which they were free to associate. This state of affairs started with 
selective and politically expedient use of the designation “terrorist organization” 
by the State Department under the 1996 Antiterrorism Act (Cole & Dempsey, 
2002, p. 137). 
 
Closer  to  home,  the  threshold  for  the  declaring  something  to  be  “domestic 
terrorism” is the commission of “acts dangerous to human life that are a violation 
of  criminal  laws…[and]  that  appear  to  be  intended…to  influence  the  policy  of 
government  by  intimidation  or  coercion.”  This  part  of  the  Act,  written  in  a 
Minnesota state law mimicking the Act, allowed protesters who were planning 
actions of civil disobedience, in the spirit of the 1960s protests, to be arrested 
and  charged  with  conspiracy  to  riot  in  the  furtherance  of  terrorism  in 
Minneapolis/St.  Paul  for  the  Republican  National  Convention  in  2008.  In  this     27 
 
case,  the  citizen  “terrorists”  were  arrested  and  charged  preemptively,  before 
anyone had protested anything (Goodman, 2008).  
 
Even if an organization is not declared to be a “terrorist organization” but found 
under Section 411 by the Secretary of State to “undermine U.S. efforts to reduce 
or eliminate terrorist activities,” and was shuttered under the provisions of the 
PATRIOT or subsequent Acts, an individual who contributed money to the group 
could have his or her assets seized. Thus, under the existing laws, protesting the 
passage of legislation extending and expanding the USA PATRIOT Act could 
result in an individual’s assets being forfeited due to the individual contributing 
money to a protest organization considered by the Secretary of State to be an 
organization  which  undermines  U.S.  efforts  to  reduce  or  eliminate  terrorist 
activities. Some might argue that this circumstance represents a circumvention of 
the American political process (Abele, 2005, p. 30). 
 
Illustrative  of  the  concept  of  privacy  is  the  question  of  Internet  and  email 
communications.  Communication  as  a  First  Amendment  right  and  the 
surveillance of protected political speech is one facet of the privacy question. The 
literature  explored  for  the  purposes  of  this  discussion  examines  the  legal 
community’s stance on the question of privacy regarding email communications, 
Web searching and surfing, and physical tracking. 
 
The most salient Constitutional question of privacy and the Real ID Act has to do 
with another enumerated First Amendment right, freedom of assembly. Freedom 
of movement is implicated directly in the concept of freedom of assembly. If one 
is under surveillance at all times, with all movements known and catalogued, is 
there  a  freedom  to  assemble?  Generally,  one  can  consider  that  freedom  of 
assembly  and  freedom  of  speech  are  married,  as  they  are  in  the  First 
Amendment  to  the  Constitution.  If  one  right  is  abridged,  the  other  is  also 
abridged. What good would it do for individuals to meet but not be able to speak     28 
 
freely? And conversely, what purpose would it serve to be able to speak, but not 
to be in personal contact with those one speaks with? A corollary is that due to 
the  manner  in  which  phone  calls,  emails,  and  all  financial  transactions  are 
logged, if one’s movements are tracked, there is not even the ability to donate to 
an organization such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) without the 
government knowing. The ACLU is, at the time of this writing, a legitimate, non-
terrorist political organization. The ACLU is an impediment to the implementation 
of some conservative policies of the government, however, and therefore may at 
some point have its membership and donor lists come under greater scrutiny.  
 
The issue of anonymous association was addressed but not resolved in a 1972 
case,  Laird  v.  Tatum  (408  U.S.  1).  The  United  States  Army  infiltrated  and 
conducted  domestic  surveillance  against  groups  that  were  planning 
demonstrations and peacefully airing their grievances. The Court did not address 
the question of privacy in one’s associations. Instead, deciding that the plaintiffs 
had not shown that they were damaged, the Court decided that the victims of the 
surveillance had no standing to challenge the constitutionality of the surveillance 
and the Court refused to issue an injunction against the Army to stop domestic 
spying. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for the majority, ruled that “the 
‘subjective  chill’  that  could  result  from  fear  that  information  collected  by  the 
government might someday be used to harm those about whom the information 
had  been  collected  was  not  a  sufficient  justification  to  issue  an  injunction…” 
(Kuhn, 2007, p.74). However, in the dissent in 1972, Justice William O. Douglas 
argued that there should not be a need to show harm in order that the Court 
would be able to review the Army’s surveillance program: 
 
The Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents of government and official eavesdroppers 
away from assemblies of people. The aim was to allow men to be free and independent 
and assert their rights against government. There can be no influence more paralyzing of 
that  objective  than  Army  surveillance.  When  an  intelligence  officer  looks  over  every 
nonconformist’s shoulder in the library, or walks invisibly by his side in a picket line, or 
infiltrates his club, the America once extolled as the voice of liberty heard around the 
world no longer is cast in the which Jefferson and Madison designed, but more in the 
Russian image. (Kuhn, 2007, p.74)     29 
 
Under scholarly definitions of terrorism, the terrorists commit terrorism in order to 
influence target populations. When the terrorists succeed in effecting changes, 
the  terrorists  are  said  to  have  been  successful.  Possibly  to  the  detriment  of 
American  civil  society,  it  would  seem  that  in  reaction  to  terrorists’  attacks, 
changes have been made to the United States’ government’s recognition of the 
rights of American citizens, with freedom and privacy having been eroded.  
 
An  example  of  thoughts  about  privacy  in  the  literature  regarding  First 
Amendment issues in the age of the Internet, the Internet Age having started 
before  the  terror  attacks  of  9/11,  would  help  to  frame  the  question  of  the 
normative  privacy  considerations  American  citizens,  as  members  of  a  society 
governed  under  the  laws  consonant  with  the  United  States  Constitution,  had 
come  to  expect.  The  pre-9/11  literature  on  the  subject  demonstrates  a  stark 
contrast  with  the  post-9/11  literature,  and  the  anti-terror  considerations  which 
caused Americans and the Congress as the citizens’ representatives to abandon 
privacy rights will be explored. 
1.3. Privacy in Internet Communications – The Literature 
 
That  privacy  considerations  involving  Internet  communication  are  seen  as  a 
moving target is a theme throughout the literature. This is due to the fact that the 
Internet and the technologies associated with and used in conjunction with it are 
evolving rapidly (Brownlee & Claffy, 2004; Grier, 2006).  
 
In the main, Americans have had a different attitude throughout the early history 
of  the  Republic  than  Europeans  regarding  privacy.  Americans  showed  a 
preference for a greater degree of property rights-based physical privacy. This is 
evidenced  by  a  history  which  includes  the  development  of  privacy  enhancing 
technologies  (a  phrase  also  used  to  describe  technologies  to  help  individuals 
maintain  privacy  in  discussions  regarding  computer-related  privacy  issues).     30 
 
Among these privacy enhancing technologies in the physical world that could be 
included in this category is as simple a development as barbed wire (McWhirter 
& Bible, 1992, p. 9). Recently, however, the European Union has had stricter 
privacy policies, especially regarding information concerning individuals, and the 
U.S.  has  had  to  make  guarantees  to  the  EU  regarding  the  manner  in  which 
information about citizens of EU countries is to be stored and handled (Sullivan, 
2006).  
 
This literature review is a survey of the literature regarding current and recent 
American normative attitudes regarding privacy, with an emphasis on information 
and electronic monitoring. Other aspects of privacy are also explored. Current 
and previous policy is examined, and an examination of policy recommendations 
from the literature is conducted. 
 
Although the emphasis of this review of the literature is on literature regarding 
privacy in the United States, literature regarding privacy policies in other western 
countries  is  also  included.  In  some  cases,  countries  are  encountering  issues 
which will arise in the United States in the future. These countries’ academics’ 
normative  stances,  particularly  in  Western  Europe  and  the  British 
Commonwealth, can be considered useful in constructing a review of norms and 
attitudes regarding privacy policy in a global context. This impingement of the 
global community on the United States therefore should be considered relevant 
to American public policy regarding privacy and consists of the development of a 
global culturally normative standpoint. 
 
The literature can be categorized by the type of privacy which it addresses, and 
then by the date of publication. The date of publication will be broadly described 
as pre-9/11 and post-9/11. The pre-9/11 literature, unless specifically referencing 
the Twin Towers event, will be considered to consist of anything published up to     31 
 
the end of 2001. This assumption is made based upon the length of time that 
papers generally spend prepress. 
 
The literature regarding the Internet and Internet communication is specialized in 
the areas and scope of discussion of Internet communications. The literature can 
be grouped in various ways, and depending on the manner of categorization, 
some groups have overlapping subject matter. From the legal side, there was a 
major focus on the Fourth Amendment, as well as a special emphasis discussion 
of the invasion of privacy represented by the FBI’s Carnivore program, as well as 
the possible illegality of its use, especially as there was no way to verify it was 
being used in the manner prescribed by law and by policy (Elmore, 2001).  
  
The literature search revealed several Fourth Amendment treatments. Lawless 
(2007)  focused  on  the  privacy  expectations  of  Internet  search  information.  
Barrett (2002) discussed the FBI claims that Carnivore collected information in 
the manner of pen register and trap-and-trace devices and the implications for 
Fourth Amendment protections for third parties, as well as the possibility the FBI 
was  gathering  more  information  with  Carnivore  than  the  courts  may  have 
allowed.  
 
Jackson  (1999),  in  a  pre-9/11  piece,  expressed  concern  that  the  Electronic 
Communications  Privacy  Act  of  1986,  while  providing  some  protection  for 
electronic communications, did not go far enough to protect individuals’ privacy in 
electronic communications. The Harvard Law Review ("Keeping secrets," 1997) 
was  concerned  with  the  question  of  striking  a  balance  between  privacy, 
individuals  avoiding  suspicionless  monitoring  by  law  enforcement,  and  the 
necessity of law enforcement in cyberspace.  
 
Another  group  of  law  journal  articles  discussed  the  Fourth  Amendment 
specifically in terms of the FBI and Carnivore. Hellums (2002) is concerned with     32 
 
the  ability  of  the  government,  through  the  use  of  Carnivore  and  technologies 
similar  to  Carnivore,  to  fulfill  Justice  Brandeis’  prediction.,  made  Olmstead  v 
United States in 1928, that “…the Government, without removing papers from 
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to 
expose  to  a  jury  the  most  intimate  occurrences  of  the  home.”  Young  (2001) 
questions the FBI’s use of the laws as old as Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to justify the use of Carnivore. Lincecum 
(2003) references the movies “The Conversation” and “Enemy of the State” in 
illustrating the dangers of uncontrolled eavesdropping and the general distrust 
Americans  have  of  government  surveillance.  Another  closely  related  article 
(Ditzion, 2004) concerns the use of “pen registers” and what the law says that will 
be applicable to the use of pen register type surveillance in the Internet age, and 
how they relate to “trap-and-trace” devices.  
 
Carnivore was a pre-9/11 invention by the FBI which evolved out of Omnivore, 
which  itself  evolved  from  a  “still-classified  surveillance  system  deemed 
technologically deficient” (Hellums, 2002, p. 2). The use or misuse of Carnivore 
hinged on what probable cause and court orders were necessary for its use, and 
the type of information to be collected. Levels of information could be considered 
as addresses email was sent from (to the target), addresses the target sent email 
to,  address  routing  information  and  message  contents.  Conceptually,  “pen 
registers” and “trap-and-trace devices” are carry forwards from the days in which 
circuit-switched telephone systems were used. Pen register and trap-and-trace 
technologies are analogous to and descriptive of the idea of inference tracking 
(E. Cole, 2003), in which knowing which parties are communicating with each 
other can give insight into who is up to something.   
 
A pen register detects and records numbers dialed from a phone, and trap-and-
trace tells those conducting surveillance from where a call was dialed to a certain 
number. In terms of email, these concepts were extended to the email address     33 
 
and routing information. The burden of proof for getting pen register and trap-
and-trace  orders  was  less  onerous  than  conducting  a  wiretap  (i.e.  a  Title  III 
order), which required more of a burden in terms of probable cause, and had 
time limits and other restrictions which law enforcement found to be inconvenient. 
For  example,  a  Title  III  order  “require[d]  probable  cause  for  intercepting 
communications’ content or an ECPA order…” and “applications under Title III 
require the authorization of a high-level Department of Justice official and are 
subject to approval and review by federal district court judges” (Hellums, 2002, p. 
3). These requirements were burdensome and time-consuming for the agency 
and were not given high priority, nor were sufficient resources devoted to the 
tasks. 
  
Some of the controversy surrounding the use of Carnivore had to do with the 
FBI’s  implausible  technical  explanation  for  the  manner  in  which  Carnivore 
functions. The agency assured target audiences that the FBI was not intercepting 
the full content of a suspect’s communication when the FBI was not authorized to 
do so. Because the workings of Carnivore were never divulged, some thought 
that  it  was  implausible  that  the  FBI  could  target  specific  email  addresses  for 
monitoring  and  analysis.  Carnivore  had  other  problems  from  civil  libertarians’ 
standpoints in terms of who would monitor the manner in which the software was 
installed and configured, as the software had capabilities built into it to collect all 
of  the  content  information  (i.e.,  the  email  message  body).  Carnivore  also 
possessed the capability to monitor all traffic of all types (e. g., Web browsing, 
etc.), if the agency so desired. 
  
In terms of the relevancy of any literature about Carnivore per se to the present 
day privacy issue, there is little. The USA PATRIOT Act has obviated the need 
for justification of surveillance which the FBI was compelled to show in the past. 
Surveillance of Americans of a much more comprehensive nature is now allowed 
and  is  authorized  internally  by  the  FBI  through  the  use  of  National  Security     34 
 
Letters  (NSLs).  The  FBI  can  issue  NSLs  by  and  to  itself  without  a  judicial 
oversight (Jordan, 2007). As the post-9/11 law review articles indicate, in terms 
of the normative view of the legal profession, as represented by the viewpoints 
expressed  by  their  published  advocates,  there  was  concern  in  attempting  to 
maintain privacy in email communications.  
  
The current discussion regarding legal issues concerning the Fourth Amendment 
focus on the seizure of search results held at third-party search providers such 
as Google, Yahoo, etc., than other computer or data acquisition. The Lawless 
(2007)  article  urges  judicial  adoption  of  a  rights-based  doctrine  in  upholding 
societal expectations of privacy for constitutional consistency. Foley (2007) notes 
that the court in Gonzalez v. Google stated that even as the government sought 
search information which pertained to lawful activity, the tendency might be for 
the  government  to  seek  information  about  “suspicious  activity”  which  would 
reveal the searcher’s identity even if there was no previous reasonable suspicion. 
Goldberg  (2005)  notes  that  Google  is  the  heavyweight  in  the  world  of  Web 
search  and  free  email,  and  privacy  guarantees  must  be  maintained  lest  the 
“electronic dossiers” which include records of all searches as well as all outgoing 
email from the free Gmail service would be sought at the very least by all manner 
of marketer.  
 
In the aggregate, the issues discussed in these articles have to do with what 
expectation  of  privacy  individuals  have  when  conducting  searches  on  the 
Internet.  The  search  data  is  generally  stored  indefinitely  at  third-party  search 
providers, such as Google, which says it never deletes any search query. Google 
search  data  has  been  seized  and  used  by  prosecutors.  In  one  case,  a  man 
searched on a type of wound which he inflicted upon himself when he killed his 
wife  and  shot  himself  (non-fatally).  The  search  history  was  evidence  which 
ultimately proved to be his story’s undoing, which was that an unknown assailant 
shot them and he lost consciousness (Lawless, 2007, pp. 1-2).     35 
 
An  observation  from  Lawless  involves  the  tests  that  the  courts  apply  when 
deciding if any “reasonable expectation of privacy” has any basis. In general, the 
basis  of  that  expectation  is  tied  to  societal  norms  and  guarantees  the  courts 
provide for individuals. The conundrum in these cases has to do with the fact that 
because third-party search providers do nothing to protect the queries entered 
into the search engine, that “it reinforces the privacy norms of a politically and 
temporally  insulated  judiciary:  once  people  know  their  searches  are  exposed, 
then  –  by  the  time  these  cases  are  contested  –  there  will,  in  truth,  be  no 
expectation of privacy” (Lawless, 2007, p. 8). 
  
There is a paucity of law review articles regarding litigation concerning the USA 
PATRIOT Act. The fact that an individual must have standing (a legal term of art 
meaning they have to have some kind of interest caused by experiencing a direct 
effect  of  the  law)  to  sue  limits  the  type  and  number  of  cases  which  can  be 
brought  for  unjust  application  of  the  act  to  victims  of  these  abuses.  Another 
reason  to  sue  would  be  for  the  reason  that  an  individual  might  consider 
application of the Act as a violation of that individual’s constitutional rights. The 
explanation used by the government is that any application of the Act is a secret 
affair. The penalties attached are against any individual who would divulge that 
they aided law enforcement in the execution of any order under the Act. This 
aspect  of  the  law  makes  judicial  review  of  the  constitutionality  of  certain 
provisions moot. No one can show he(she) has standing so there is no one a 
court can be shown  was harmed. The harm is kept a secret. The government’s 
claim that the plaintiff lacked standing led to the dismissal of a case in Cincinnati 
in July 2007. The court stated that the plaintiffs in the case, including lawyers and 
journalists, could not prove they had been subject to surveillance and therefore 
could not show injury, and therefore did not have standing to sue (Liptak, 2007). 
 
Another tactic the government uses to keep issues out of court is to claim that 
there is some type of prejudicial harm that can come to security efforts if a judge     36 
 
were to hear cases that involve secrecy and/or national security. This is currently 
the tactic being used in the case of Al-Haramain v. Bush in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California. This case is also the closest 
that plaintiffs have come to getting heard in court. 
 
Al-Haramain is a charity that now is no more. It was shut down for suspicion of 
being involved in financing terrorists and terrorism. Joe Eisenberg is arguing on 
the side of the charity which claimed it had been given copies of its phone logs 
by the Treasury Department by accident. The papers Treasury turned over were 
marked “Top Secret” on each page. The FBI retrieved the packet of papers but 
not before several people in the law office had seen them. 
 
When the warrantless surveillance program was revealed in December 2005, the 
attorneys for the charity realized what they had seen was evidence generated 
from that program and they filed suit (Elias, 2007). The government argued that 
“The Document,” as it is referred to in court papers, should not be entered into 
evidence or produced through discovery, as it was a state secret. The court let 
the suit proceed based on the recollection of a plaintiff who had seen it. The 
government argued that the only way to verify if the recollection was correct was 
to compare it to the Document, but since the Document would not be produced, 
the suit should be dismissed.  
 
The Deputy Solicitor General Gregory Garre, in urging the judges to dismiss the 
lawsuit,  said  that  exposing  the  Document,  or  even  continuing  with  the  case, 
would jeopardize the national security of the United States. When challenged as 
to  whether  the  judiciary  should  just  take  the  executive  branch’s  word  that 
something should be considered a state secret, Garre suggested that the courts 
should show the “utmost deference” to the Bush administration (Poulsen, 2007). 
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The lengths to which the government goes to try to maintain the secrecy of the 
Document, notwithstanding the part about Treasury handing it over to the subject 
of  their  investigation,  are  extreme.  Eisenberg  must  type  his  briefs  on  a 
government  computer  with  an  armed  guard  watching,  cannot  keep  copies  of 
what he’s written, and any printouts he makes must be taken for shredding by the 
guard. As he wrote in an email:  
 
So, it’s like this. Yesterday, under the auspices and control of my litigation adversaries, at 
their offices and on their computer, I wrote a brief, of which I was not allowed to keep a 
copy, responding to arguments which I was not permitted to see, which will be met by a 
reply which I will not be permitted to see. (Liptak, 2007, par.19) 
  
A three-judge panel in a Washington appeals court did not like the government’s 
approach to handling cases involving state secrets. Judge Judith W. Rogers, for 
the  majority,  wrote  that  the  deck  seemed  stacked  for  the  government  in  that 
when  a  plaintiff  “lacks  information  about  his  claim,  the  complaint  must  be 
dismissed… But as soon as any information is acquired, it becomes too risky to 
introduce the evidence at trial” (Liptak, 2007, par. 16). 
  
The government made a motion to dismiss in January, 2009 and it was denied in 
the  al-Haramain  case  ("Order  pertaining,"  2009).  There  was  a  conference 
scheduled  for  January  23,  2009  ("Clerk's  Notice  in  Al-Haramain  Islamic 
Foundation, Inc. et. al. v. George W. Bush et. al.," 2009), and at that time the 
government was ordered to produce a plan by February 13 for going forward with 
the case, bearing in mind the sensitivity of the documents the court needed to 
see. On February 11 the  government filed a brief with the court declaring its 
intention to appeal and get a stay. The court found that the decision to move 
forward  with  the  case  was  not  appealable.  At  the  time  of  this  writing,  Judge 
Vaughn  issued  an  order  dated  February  13,  2009,  denying  the  government’s 
motion to appeal and stay the court’s order that the government produce the 
documents in camera that the court has determined that it must see in order to 
proceed with the case. The court has given the government until February 27,     38 
 
2009 “…to inform the court how it intends to comply with the January 5 order” 
(Case 3:07-cv-00109-VRW, p. 3). 
 
Another  group  of  writers  addresses  the  loss  of  privacy  on  the  Internet  in  a 
general  way,  without  focusing  on  the  Fourth  Amendment  or  Carnivore 
specifically,  addressing  the  loss  of  privacy  and  government  and  commercial 
interests’ infringement of individuals’ civil rights generally (Smith, 2005; Bowie & 
Jamal, 2006; Freiwald, 2007; Reilly, 1999; Thompson, 1999; Skatoff-Gee, 1996; 
Glancy, 2000; Berman & Mulligan, 1999; Knopf, 1999; McTigue, 1999), and also 
employees’ expectations of privacy at work (Dixon, 1997). 
 
The  Dixon  piece  is  from  the  early  days  of  the  commercial  Internet,  and 
addressed employers’ monitoring of employees’ email communication. The use 
of  email  in  the  corporate  environment  was  relatively  new,  and  employees 
generally were under the impression that their expectation of privacy was similar 
in using email as to that expectation of privacy in making personal phone calls. 
The court ruled in Smythe v Pillsbury that no employee email had any protection. 
Dixon  takes  issue  with  this  decision,  maintaining  that  the  court  misread  the 
societal expectation of privacy, and that from a culturally normative viewpoint, the 
employees should have been able to expect their email communications to be 
treated  as  private,  much  as  personal  phone  calls  in  the  workplace  were 
protected.  
 
According to Dixon, there existed an expectation of privacy in a wider sense. On 
the other side of the normative coin, the federal court’s decision “is significant 
because  it  is  the  first  federal  decision  to  hold  that  a  private  sector  at-will 
employee has no right of privacy in the contents of his or her email when it is 
sent over an employer’s email system” (Dixon, 1997, p. 1). Dixon’s argument is 
that  if  the  employer  gives  the  employee  access  to  the  public  Internet  via  the     39 
 
company  network,  and  that  employee  uses  some  type  of  Web-based  mail 
system, that employee has some expectation of privacy.  
 
For  post-9/11  considerations  in  terms  of  electronic  communication  privacy, 
Freiwald sums up the essential issues in a succinct, easy to understand manner. 
The  courts  had  avoided  addressing  the  constitutional  issues  surrounding 
wiretapping for 40 years. Two cases in 1967, Katz v. United States and Berger v. 
New York, established procedural safeguards to be placed on traditional wiretaps 
based  on  Fourth  Amendment  considerations.  Since  that  time,  however,  the 
courts  have  not  subjected  modern  electronic  surveillance  practices  to 
constitutional scrutiny (Freiwald, 2007, p. 1). 
 
Freiwald’s  piece  raises  the  question  of  normative  attitudes  about  privacy,  as 
there are several unanswered questions about the government’s surveillance in 
relation to the Constitution. The first case challenging, on constitutional grounds, 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which was passed as a subset of the 
Electronic Communications Protection Act (ECPA) in 1986, was pending at the 
time  of  publication  in  the  Sixth  Circuit  (Warshak  v.  United  States)  (Freiwald, 
2007, p. 2). 
 
Freiwald  hypothesizes  as  to  the  reason  that  there  has  been  no  constitutional 
review of any of this warrantless invasion of privacy by  the government. She 
gives the reason simply as the fact that a test for users’ reasonable expectation 
of privacy needs to be applied for the courts to rule on these issues, and that this 
is beyond the capability of the courts, in that they “lack adequate empirical data 
for the positive inquiry and adequate guidance for the normative one” (Freiwald, 
2007, p. 2). 
 
Subsequent to Freiwald’s publication, the court did come down on the side of 
privacy, but only in that the police need search warrants to seize older emails     40 
 
from ISPs. From the perspective of criminal defendants whom the police had a 
case against, the point of the ruling was practically moot, because the police 
needed warrants for newer mail. However, from the perspective of the general 
public, it was a good decision for privacy advocates because it limited the ability 
of  the  government  to  engage  in  warrantless  fishing  expeditions  (“Warshak  v. 
United States,” 2007).  
 
The other selections in this grouping are consistent in that the selections from the 
pre-9/11 time period discuss privacy in a general fashion from several different 
angles. Privacy, and the compromise thereof, was described and discussed in 
terms  encompassing  such  diverse  activities  as  tracking  down  deadbeats, 
keeping  the  privacy  of  one’s  images  (in  the  suppression  of  distribution  of  a 
videotape  on  the  Internet),  increasing  capabilities  for  monitoring  users  and 
considering the misperception that any communication can be considered private 
(McTigue, 1999).  
 
McTigue  makes  a  similar  point  to  Freiwald’s,  by  describing  cases  in  which 
people’s expectations of privacy in electronic communications were unfounded 
and the consequences deriving from these circumstances. One of these involved 
the case of Senior Chief Petty Officer Timothy McVeigh of the U.S. Navy, who 
was associated with his screen name by AOL employees in direct contravention 
of the company policy of non-disclosure on information about their subscribers 
(McTigue, 1999, p. 3). McVeigh was dismissed from the Navy because of the 
company’s disclosure of information of violation of its rules. 
  
A major issue in the study and discussion of vacuuming up citizens’ emails had 
to do with the fact that the bars of the various states had not decided whether 
attorney-client  communication  could  occur  via  email  without  encryption.  This 
confusion as to the standards of confidentiality to which client communications 
should have been kept, appeared to fly in the face of knowledge the state bars     41 
 
should have had regarding the problem for their clients with law enforcement 
copying and seizing stored emails (McTigue, 1999, p. 6). McTigue also arrives at 
a reason for the legal community’s naivete concerning the difference between 
stored  communication  and  intercepted  communication  in  terms  of  maintaining 
attorney-client privilege. This naivete involves the fact that state bar associations 
focused on Title I of the ECPA which applies to email interception. In real-time, 
email interception is as difficult as wiretapping. Title II of the ECPA applies to the 
stored aspect of the email and because it is illegal to disclose stored information 
in an unauthorized fashion, the Act is of no consequence in helping to protect 
privileged communication. However, with the proper authorization, the attorney-
client privilege cannot be maintained against the state without the use of some 
type of cryptographic protective measure. Title I is not relevant when it comes to 
the government seizing the stored communication per Title II (McTigue, 1999, p. 
6) and in non-technical circles, this could lead to confusion. 
 
The  third  group  of  articles  regards  possibly  the  most  privacy  destroying 
technologies  available,  physical  tracking  technology  (Phillips,  2005;  Caldwell, 
2006; Glancy, 1995). The technologies in use now which allow cell phones to 
connect  to  any  cell  tower  as  the  owner  of  the  phone  travels,  and  Global 
Positioning Systems (GPS), which allow people to do away with paper maps, are 
technologies which can be turned around and used to plot the location of anyone 
using these technologies at any time. These records are stored by the entities 
providing the services, and are considered “contentless” data. The question with 
these  technologies  has  to  do  with  whether  a  person  has  a  reasonable 
expectation of privacy of location when employing these technologies. 
 
Glancy (1995) clearly saw the coming future, as her publication was well before 
9/11 and also before email was the ubiquitous application that it has become. All 
three authors are on the same side on these issues, that there should be an 
expectation of privacy when using these devices.     42 
 
Caldwell argues the case for privacy very specifically from the point of view of the 
fact that the Florida Constitution specifically has a clause in Article I, Section 23 
("Florida constitution," 1968) enumerating the right to be left alone. This Right to 
Privacy parallels Fourth Amendment protection which itself is synchronized with 
the  pre-9/11  federal  interpretation  of  what  the  Fourth  Amendment  meant.  He 
examines whether there is an expectation of privacy regarding cellular calls and 
how this means the ‘Shaktman test,’ a three part test to determine if a user has a 
reasonable  expectation  of  privacy,  applies.  For  these  purposes,  “…the  state 
carries the burden of satisfying the three-part test of compelling state interest, 
relevance,  and  least  intrusive  means”  ("Limbaugh  v.  Florida,"  2004).  What  is 
interesting about the Limbaugh case in terms of the post-PATRIOT Act age is 
that it concerns Rush Limbaugh’s medical records, which Limbaugh’s attorneys 
contended  were  seized  illegally  from  four  of  Limbaugh’s  physicians.  The 
PATRIOT Act specifies that in terrorism investigations, the state can seize and 
use medical records without probable cause or a search warrant – that all the 
state must do is claim that it is germane to some investigation (Lenzer, 2006).  
 
Another technology that Caldwell examines is implicated in the example of Kyllo 
v United States. In this case, the police used thermal imaging to detect drug 
activity  inside  a  home.  The  Supreme  Court  argued  that  the  police  could  not 
specifically  use  “sense-enhancing”  technologies  against  random  targets,  or 
targets they intend to examine without a warrant, unless those techniques were 
in widespread use by the general public (Caldwell, 2006, p. 9). Unfortunately for 
privacy considerations of the general public, the cost of technology continues to 
go down, and therefore the chance of “widespread use” increases. The question 
specifically of what “widespread use” means is also subject to interpretation. 
  
Glancy  (1995)  saw  specifically  the  type  of  situation  in  which  the  logical 
conclusion is that each person ultimately would have to register their destination 
every time they were about to leave to go somewhere. Ostensibly, this type of     43 
 
surveillance system would determine which roads to drive upon, and also allow 
for constant monitoring of the individual’s location. The results of this monitoring 
could be stored in a database and correlated with the patterns given to private 
industry for more targeted marketing, and in the post-9/11 age, government.    
Phillips (2005) discusses the set up and implementation of the E9-1-1 system in 
Texas, and how the raw data, basically the same information as in the previous 
two  examples,  could  be  used  to  build  profiles  of  individuals  who  were  being 
tracked. A simple move would be to say that the government would have access 
to this data and be able to build location/identity databases for any reason, of 
which one could be anti-terrorism tracking. Anti-terrorism would not be the only 
use.    
  
There have been differing rulings as to the question of whether the government 
can seize cell phone location records and/or get real time cell phone location 
data  without  a  warrant.  As  recently  as  2005,  there  were  differing  opinions  in 
federal courts in terms of what Fourth Amendment protections applied to those 
data. In five cases in 2005, two judges treated the request for real time data as 
an order for a tracking device, two treated them as wiretaps and another held it 
was the same as a pen register order (the order with the least protection for the 
target). This part of the law is still evolving ("Government requests," 2006). 
1.3.1. Americans’ Attitudes Regarding Privacy 
 
Davis and Silver (2004) conducted a survey in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 
The telephone survey was conducted between November 14, 2001 and January 
15, 2002 and surveyed 1,448 respondents. 
 
There were nine questions which the research was predicated on. The answers 
to  these  indicated  the  respondent’s  choice  between  preferring  security  and     44 
 
preferring  civil  liberties.  The  population  included  an  over-sample  of  African-
Americans and Hispanics.  
 
The  questions  postulated  situations  in  which  the  respondent  had  to  make  a 
choice. In the case of the innocuous “Give up some civil liberties” entry in the 
table, the respondent would be asked if they would be willing to give up some 
civil liberties if it would make the country safer. If the respondent answered yes, 
the respondent would be categorized for that question as preferring security to 
civil liberties. For the table entry for results for “Crime to belong to a terrorist 
organization,”  the  question  was  posed  and  the  answer  categorized  in  the 
following way:  
 
In [the] Survey, when the value trade-off is framed as the need to be safe and secure 
against judging people guilty by association – “people who belong to or associate with 
terrorist organizations should be considered a terrorist” – 71% support treating people as 
guilty based on their associations. (Davis & Silver, 2004, p. 32) 
 
Some  of  the  situations  in  the  middle  range  of  acceptance/non-acceptance,  in 
terms of what respondents preferred, were yielded by posing privacy destroying 
actions such as “Warrantless searches on suspicion” and “Monitor telephone and 
email.”  Even  in  the  initial  post-9/11  hysteria  and  fear,  most  people  voted  to 
protect civil liberties the majority of the time. Additionally, “Investigate protesters” 
received only 8% agreement for a security response, with 92% taking the civil 
liberties side. This is in line with Chomsky’s observation that both political parties 
are to the right of the populations they “serve” (Chomsky & Matta, 2008). 
 
Warrantless  searches  received  only  23%  approval,  and  monitoring  telephone 
and email received only 34% agreement in terms of the security responses. Thus 
it is evident via self-reporting that the societal norm in American’s minds is for a 
free society even in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack (Davis & Silver, 
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1.3.2. Conclusions from the Literature 
 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the literature involve the observation 
that  even  in  a  shell-shocked  state,  immediately  after  the  attacks  of  9/11,  the 
American public was only slightly in favor of giving up some of their civil liberties 
in return for security. In regards to anti-war protest groups, Americans did not 
favor suppressing political dissent. 
 
The inferences that can be drawn from the literature on the legal side of the 
question include that the normative cultural value of Americans regarding privacy 
was such that Americans favored having privacy, and wanted to keep what they 
thought they had of it. The events of 9/11 changed the focus of the discussion. 
The playing field for privacy rights tilted so much in favor of the government that it 
seems  to  have  become  difficult  for  scholars  and  privacy  advocates  to  decide 
about which privacy destroying initiatives to write because there were so many. 
  
Post-9/11,  the  standards  the  government  had  to  meet  and  the  requirements 
necessary for safeguarding civil rights changed overnight with the passage of the 
USA PATRIOT Act and the other acts complementing it. This changed the tone 
and direction of the privacy debate, by making privacy and civil rights advocates 
start  much  further  away  from  the  positions  they  could  reasonably  expect  to 
defend. The right to privacy had been built up over the years by degrees with 
court rulings establishing and expanding the right. Strict constitutionalists could 
reasonably  maintain  that  there  was  no  need  to  establish  the  right  to  privacy 
because the Constitution didn’t grant the federal government the power to decide 
if we should or should not have privacy. 
  
The main battlegrounds in the privacy war are battles over email seizure, email 
monitoring, Web surfing and location tracking and the associated profiling which 
the organization of all of the data about an individual would yield.     46 
 
Americans still want and value their privacy; however there are serious problems 
for those who care about personal privacy and liberty. This is brought about by 
the manner in which the government conducts surveillance. 
1.3.3.  Privacy and the Law 
 
The events of September 11, 2001, precipitated the passage of laws which have 
become  flashpoints  in  the  discussion  regarding  privacy.  These  laws  figure 
prominently in the literature regarding attitudes toward privacy as elucidated in 
various authors’ offerings on the subject. Americans’ attitudes toward privacy are 
important  due  in  part  to  the  shift  in  focus  on  the  part  of  intelligence  and  law 
enforcement agencies toward prevention of terrorism as a goal and away from 
apprehension  and  prosecution  of  terrorists  after  the  terrorist  act  has  been 
committed.  These  laws  are  the  tools  the  government  claims  as  necessary  to 
conduct the surveillance necessary to combat terrorism.  
 
The  primary  law  in  question  is  The  Uniting  and  Strengthening  America  by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT) Act of 2001. The Act was signed into law on October 26, 2001.(Report 
from the field, 2004) The Act has subsequently been renewed, with revisions and 
expansion of the government’s powers, as there were some sunset provisions in 
the Act as a protection for civil liberties. Those sunset provisions were nullified by 
the provisions of the Act as extended and expanded with the signing of HR 2417 
“Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004” (Bush, 2003) on December 
13,  2003,  HR  3199  “USA  PATRIOT  Improvement  and  Reauthorization  Act  of 
2005”  on  March  13,  2006,  and  S2271  “USA  PATRIOT  Act  Additional 
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006” on the same day ("Statement on HR 
199," 2006).  The earlier laws were precursors to the Real ID Act, which was 
signed into law on May 11, 2005. The laws signed after 2005, which increased     47 
 
the power of government, can all be considered to be cut from the same cloth, 
including the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, PL 110-261. 
 
Sections of these laws included budgetary provisions and increased penalties for 
various  terrorist  related  offenses.  Those  sections  are  not  germane  to  the 
discussion  here.  The  sections  of  the  laws  of  concern  in  this  literature  review 
relate to the expanded powers the government granted to its intelligence and law 
enforcement  agencies  in  the  government’s  surveillance  of  all  citizens  and 
individuals in general, within the confines of the United States. Many of these 
powers can be exercised with little or no oversight and many can be exercised 
without any judicial review.  
 
The lack of judicial review is a theme in literature regarding Fourth Amendment 
rights  and  the  traditional  ‘probable  cause’  theory  in  the  law.  The  Fourth 
Amendment  is  the  amendment  which  proscribes  “unreasonable  searches  and 
seizures.” 
 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. ("Bill of Rights," 1791) 
 
The full text of the Fourth Amendment is included here to demonstrate that as 
technology has evolved, the language of the Constitution must be interpreted 
according to the intent of those who framed the Constitution for this amendment 
to be relevant.  
 
Application of the USA PATRIOT Act also has Fifth Amendment (right against 
self-incrimination) ramifications. Additional fallout from the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT – this is an operational term used by the Bush Administration to describe 
operations  against  terrorism)  include  possible  Sixth  Amendment  (speedy  trial,     48 
 
right  to  confront  accuser)  and  Eighth  Amendment  (cruel  and  unusual 
punishment) issues.  
 
The use of these laws impinges on the First Amendment rights of individuals, 
which leads directly to the abridgement of rights that the Real ID Act represents. 
The Real ID Act was passed for the reason of providing a framework requiring 
verification of identity of U.S. persons and therefore providing security for society 
by that guarantee of identity of individuals carrying these Real IDs.  
 
What the use of Real IDs will mostly accomplish will be to establish a single point 
of identity for tracking citizens throughout their daily lives. Tracking citizens will 
become easier to do than it is currently, as the initial specification of the Real ID 
RFID mandates that citizens’ information is stored on the card in unencrypted 
form.  Additionally,  the  current  specification  and  implementation  of  “enhanced 
drivers’ licenses” (EDLs) requires no security features. In this way, anyone with 
an  RFID  reader  can  read  the  information  on  the  EDL.  DHS  has  previously 
dismissed security concerns about the EDL and Real ID security flaws as an 
academic exercise, and has stated the department will do nothing to enhance the 
security of the Real ID and EDLs. Recently however, a security researcher drove 
around downtown San Francisco streets harvesting EDLs and passport numbers 
using  $250  of  commercial  off  the  shelf  (COTS)  technology.  According  to  the 
researcher,  he  wanted  to  provide  a  proof-of-concept  demonstration  that  what 
researchers said could be done, could in actuality be done (Goodin, 2009). 
 
This lack of security of the information on the IDs may seem counterintuitive, yet 
the manner in which the Real IDs are set up to be implemented provides for plain 
text storage of data. The original specification was for RFID, and there is nothing 
to keep DHS from specifying the RFID implementation in the future. The current 
rules for implementation dictates a 2D bar code on the actual ID card, but there is 
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each state but interconnected as a distributed database, will maintain the basic 
identity information of each individual (Minimum standards, 2008).  
 
The inclusion of this background on the effect of Real ID should underscore the 
importance of the issue of privacy. This is because the right to privacy, although 
not  written  into  the  Constitution,  was  derived  from  reading  the  intent  of  the 
Constitution  by  various  Supreme  Courts  and  formed  the  basis  for  decisions 
rendered  based  on  those  readings.  Thus  the  rights  to  privacy  are  built  on 
fundamental rights of the people guaranteed in the Constitution. 
1.3.4. The Public Discourse and Societal Norms Regarding Privacy 
 
The largest shift in the nature of the public discourse regarding privacy occurred 
with an incident of international terrorism. The U.S. Governments stated the need 
to protect its citizens and itself from international and domestic terrorists. In the 
United States, the events of 9/11 were the catalyst for major changes in the way 
privacy was regarded and implemented ("USA PATRIOT Act," 2001). 
 
Prior to 9/11, there had been serious discussion within the computer profession 
regarding the manner in which individuals’ information should be handled by the 
government  and  commercial  entities.  Generally  industry  actors  would  act 
according to a rational choice (for corporate actors) model when it came to the 
collection and use of individuals’ information. The corporate actors would attempt 
to  maximize  the  profit  realized  from  collecting  and  brokering  the  personal 
information they collected, while doing the minimum possible to safeguard the 
information. Milberg (1995) examined the issues and concluded that corporate 
actors  would  do  well  to  protect  the  information  of  the  individuals  whose 
information they collected, lest citizen and consumer concern trigger some level 
of regulatory remedy. They also found an overriding consideration may have be 
work, that information privacy could be considered a “hypernorm,” transcending     50 
 
cultures  and  fundamental  element  in  human  existence  -  thereby  creating  an 
ethical  imperative  for  the  information’s  protection  (Milberg,  Burke,  Smith,  & 
Kallman, 1995, p. 73).  
 
Froomkin  (2000)  expresses  concern  over  how  little  control  individuals  can 
exercise over their information once it is in a database. Froomkin’s initial solution 
is for individuals to attempt to limit the amount of information they hand over to 
marketers  and  the  government.  Froomkin  discusses  the  “media-sanctioned 
exhibitionism and voyeurism” in society and observes that some might think it 
reactionary  to  worry  about  information  privacy  under  those  circumstances  (p. 
1466). 
 
One observation regards the categorization of privacy-destroying technologies, 
into technologies which “facilitate the acquisition of raw data and those that allow 
one to process and collate that data in interesting ways” (Froomkin, 2000, p. 
1468).  The  contention  and  the  argument  developed  regard  the  difference 
between data that might be collected for a single purpose and not parsed to 
associate  with  an  individual,  and  data  that  is  collected  for  aggregation  and 
association with specific individuals. The latter type of data, that which can be 
associated  with  an  individual,  can  provide  the  foundation  for  or  additional 
information to aid in the development of personal profiles. In the endgame of 
information  acquisition,  the  questions  of  prediction  and  predictive  abilities  are 
paramount. This is the case with the NSA’s “Advanced QUestioning Answering 
for  INTelligence,”  or  Aquaint  program  (Bamford,  2008).  Aquaint  is  the  most 
advanced and modern profiling and prediction tool possessed by the agency. 
NSA also has, especially for the warrantless wiretapping aspect of the operation, 
a slew of social network analysis, data mining and traffic analysis tools. All of 
these need information as input, but the tools aggregate and analyze the data 
(Bamford,  2008,  p.  149),  associating  it  with  specific  individuals  and  building 
profiles, in the manner that Froomkin described in his pre-9/11 work.     51 
 
Post  September  11,  policies  regarding  privacy  would  take  two  roads 
simultaneously. The first road involved the continuation of the public discussion 
regarding privacy in the sense that it had been conducted pre-9/11 in terms of 
local law enforcement and commercial interests. The second road involved the 
discussion of privacy in the context of anti-terrorism and national security.  
 
An example of the post-9/11 privacy concern, as well as the public (government)-
private surveillance partnership, is illustrated in the case of Lakehead University 
in Thunder Bay, Ontario. In this case, concerns over the PATRIOT Act and the 
powers of the U.S. government to harvest data off servers in the United States 
made faculty at the university wary of the use of Google’s products and services. 
 
Michael Pawlowski, vice president of administration and finance, defended the 
university’s decision to allow Google to build out a new email and collaborative 
tool system for the university, at no cost to Lakehead. The downside was that the 
system  could  not  be  used  to  transmit  any  private  data,  including  students’ 
grades. The PATRIOT Act gives the U.S. government the authority to “secretly 
view  data  held  by  U.S.  organizations.”  This  type  of  activity  is  contrary  to 
Canadian privacy laws, which requires individuals to be notified when their data 
is shared and also that organizations protect individuals’ data.  
 
Tom Puk, a former president of the faculty association at Lakehead, elaborated 
on the grievance that the faculty association filed with the university, saying, “By 
getting  this  free  from  Google,  they  gave  away  our  rights.”  Darren  Meister, 
associate  professor  of  information  systems  at  the  Richard  Ivey  School  of 
Business,  observing  the  disconnect  between  Canada’s  privacy  laws  and  the 
United States’ security measures, noted that in terms of Canadian organizations 
making the decision to allow their data to reside on U.S. servers, “You have to 
decide which law you are going to break.”     52 
 
As Mr. Puk observed, the PATRIOT Act allows the U.S. government to scan all 
the  information  held  on  the  servers  it  can  secretly  examine,  and  then  build 
profiles based on the writings found there. This could be a problem for academic 
freedom in Mr. Puk’s estimation, as individuals might be researching something 
that might end up getting them disqualified for entry into the U.S. (Avery, 2008). 
Various academics and researchers have been denied entry to the U.S. even as 
they  were  scheduled  to  give  presentations  at  conferences,  so  the  fear  is  not 
entirely groundless (Keizer, 2007).  
 
Google  maintains  that  it  makes  valiant  efforts  to  protect  customer  records, 
although  there  is  some  debate  on  that  point.  Specifically  its  policies  on 
anonymization of user data allow the data to be easily recovered in one step 
(Metz, 2008), and it is also providing the Center for Disease Control with data 
regarding  user  searches,  ostensibly  to  help  the  U.S.  government  locate  flu 
outbreaks (Helft, 2008).  
1.4. Government’s Assumption of Extraordinary Power 
 
In history in the United States, during times of war and national emergency the 
Congress  passed  laws  that  restricted  personal  liberty  for  national  security 
reasons.  Enforcement  of  these  laws  can  be  seen  as  abridgements  to  and 
restrictions of enumerated rights, including such First Amendment rights as the 
freedoms of speech, assembly and association. Wartime has also been used as 
the reason for using a conceptually different framework for deciding the manner 
in  which  crime  and  punishment  are  defined.  Thus,  in  World  War  II,  military 
tribunals  for  foreign  enemy  combatants  were  instantiated  and  upheld  by  the 
Supreme Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager (Posner, 2006, p. 57). The issues of 
crime and punishment in times of the abridgement of enumerated Constitutional 
rights  impinge  directly  on  privacy  in  terms  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  as  a 
protection  against  privacy-destroying  surveillance.  For  example,  during  World     53 
 
War I, the government encouraged citizens to report on their fellow citizens in 
cases  of  speech  or  action  that  might  be  interpreted  as  disloyalty  to  the 
government.  As  some  speech  was  illegal,  Fourth  Amendment  guarantees 
against  unreasonable  search  and  seizure  conflict  with  the  idea  that  speaking 
privately to another private individual (i.e., not law enforcement personnel) might 
result having that speech used as evidence against the speaker.  In cases of 
three or more individuals gathered, it would also impinge on the enumerated First 
Amendment right of freedom of assembly. 
1.4.1. Alien and Sedition Acts 
 
The  first  instance  of  legislating  restrictions  on  personal  freedom  because  of 
national emergency came in 1798, with the passage of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts. These consisted of the Naturalization Act, the Alien Friends Act, the Alien 
Enemies Act and the Sedition Act.  
 
Europe was in the throes of war, with the countries of France and England at war 
with each other. The United States was reluctant to join the conflict on either 
side, hoping to remain neutral. However, the French were seizing and sinking 
American  merchant  ships.  These  ships,  the  French  claimed,  were  thought  to 
have been conducting trade with Britain. The situation has been characterized as 
an undeclared naval war with France (Smelser, 1954). 
 
The Alien Friends act was enacted because of the fear that non-citizens (aliens) 
might  be  disloyal  and  therefore  these  aliens  represented  a  danger  to  the 
Republic. The Alien Act gave the President power to detain and deport any non-
citizen  who  was  considered  to  possibly  pose  a  danger  to  the  United  States 
("Alien Act of 1798," 1798).  
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The Sedition Act of 1798 prohibited the publication of “any false, scandalous, and 
malicious writing” against the government of the United States or the institutions 
of the Executive or legislature. Enforcement of this Act could be seen as a prima 
facie  abridgement  of  First  Amendment  freedoms.  The  Sedition  Act  was 
successfully  used  to  prosecute  any  individuals  who  dissented  and  stirred  up 
opinion against the Adams administration. The Act expired on Adams’ last day in 
office  and  Jefferson  pardoned  those  who  had  been  convicted  under  the  Act 
(Stone, 2003). 
1.4.2.  The Civil War – Habeas Corpus 
 
The  Civil  War,  being  a  time  of  war  and  national  emergency,  led  to  some 
abridgements  of  traditional  protections  under  the  law  in  the  name  of  national 
security. A notable example of this abridgement was the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus.  
 
President  Lincoln,  soon  after  taking  office  in  1861,  had  considered  and  then 
rejected the idea of preventing the Maryland state legislature from meeting on 
April 26th. There was a legitimate concern that Maryland would vote to secede 
from the Union, thereby isolating Washington, D.C. (Halbert, 1958).  
 
Soon  after  hostilities  started  with  the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter,  the  Sixth 
Massachusetts Volunteers were attacked by a mob of Confederate sympathizers 
as  they  marched  through  Baltimore  on  their  way  to  the  capital.  The 
Massachusetts militia arrived in Washington on the 19th of April. The attack by 
the  mob  and  the  subsequent  rioting  left  sixteen  dead  and  there  was  much 
damage to the city. The mayor of Baltimore then ordered the destruction of the 
bridges connecting Baltimore to the Union to prevent more Union troops from 
entering the city (Stone, 2003).  
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Under  these  circumstances,  President  Lincoln  was  still  reluctant  to  suspend 
habeas corpus, yet he understood that he must take steps to prevent Maryland 
from seceding. The President decided to wait and see what the state of Maryland 
would do.  
 
The President declared in orders to General Winfield Scott on April 25th, 1861, 
that if Maryland were to secede, General Scott should bombard their cities “if 
necessary,” and “in the extremest necessity,” suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
Even though many of the people of Maryland had secessionist sympathies, these 
orders proved to be prudent in that Maryland never seceded (Halbert, 1958). 
 
On April 27th, President Lincoln ordered the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus in an area along the line of the military front, drawn from Philadelphia and 
Washington, via Perryville, Annapolis City and Annapolis Junction. It was in this 
area that John Merryman operated (Halbert, 1958). 
 
John  Merryman  had  raised  a  company  of  soldiers  for  the  Confederates  and 
started drilling them. Merryman and these recruits were in possession of arms 
and Merryman was thus committing treason. On May 25, 1861, Merryman was 
arrested for “various acts of treason…” and held at Fort McHenry (Halbert, 1958). 
Merryman filed a writ of habeas corpus, and the petition was assigned to Chief 
Justice  Robert  Taney,  a  strict  constitutionalist  from  the  south,  who  ruled  in 
Merryman’s  favor,  i.e.,  ruling  that  only  Congress  had  the  authorization  to 
suspend habeas corpus, and therefore President Lincoln’s orders were illegal. In 
the end, the President ignored the Court. The New York Times attacked Justice 
Taney  for  making  an  “officious  and  improper”  decision  as  it  “presents  the 
ungracious spectacle” of the judge wishing to “exculpate a traitor” (Stone, 2003). 
 
President  Lincoln  explained  his  rationale  for  suspending  the  writ  by  stating 
famously that Judge Taney’s decision would allow “all the laws, but one, to go     56 
 
unexecuted, and the Government itself go to piece, lest that one be violated.” A 
few weeks later, the President suspended the writ in Florida. 
 
President  Lincoln  suspended  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus  on  eight  separate 
occasions,  including  the  most  extreme  suspension  order,  a  nationwide 
suspension  which  declared  that  “[A]ll  persons…guilty  of  any  disloyal 
practice…shall be subject to martial law.” In 1863, the Congress legislated the 
President’s actions into law. The Democratic press widely quoted William Seward 
when Seward told the British minister in Washington that, “I can touch a bell on 
my right hand and order the arrest of a citizen in Ohio. I can touch the bell again 
and order the imprisonment of a citizen of New York, and no power on earth but 
that  of  the  President  can  release  them.  Can  the  Queen  of  England,  in  her 
dominions, say as much” (Stone, 2003, p. 222)? 
 
After the war, the writ of habeas corpus was restored. 
1.4.3.  World War I – The Espionage and Sedition Acts 
 
In April 1917, the United States entered the war in Europe and public opinion 
was  divided  as  to  whether  the  United  States  should  participate  in  the  war  in 
Europe. Many citizens believed the motives behind the United States’ entry into 
the war were less than pure, and that the United States was going to war to 
protect  wealthy  individuals’  investments.  Nebraska  Senator  Frank  Norris  said, 
“[W]e are about to put a dollar sign upon the American flag.” President Wilson 
was not of the mind to allow this type of dissent. He declared that disloyalty “must 
be crushed out” and that disloyal individuals “had sacrificed their right to civil 
liberties” (Stone, 2003). 
 
The  Espionage  Act  of  1917  was  primarily  concerned  with  espionage  and 
sabotage.  Other  provisions  of  the  Act  had  consequences  for  free  speech.     57 
 
Specifically,  any  speech  of  the  nature  that  could  be  considered  to  obstruct 
recruiting or enlistment in the armed forces was restricted. Anti-war speech and 
dissent regarding governmental policy was therefore considered to be an attempt 
to  discourage  enlistment.  Attorney  General  Charles  Gregory  declared  in 
November 1917, referring to those who dissented regarding the war, “May God 
have mercy on them, for they need expect none from an outraged people and an 
avenging government.” (Stone, 2003, p. 223) 
 
Initially, as prosecutions under the Act were being ramped up, three important 
Espionage Act cases were prosecuted. These cases involved Charles Schenck 
in one case, Jacob Frohwerk in another and Eugene Debs in a third. The briefs 
were written and submitted by Alfred Bettman, special assistant to the Attorney 
General in charge of prosecution under the Espionage Act.  
 
Schenck  was  the  general  secretary  of  the  Philadelphia  Socialist  party  and 
published 15,000 anti-war leaflets. Some leaflets were mailed to men who were 
subsequently drafted. The pamphlets, among other things, urged the readers to 
“assert  and  support  your  rights”  by  upholding  “democracy.”  Justice  Oliver 
Wendell  Holmes,  after  reviewing  the  content  of  the  leaflet,  determined  that 
Schenck would not have printed and circulated the leaflet unless he had intended 
it to have the effect of causing men to resist the draft, and upheld the conviction. 
It was in this case that Holmes applied the “clear and present danger” test to 
speech (Johnson, 1958, p. 472).   
 
In  the  space  of  a  single  year,  Justice  Holmes  went  from  a  conservative 
interpretation of “clear and present danger” to a more libertarian interpretation. 
Thus in the early free speech opinions, he interpreted “clear and present danger” 
in the context of the common law crime of seditious libel, which turned on any 
utterance or printed word which criticized the “form, officers, conduct or policies 
of  the  government  if  such  criticism  could  be  construed”  as  painting  the     58 
 
government in a bad light or disturbing the peace (Ragan, 1971, p. 25). In these 
cases, the question of freedom of speech revolved around the question of “prior 
restraint,” the idea that the government could stop the printing or distribution of 
printed material, or the speech of an individual before the act, but that once the 
speech  act  had  occurred,  the  government,  as  willed  by  the  public,  could 
determine whether the speech was offensive to public sensibility and thus be 
punished. 
 
The test Justice Holmes was to employ in later cases involved a proximity test, 
which meant that some type of direct correlation between the speech and some 
type of incitement to criminal behavior needed to be shown. Much of the free 
speech debate from the end  of 1919 on revolved around  the  question  of  the 
nature  and  scope  of  First  Amendment  protections  and  what  utterances  were 
protected  speech  and  what  were  considered  subject  to  governmental  control 
during times of national crisis (Ragan, 1971, p. 40). 
 
Another  early  Espionage  Act  case  the  Supreme  Court  heard  was  that  of 
Frohwerk,  editor  of  the  Missouri  Staats  Zeitung.  He  was  charged  with  writing 
thirteen anti-war articles published between July and December 1917. The brief 
Bettman submitted argued that the “main tenor” of the articles was “that Germany 
committed no wrong against the United States; that this country entered into the 
war for the benefit of England and the rich men; that the official reasons for our 
entrance into the war, such as the benefit of democracy and wrongs committed 
against us by Germany, are mere pretenses” (Ragan, 1971, p. 32). Justice Oliver 
Wendell  Holmes  of  the  Supreme  Court  wrote  in  upholding  the  Frohwerk 
conviction that “it is impossible to say that it [the court record] might not have 
been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath 
would be enough to kindle a flame” of resistance (Ragan, 1971, p. 35).  
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In the Debs case, the conviction was based on a speech that Debs gave June 
16, 1918, in Canton, Ohio. Eugene Debs was well known, having received a 
million votes in his run as a Socialist for President in 1912 (Stone, 2003). In a 
speech Debs stated that wars were declared by the “master class” and fought by 
the “subject class”: “The master class has had all to gain and nothing to lose, 
while the subject class has had nothing to gain and all to lose – especially their 
lives” (Ragan, 1971, p.32). During the speech, Justice Department agents were 
able to gather evidence that men of draft age were present. The presence of 
those draft age individuals provided the basis for the government’s prosecution of 
Debs.  
 
In this decision, Justice Holmes determined that Debs’ intent could be inferred 
from the Socialist party’s St. Louis platform opposing the war. Noting that the jury 
had been instructed not to hate the speech but to determine if the speech was 
calculated  to  bring  resistance  to  the  draft  or  the  war  and  Justice  Holmes 
determined that the jury, in convicting Debs, had discharged its duty properly. 
 
The Espionage Act was used to prosecute people nobody had ever heard of. 
One  of  those  individuals  was  Mollie  Steimer,  a  Russian-Jewish  émigré  who 
handed out anti-war leaflets in Yiddish on New York’s East Side. This stifling of 
dissent for national security purposes may have been considered necessary for 
the security of the state at the time. 
 
Some judges who had been against the application of the Espionage Act, started 
to pen decisions that viewed free speech rights more liberally. This included such 
judges as Learned Hand in New York and Justice Holmes, as well as Judges 
Bourquin and Amidon (Stone, 2003).   
 
To remedy this situation, Congress passed the Sedition Act of 1918. This Act 
made  it  criminal,  among  other  things,  for  “any  person  to  utter,  print,  write,  or     60 
 
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language intended to cause 
contempt  or  scorn  for  the  form  of  government  of  the  United  States,  the 
Constitution,  or  the  flag,  or  to  utter  any  words  supporting  the  cause  of  any 
country at war with the United States or opposing the cause of the United States” 
(Stone, 2003, p. 227). 
 
After  the  war,  the  Russian  Revolution  was  determined  to  be  a  danger  to  the 
United  States,  and  Attorney  General  A.  Mitchell  Palmer  formed  the  General 
Intelligence  Division  (GID)  within  the  FBI  to  investigate  radicals  and  radical 
activities. The GID conducted raids in 33 cities, arresting more than 5,000 on 
suspicion of radicalism. Attorney General Palmer reported that the “alien filth” the 
GID had captured were individuals with “sly and crafty eyes… lopsided faces, 
sloping  brows  and  misshapen  features”  and  that  their  minds  were  filled  with 
“cupidity, cruelty… and crime.” Over 1,000 of these individuals were summarily 
deported (Stone, 2003, p. 228). 
 
Some  observers  after  the  war  tried  to  make  sense  of  freedom  of  speech  in 
wartime. Speaking of the First Amendment, one author wrote, “If the sinews of 
out political body cannot bear the strain of war, they fail of their fundamental 
purpose… If our creed is merely a peace-time panacea, it is wholly unfitted to 
exist. For the world is forever at war” (Garrett, 1919, pp. 72-73). 
 
In the end, the Red menace was defeated, and in 1920 Congress repealed the 
Sedition Act.  
1.4.4. World War II – The Smith Act and Japanese Detentions 
 
One and a half years before the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and 
the United States entry into World War II, on June 28, 1940, President Roosevelt 
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Alien Registration Act of 1940, or Smith Act, had several provisions, including 
making  it  illegal  to  advocate  overthrowing  the  U.S.  government  by  force  or 
violence, being a member of an organization which advocated such violence, or 
conspiring to do so. There were only a couple of prosecutions during World War 
II. The first involved 18 members of the Socialist Workers party in 1941, and the 
second, 28 pro-Nazi individuals in 1942. In the second trial, the judge died seven 
months into the trial and it was never revisited and therefore was dismissed for 
failure to prosecute (Johnson, 1958, p. 469). 
 
After the War, in 1949, 11 Communists were convicted under the Act in federal 
court in New York City of conspiracy to overthrow the government. The Supreme 
Court  sustained  the  convictions  of  Dennis  and  his  associates  in  1951,  and 
therefore  sustained  the  Act’s  validity.  This  decision  cleared  the  way  for 
prosecution of Communists. The government vigorously pursued Communists in 
order to safeguard the Homeland. By 1956, 131 persons had been indicted, and 
98 of those were convicted, 9 acquitted and 24 trials resulted in no verdict by the 
juries (Johnson, 1958). 
 
In  the  case  of  Dennis,  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the  Act  because  the  Act 
prohibited advocacy, not speech per se. So an academic discussion of Marxism 
was permitted, but to advocate action against the government was illegal. This 
finding was in line with the Court’s finding in the earlier case, Schenck v. United 
States. In Schenck, Justice Holmes in the majority decision affirmed that if the 
advocate’s  speech  presented  “a  clear  and  present  danger”  then  it  was 
actionable.  This  rule  was  then  modified  to  be  a  rule  of  “clear  and  probable” 
danger in Dennis, and under that legal theory, the rhetorical speech act of Dennis 
and his associates was actionable under the statute (Johnson, 1958). 
 
The Supreme Court in 1957 heard Yates v. United States, in which the Court 
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prosecution.  The  Court  decided  that  there  should  be  some  sufficiency  of 
evidence of anti-government speech before convicting an individual. The fact of 
Dennis  being  a  leader  of  the  Communist  Party  was  evidentially  sufficient  to 
convict back in the late 1940s. The new view of the 1950s Court was that being a 
leader  of  an  organization  dedicated  to  the  overthrow  of  the  United  States 
government  was  not  enough  to  convict  without  evidence  of  the  proscribed 
speech (Johnson, 1958). 
 
On  a  parallel  timeline,  on  February  19,  1942,  President  Roosevelt  signed 
Executive  Order  9066.  This  order  effectively  set  up  the  Japanese  internment 
camps.  Neither  the  words  Japanese  nor  Japanese-American  appeared  in  the 
order, yet the effect was that in 1942, 120,000 persons of Japanese descent 
were  resettled.  Two-thirds  of  these  were  American  citizens,  and  the  total 
represented 90% of the total of all Japanese-Americans. In Korematsu v. United 
States in 1944, the Supreme Court upheld the actions in interring the Japanese 
Americans  in  terms  of  national  security.  Justice  Hugo  Black  wrote  for  the 
majority, “Hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships” 
(Lofgren, 2005). 
 
The Japanese-Americans were released at the end of the war, and those who 
lived long enough received reparations payments from the government during 
the Reagan administration (Yoo, 1996, p. 684). 
1.4.5.  Cold War & Korea – McCarran-Walters and Communist Control 
 
During the Korean Conflict, the Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality 
Act  of  1952,  more  popularly  known  as  the  McCarran-Walters  Act.  This  Act 
reformed  the  immigration  laws  and  created  a  single  referential  law  for 
immigration  into  the  country.  The  Act  gave  the  Attorney  General  wide 
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broad authority in the matter of waiving restrictions on exclusion of aliens whom 
the Congress may have intended to exclude (Bennett, 1966).  
 
Additionally, there were provisions in the Act which allowed the government to 
strip citizens of their citizenship for various offenses (Graham, 2005). The Act 
had  provisions  for  denying  visas  and  expediting  the  deportation  of  resident 
aliens. Chief among these offenses was if in individual was a member of the 
Communist Party, or if the individual in any way helped enemies of the United 
States with money or other aid (Margolick, 1982).  
 
In 1954, Congress passed the Communist Control Act. This Act outlawed the 
Communist Party. Other measures were also put in place for the national security 
– including extensive loyalty programs and infiltration of subversive organizations 
(Goldstein, 2006; Marx, 1974). It was also during this time that the House Un-
American  Activities  Committee  investigated  various  individuals’  political 
affiliations (Carr, 1951). 
1.4.6.  The Vietnam War 
 
The Vietnam War era brought nothing new in terms of legislation to limit personal 
freedom. The state determined that the main dangers to the established order 
(the Establishment) at that time were the civil rights and anti-war movements. 
The groups were infiltrated and put under surveillance through undercover work.  
 
J. Edgar Hoover launched COINTELPRO in 1956, and the FBI operated against 
dissident groups – and encompassed operations against socialist, white hate, 
black  nationalist,  civil  rights,  antiwar  and  New  Left  groups.  These  operations 
were able to achieve their objectives until 1976, when the Senate moved to limit 
domestic security activities (Garrow, 1988).      64 
 
1.5. The PATRIOT Act 
 
September  11  precipitated  the  passage  of  the  Uniting  and  Strengthening 
America  by  Providing  Appropriate  Tools  Required  to  Intercept  and  Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001. The Act was signed into law on October 
26, 2001. There were some sunset provisions in the Act as a protection for civil 
liberties. The Act has subsequently been renewed, with revisions and expansion 
of the government’s powers. Many of the sunset provisions were nullified by the 
extension and expansion of provisions of the Act with the signing of HR 2417 
“Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004” (Bush, 2003) on December 
13,  2003,  HR  3199  “USA  PATRIOT  Improvement  and  Reauthorization  Act  of 
2005”  on  March  13,  2006,  and  S2271  “USA  PATRIOT  Act  Additional 
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006” on the same day ("Statement on HR 
199," 2006). (The reference is correct, on the White House Web site, the title was 
as it is printed here).  
The  PATRIOT  Act  grants  intelligence  agencies  the  ability  to  monitor 
communications, conduct searches of United States citizens’ residences without 
informing the target of the search, and gather any manner of information without 
any judicial oversight. This means that searches can be conducted without the 
issue of a warrant based on probable cause (Jordan, 2007). 
 
The vehicle of choice for seizure of all types of records is the issue of a National 
Security Letter (NSL). The NSL allows the FBI to go to a business and obtain any 
information for which the FBI asks. No judge is required for the issuance of a 
NSL. There are some guidelines. Additionally, in “emergency” situations, the FBI 
is allowed to seize information using an “exigent letter.” These exigent letters are 
also only to be issued after some type of procedure is followed (Jordan, 2007). 
 
An audit by the Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine uncovered 
irregularities  in  the  FBI’s  following  of  its  own  procedures  for  issuing  National     65 
 
Security Letters. The FBI underreported the number of letters issued by 22%, 
some  letters  were  used  for  improper  purposes,  exigent  letters  were  issued 
without proper authorization, and according to the FBI’s own count, at least 26 
instances of the issue of NSLs were in violation of the procedures the FBI itself 
enumerated (Jordan, 2007).  
 
The PATRIOT Act authorizes intelligence and domestic surveillance agencies to 
turn over the information gathered without probable cause to prosecutors. The 
prosecutors can then use the evidence in the prosecution of ordinary criminal 
cases.  The  custodians  of  the  records  who  surrendered  those  records  are 
prohibited from informing anyone (especially the target of what in the past would 
have  been  an  illegal  search)  that  they  surrendered  those  records  (Dunham, 
2005).  
 
The PATRIOT Act received a boost on December 13, 2003, with the signing into 
law  of  the  Intelligence  Authorization  Act  for  Fiscal  Year  2004.  As  Andrew 
Napolitano wrote on March 5, 2004, for the Wall Street Journal: 
 
This statute expands the term “financial institution” so as to include travel agencies and 
car  dealers,  casinos  and  hotels,  real  estate  and  insurance  agents  and  lawyers, 
newsstands and pawn brokers, and even the Post Office. (par. 4) 
 
When these powers are used against U.S. citizens in cases which do not involve 
national  security,  the  Constitution’s  Fourth  Amendment  guarantees  against 
unreasonable searches have been circumvented, in that no warrant is issued. No 
judge must determine if there is reasonable cause. In the past, a search required 
a search warrant specifying the place to be searched and the thing to be seized.  
 
To illustrate the scope of the powers the government was interested in granting 
to itself, one needs only look at the events of early 2003 in the quest to pass the 
next generation of surveillance law. 
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In  January  2003  the  Justice  Department  created  “The  Domestic  Security  and 
Enhancement Act” which was sent to Congressmen on the Hill, but not to the full 
Congress at the time. A Congressional staffer had leaked the document to the 
press.  When  asked  about  the  leaked  document,  a  Justice  Department 
spokesman, Mark Corallo, told the Village Voice that the legislation  would  be 
“filling in the holes” in the original USA PATRIOT Act, and would be “refining 
things that will enable us to do our job.” The circulation of the draft with proposals 
for over 100 new provisions was attributed to Attorney General John Ashcroft 
(Welch, 2003). 
 
The public debate and controversy which ensued resulted in some setbacks in 
expanding the powers of the USA PATRIOT Act. At the time, Attorney General 
Ashcroft “denied a bill was in the works, although he admitted that the leaked 
document is ‘what we’ve been thinking’” ("EFF Analysis," n.d.). 
 
One of the features the draft Domestic Security and Enhancement Act would 
have  indemnified  law  enforcement  and  intelligence  officials  from  being 
prosecuted for violating federal law when conducting these warrantless wiretaps 
or illegal searches as long as the officers were only following orders. Subsequent 
to the leak regarding the President’s authorization of warrantless wiretaps by the 
NSA  in  late  2001,  observers  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  draft  legislation 
leaked  in  2003  was  an  attempt  to  legalize  the  NSA  warrantless  wiretapping 
program (Welch, 2003).   
 
The Administration later claimed that the draft legislation leaked in January 2003 
was  not  the  legislation  that  the  Administration  wanted.  According  to  Justice 
Department  spokesperson  Tasia  Scolinos,  “These  proposals  were  drafted  by 
junior staffers and never formally presented to the attorney general or the White 
House. They were not drafted with the NSA program in mind”  (Eggen, 2006). 
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CHAPTER 2. FOUNDATIONAL THEORY OF SURVEILLANCE 
The  reason  given  for  the  types  of  surveillance  that  the  government  conducts 
against  American  citizens  involves  the  desire  to  avert  another  terrorist  attack 
such  as  9/11.  According  to  former  Attorney  General  John  Ashcroft,  President 
Bush told him, “Don’t ever let this happen again” (Solomon, 2006). 
 
The advocates of the total surveillance regime that the U.S. government is in the 
process of imposing on the population of the United States argue that there is a 
logically straight line from the destruction of personal privacy protections under 
the Constitution to the prevention of terrorism. Conversely, it can be stated that 
the  manner  in  which  terrorism  can  be  best  prevented  is  to  put  every  person 
under surveillance. The analogy is made by one of John Poindexter’s associates, 
Ted Senator: 
 
Our  task  is  akin  to  finding  dangerous  groups  of  needles  hidden  in  stacks  of  needle 
pieces. This is much harder than simply finding needles in a haystack: we have to search 
through  many  stacks,  not  just  one;  we  do  not  have  a  contrast  between  shiny,  hard 
needles and dull, fragile hay; we have many ways of putting the pieces together into 
individual needles and the needles into groups of needles; and we cannot tell if a needle 
or group is dangerous until it is at least partially assembled. So, in principle at least, we 
must track all the needle pieces all of the time and consider all possible combinations. 
(Bamford, 2008, p. 102) 
 
John Poindexter was the driving force behind Total Information Awareness (TIA), 
the program started under the aegis of the Department of Defense. Poindexter 
graduated at the top of his class at the Naval Academy, but was also the highest 
ranking official to be found guilty as a result of his role in the Iran-Contra scandal 
(Bamford, 2008). TIA was the method the government was going to use to track     68 
 
the needles and try to assemble all of the combinations that the needle pieces 
could make. 
 
Most  of  the  literature  which  advances  surveillance  as  a  solution  to  terrorism 
and/or defends the practice of surveillance advances (or defends) the thesis that 
increased surveillance decreases terrorism and or crime. This thesis is advanced 
without a foundational argument; the assertion is made as an article of faith. It is 
argued that surveillance as a preventive measure is a postulate that needs no 
explanation. Evidence is proffered for the practical effects of surveillance, (Report 
from  the  field,  2004),  and  other  statements  are  made  to  the  effect  that  the 
surveillance works, but the public cannot be told the manner in which it works 
(Levey, 2006) because to do so would compromise the effect of it working.  
 
The theory of surveillance as a tool to prevent terrorism appears to have two 
components. The first component involves finding and tracking known terrorists. 
Once  a  terrorist  is  found,  the  tracking  is  not  stopped  nor  the  terrorist 
apprehended. The next phase involves finding the wider web of relationships of 
which  the  terrorist  is  part.  The  web  of  investigation  grows,  and  the  people 
associated  with  the  initial  individual  being  investigated,  are  themselves 
investigated, and then their associates.  
 
Of course, there is the argument that, this being the case, bin Laden should have 
been  caught  by  now  (Devita-Raeburn,  2008).  Devita-Raeburn  examined 
Milgram’s  original  small  world  study  (Milgram,  1967).  Even  though  Devita-
Raeburn noted weaknesses in the statistical analysis of the study, the popular 
supposition that these connections are the case is ingrained in the culture. The 
explanation  she  arrived  at  involved  questions  of  socio-economic  status  and 
motivation,  in  that  the  chains  that  are  not  finished  due  to  some  connectivity 
failure, fail to complete because of a lack of motivation. Additionally, the original     69 
 
Milgram study used and targeted individuals in average to above-average socio-
economic classes which tended to have more connections among more strata. 
 
Milgram (1974) was famous for his study of obedience in which experimental 
subjects were tested to see at what point they would stop administering painful 
electric shocks to actors posing as experimental subjects. In a shocking reprise 
of  circumstances  thought  to  be  similar  to  those  that  Nazi  camp  guards  and 
soldiers  would  encounter,  almost  all  of  the  subjects  in  Milgram’s  famous 
experiment were to administer what they believed were fatal doses of electric 
current. It is useful to bear in mind that in the Milgram study, law-abiding citizens 
conducted themselves in unlawful ways based on the assurance that what they 
did was necessary. Thus, when members of the security apparatus in today’s 
society  are  asked  to  break  the  law,  such  as  in  the  case  of  warrantless 
wiretapping activities, or when issuing National Security Letters in violation of FBI 
guidelines  (Jordan,  2007),  for  the  “security  of  the  country,”  it  is  easy  to 
understand  that  they  are  well-intentioned  but  misinformed  and  misguided 
criminals. 
 
The second component involves monitoring individuals’ activities and using the 
results of this monitoring to predict whether the individual is going to commit a 
terrorist act. In the immediate circumstance, the individual’s behavior would be 
compared with the behavior of an individual who was going to commit a terrorist 
act. The baseline for prediction would be developed by monitoring everyone all 
the  time,  then  when  someone  commits  a  terrorist  act,  the  activities  of  that 
individual could be replayed up to the point of the launch of the attack. If the 
behavior  of  the  observed  individual  matches  the  behavior  of  those  who  have 
launched terrorist attacks in the past, prior to the launch of the attack, then the 
individual  exhibiting  that  behavior  could  be  prevented  from  committing  the 
terrorist  attack.  This  thinking  was  behind  the  other  purpose  of  the  Total 
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There are now only gross approximations of indicators that law enforcement and 
intelligence community members use to identify potential terrorists (leaving out 
the rhetorical question of who would not be a “potential terrorist”), and some of 
these  are  bad  for  journalists.  For  instance,  according  to  the  current  law 
enforcement manuals, the use of cameras and video equipment is considered a 
precursor to terrorism (Goodman, Rosa, German, & Clancy, 2008). 
 
It  is  instructive  to  understand  the  rationale  of  the  surveillance  advocates  and 
attempt to find the reasons behind society’s redefinition of the right of privacy. 
The  rhetoric  of  surveillance  proponents  is  a  good  place  to  start  and  can  be 
examined in the context of post 9/11 legal and policy initiatives, although there 
had been significant work in the surveillance arena prior to the attacks of 9/11. 
This rhetoric must be examined in the light of the terrorist threat which underpins 
the  reasons  that  citizens  seem  unconcerned  for  their  liberty  and  trust  the 
government to use the powers it has gained by circumventing the Constitution to 
society’s benefit. 
2.1. What is Terrorism? 
 
Various government agencies and recognized experts in the field of terrorism 
have constructed and apply differing definitions of the term “terrorism.” In popular 
discourse, unpopular individuals and causes are labeled terrorists (Pabst, 2006). 
The term as used in the press is amorphous and is commonly misapplied by the 
media and government interests (Pumphrey, 2003). Before September 11, 2001, 
however, there were attempts to define terrorism in ways in which scholars could 
agree.  
 
These  serious  attempts  in  the  field  of  terrorism  studies  to  define  the  term 
terrorism have led to various degrees of precision in defining the term. Badey 
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accepted definition of international terrorism” (p.90).  Badey refers to work by 
Alex P. Schmid, attempting to craft a definition of terrorism as a synthesis of 109 
definitions.  The  result  was  a  very  precise,  yet  very  verbose  definition.  Badey 
contrasts the Schmid definition with the 1983 definition contained in Title 22 of 
the  United  States  Code,  Section  2656(d),  which  is  shorter,  yet  more  general. 
Badey correctly notes that governments define terrorism in ways that allow them 
maximum  flexibility  in  characterizing  politically  significant  events  in  terms 
advantageous to the government describing them.  
 
Pragmatically, due to the multi-national nature of terrorism, it seems as if it would 
be  important  for  states  to  agree  on  the  definition  of  terrorism  in  order  to 
cooperate  in  the  suppression  of  terrorism,  although  states  are  generally  in 
agreement with what constitutes terrorism in times of peace. The definition has 
evolved  in  the  rubric  of  “customary  law”  over  time  (Cassese,  2006,  p.  933). 
However, in other circumstances, such as in terms of armed resistance to an 
occupation, there is less agreement. There is an element of one political or policy 
interest group’s “terrorist” as another’s “freedom fighter.” Under international law, 
there are distinctions between violations regarding civilian populations for states 
– such that states can rarely be held accountable for “state-sponsored terrorism” 
(Cassese, 2006).  The key is for the state to kill (or at least attack) an “enemy 
combatant” and keep the incidence of civilian deaths (collateral damage) from 
being  “disproportionate.”  The  big  disagreement  is  what  to  do  with  “freedom 
fighters” who are fighting to end an occupation, and what their culpability is in the 
case of civilian casualties. In almost every case, it is agreed that non-state actors 
killing civilians are guilty of terrorism, while killing civilians in an armed conflict 
could, in the worst case for the aggressor, raise the offense to only the status of 
“war crime” (Cassese, 2006, p. 946). 
 
Hoffman (1998) also looked at 109 definitions of terrorism and calculated the 
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political, emphasis on fear etc. Broad variations in frequency were found, with 
(only) 83.5% of the definitions including violence or force conceptually, to the 
idea of demands being made on third parties included in only four percent of the 
definitions  (Hoffman,  1998,  p.  40).  Thus  there  is  a  wide  variation  in  the 
intersection  of  definitional  elements,  allowing  for  rhetors  to  manipulate  the 
meaning of what is considered to be terrorism merely using the construction of 
the definition of terrorism. 
 
The term terror entered the lexicon originating from a description of state action 
during  the  French  Revolution.  The terrors were a tool of the state to enforce 
compliance and order during the period of turmoil following the uprisings of 1789, 
specifically the French government’s actions against their domestic enemies in 
1793 and 1794 (Tilly, 2004). Therefore, the use of the term terror in a political 
context in the modern day is well-divorced from the manner of use of the term 
from the time of the French Revolution. 
 
Terrorism,  according  to  the  United  States  Department  of  State  in  1983,  was 
explicitly  described  as  political  and  a  tool  used  by  non-state  actors  or 
“clandestine  agents.”  This  was  the  manner  in  which  modern  international 
terrorism was presented in the popular discourse prior to 9/11. Acts of terror in 
definitions  of  terrorism  are  designed  to  induce  fear  which  would  influence 
behavior. Many definitions are concerned with the repeatability of acts of terror, 
in that if an act in itself is an isolated act of terror which has no possibility of being 
repeated,  is  it  terrorism  under  the  definition?  (Badey,  1998)  In  the  popular 
discourse, the Oklahoma City bombing, even though it had no possibility of being 
repeatable (by the same perpetrator(s) or organization, as the government said 
there was no organization), is referred to as terrorism (Lewis, 2000). 
 
Historically,  modern  terror’s  origins  can  be  traced  to  the  Narodnaya  Volva 
(People’s  Will)  in  czarist  Russia.  The  group  was  founded  in  1878  with  the     73 
 
purpose of committing dramatic acts of violence to awaken the apathetic Russian 
people  and  rally  them  to  the  anti-czarist  cause.  There  was  a  successful 
assassination, that of Czar Alexander II in 1881.  
 
Operationally, the chain of events following the assassination led to anarchists 
and anti-government revolutionaries discovering the concept of organizing into 
small  “cells,”  or  groups  of  individuals.  This  organization  into  cells  served  the 
purposes of avoiding detection by police and minimizing the amount of damage 
to which discovery could lead if one of the members were to be discovered and 
confess their anti-government associations (Hoffman, 1998). 
 
Anarchists  were  responsible  for  several  political  assassinations,  including  the 
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. Despite their 
success  in  killing  heads  of  state  and  politically  important  personages,  those 
events did not have the effects desired by the revolutionists. Political life and 
power structures were not changed by these events.  
 
Anarchists were described as such during that time, although their actions could 
arguably fit into the definition of terrorism. Their actions were repeatable, in that 
they were attempting to build an international fellowship of anarchists. Their aim 
was to affect behavior, hoping to affect political change in all spheres of political 
and societal structure. Their actions were intended to affect the target group, in 
this case individuals in power, and there was a certain amount of fear that they 
hoped to inspire in the target groups (Hoffman, 1998). Thus, anarchists could be 
considered ideologically motivated terrorists. 
 
States  are  also  known  to  sponsor  terrorists  for  their  political  ends.  These 
terrorists  are  known  as  “state-sponsored  terrorists.”  These  terrorists  are 
considered to be even more dangerous than terrorists who must raise their own 
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they  would  not  otherwise  have  access.  The  danger  that  state-sponsored 
terrorists pose to their “constituents” is that state-sponsored terrorists also have 
latitude to conduct operations that they might not have contemplated were they 
not  sponsored;  operations  which  might  cause  collateral  damage  among  their 
perceived constituents, due to the disconnect between their funding sources and 
the actual population they are ostensibly representing (Jenkins, 1986). 
 
The destructive capability of terrorist groups at all times throughout history was 
limited by the capabilities of the weapons they could bring under their control. 
These  weapons,  by  definition,  were  the  most  deadly  weapons  for  which  the 
technology existed at the time. Prior to the advent of gunpowder, terrorists would 
have had to use knives and swords. With gunpowder, there was the ability to 
make bombs. Until the advent of weapons of mass destruction, the best terrorists 
could do was to use explosives. However, with the advent of chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons came the ability to cause damage on a much greater scale 
(Laqueur, 1999). 
 
These more powerful and more destructive weapons also require a will to use 
them. Laqueur (1999) describes the “New Terrorism,” which involves terrorists 
who have the will to use weapons of great destructive power. The motivations of 
these  terrorists  may  not  be  traditional  in  the  sense  that  they  are  not  working 
toward what would be considered politically achievable aims. The motivations 
that these terrorists possess are expected to be extreme, and possibly the most 
dangerous and extreme position is that of religious fanaticism. 
2.2. The Terrorist Threat 
 
The  United  States  government  asserts  that  the  reason  the  government  is 
compelled to conduct surveillance on its citizens is that the government must 
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necessary  to  discover  and  pre-empt  terrorists.  The  seminal  event  which  the 
government points to in generating consensus for its surveillance activities is the 
attack  by  “international  terrorists”  of  September  11,  2001  (Bloss,  2008). 
Terrorism studies scholars have attempted to rigorously define the meaning of 
the term “terrorism.” The term terrorism is used differently in popular discourse 
than the manner in which scholars use the term. This observation is included due 
to the fact that it is the popular definition which is used as the touchstone upon 
which policy decisions are made by the government and consensus is obtained 
for those decisions (Badey, 1998; “USA PATRIOT Act,” 2001). 
 
It is accepted as fact that 19 men, 15 individuals traceable to Saudi Arabia, two 
individuals  from  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  one  from  Egypt  and  one  from 
Lebanon were involved in the hijackings and subsequent crashing of airplanes 
into  the  World  Trade  Center  and  the  Pentagon  on  September  11,  2001 
(Johnston, 2003). These terrorists acted under orders of al Qaeda leader Osama 
bin  Laden,  whose  organization  took  credit  for  the  attacks.  Department  of 
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff refers to the attacks of 9/11 as a defining 
moment in U.S. history (Chertoff, 2006a).  
 
September of 2001 was not, however, the first time that the World Trade Center 
had been attacked by terrorists. A truck with a bomb in it had been driven into the 
parking garage in 1993 and detonated, leaving six dead and over 1,000 wounded 
("Significant  terrorist  incidents,"  2004).  Similarly,  according  to  the  State 
Department, the bombing in Oklahoma City, a single incident attributed to Terry 
Nichols  and  Timothy  McVeigh,  is  considered  terrorism  ("Significant  terrorist 
incidents,"  2004).  Although  the  Oklahoma  City  bombing  lacked  repeatability, 
which most scholarship considers to be a litmus test in the definition of terror 
(Badey,  1998;  Hoffman,  1998),  under  USA  PATRIOT  Act,  passed  in  October 
2001, the Oklahoma City bombing is definitely considered to be terrorism. Under     76 
 
many definitions of terrorism, a pattern of lighting churches on fire or bombing 
abortion clinics could be considered domestic terrorism.  
 
The  USA  PATRIOT  Act  in  Section  802  expanded  the  definition  of  domestic 
terrorism for criminal consideration to include ‘‘…activities that— (A) involve acts 
dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United 
States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
coercion;  or  (iii)  to  affect  the  conduct  of  a  government  by  mass  destruction, 
assassination,  or  kidnapping;  and  (C)  occur  primarily  within  the  territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States” ("USA PATRIOT Act," 2001). This would fit the 
Oklahoma  City  bombings  squarely  within  the  rubric  of  terrorism  if  it  was  not 
considered so under previous law. 
2.3. Pre-empting Terrorists 
 
There  are  several  components  to  the  art  or  science  of  preventing  terrorism. 
Identification  of  terrorists  would  be  the  first  issue.  Intuitively,  the  first  thought 
would be to identify and apprehend those who have committed terrorist acts in 
the past, and punish them.  
 
However, according to prevailing anti-terrorism theory, the operational construct 
involves observing and monitoring the terrorists to allow the known terrorists to 
lead  investigators  to  additional  unknown  terrorists.  The  theory  in  this  case 
involves the supposition that those who may have committed terrorist acts in the 
past would associate with those who would commit terrorist acts in the future with 
a higher probability and frequency than the average United States citizen. 
 
The 9/11 Commission investigated the sequence of events that led to the attacks 
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who  knew  what,  when.  The  9/11  report  indicates  that  the  government  had 
knowledge of the identities and whereabouts of key terrorists involved in the 9/11 
hijackings, and despite ample warning that these individuals were in the United 
States, did nothing to stop them (9/11 Commission, 2004). Additionally and after 
the fact, Bamford (2008), in interviews conducted at NSA, discovered that no 
9/11  Commission  members  interviewed  anyone  from  NSA  to  see  what  was 
known at that agency. It turns out that NSA knew the terrorists were interesting 
targets and was listening in on the 9/11 hijackers for months before the attacks. 
NSA passed the information to CIA and the information was then not forwarded 
to the FBI for investigation. In any event, it is accepted there were key failures in 
the handoff of information regarding these terrorists (9/11 Commission, 2004).  
This highlights a key problem in the growing surveillance society:  there is so 
much  information  potentially  and  actually  available  that  interagency 
communication and prioritization is nearly impossible.  In other words, security 
agencies suffer from information overload. 
 
Two of the hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazni and Khalid al-Mihdhar, were known to the 
U.S.  intelligence  community  for  their  involvement  with  the  1998  embassy 
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya. These bombings had been the work of al-
Qaeda, and these two were implicated. In January 2000, it was discovered that 
these two individuals were in attendance at a secret terrorist planning meeting in 
Kuala Lumpur. In March 2000, the CIA had been informed of the fact that al-
Hazmi flew to Los Angeles from Malaysia on United Airlines. The CIA failed to 
notify  any  agency  which  could  have  stopped  or  monitored  al-Hazmi.  Denying 
entry to the U.S., arrest or surveillance against al-Hazmi was possible under the 
laws as they existed at the time (Jonas & Harper, 2006). 
 
NSA director General Mike Hayden had been worried about getting the NSA in 
trouble  for  breaking  the  law,  as  the  agency  had  in  the  past.  Therefore,  the 
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communication,  did  not  divulge  information  gleaned  from  the  surveillance. 
General Hayden, in an excess of caution to avoid having NSA officials accused 
of breaking the law, as they had in the past, stopped monitoring all calls involving 
any person in the U.S., including calls of suspected terrorists (Bamford, 2008, p. 
27).  
 
However, before the meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the NSA had intercepted a call to 
Khalid al-Mindhar in late December 1999. This call was intercepted, terminating 
at a house in Yemen the intelligence community knew al-Qaeda was using as an 
operations center. It had been used in planning the operation against the U.S.S. 
Cole and identified as such in the investigation into the attack on the Cole. The 
NSA only picked up first names in the call indicating that the terrorists would be 
meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The failure by the NSA to look up the names Khalid 
and  Nawaf  was  the  first  of  many  oversights  committed  by  the  intelligence 
community. In the case of this first NSA misstep, it is reported that the NSA was 
deliberately  doing  as  little  as  possible  in  identifying  the  subjects  of  their 
investigation because of professional rivalries with the CIA (Bamford, 2008, p. 
17). 
 
If the goal of surveillance is as the government says it is, anti-terrorism and the 
identification of terrorists, this situation would be remedied with the new powers 
the government has granted itself. However, the logical conclusion is that the 
surveillance regime, as it was constituted before the current push for ubiquitous 
surveillance, if correctly applied, would have resulted in the apprehension of the 
individuals who posed a threat to the United States. The government had all the 
information  it  needed  to  prevent  the  attacks  of  9/11  with  the  intelligence 
apparatus it possessed at the time. The question, then, is what is to be gained by 
new incursions against individual privacy—certainly much stands to be lost.  
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Another component involves the idea that once these terrorists are identified, 
their associates could also be identified, on the theory that individuals with which 
the terrorists are in communication would be individuals who might pose a risk to 
the United States. In this case, terrorists would be identified, surveilled, and then 
their associates would be identified and surveilled.  
 
A corollary to this theory involves the placement of these individuals’ names on 
various lists. Some of the lists include the No-Fly List and the Terrorist Watch List 
(Goodman et al., 2008). The theory in this case holds that a terrorist might not 
know he/she has been identified as a terrorist, and would attempt to board a 
plane  or  enter  through  a  border  checkpoint,  use  a  real  name,  and  be 
apprehended.  Thus  far,  unfortunately  for  the  proponents  of  this  theory,  there 
have been no known instances of a terrorist being apprehended in this manner. 
There are many instances, however, of people who have been delayed in their 
attempts to fly. Some of these include Catherine Stevens, wife of Senator Ted 
Stevens (R-Alaska) and Senator Ted Kennedy (D-Massachusetts). In Catherine 
Stevens’ case, her name is similar to the name of a formerly popular rock and roll 
singer whose stage name was Cat Stevens but who now goes by the name of 
Yusuf Islam. Ted Kennedy has been repeatedly delayed because there is an 
Irish terrorist who goes by that name (Marek, 2007). The theory’s proponents 
hope  that  at  some  point  a  terrorist  will  fall  into  the  No-Fly  List  trap  that  the 
government has set. 
 
Alternatively,  the  government  might  actually  keep  the  list  as  a  mechanism  to 
scare terrorists away from airplanes. This would tend to keep them from being 
able to travel freely in the U.S., tripping tracking mechanisms when they show up 
at airports. This also assumes that with all of the new surveillance powers the 
government has that somehow the terrorists are lost in the shuffle until they show 
up at the airport, thus alerting the government as to their whereabouts. 
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The  most  overarching  view  of  terrorism,  its  prevention,  and  the  surveillance 
necessary to achieve this preventative stance can be found in the rhetoric of the 
government’s political appointees who are responsible for evangelizing for the 
need  for  total  surveillance.  Part  of  this  surveillance  involves  the  warrantless 
wiretapping  program  and  other  data  collection  efforts  by  the  NSA  (Gorman, 
2008). 
 
John Yoo has been responsible for some of the current thought on the manner in 
which terrorists can be preempted. In his explanation for the reasons that the 
President  has  the  authorization  to  order  surveillance  without  having  to  follow 
procedures that would normally have to be followed under FISA, the operational 
advantages of the surveillance are extolled. General Hayden, director of the NSA 
during  the  warrantless  wiretapping  program,  said  that  the  program  had  been 
successful  in  detecting  and  preventing  attacks  in  the  United  States.  Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzalez also stated that the programs had been effective (Yoo, 
2006, p. 104). 
 
According  to  current  U.S.  government  thinking,  the  most  dangerous  terrorist 
organization is al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was responsible for 9/11, the attack on the 
U.S.S. Cole, and bombings at two embassies in Africa, among other attacks. 
Therefore,  the  government  is  very  concerned  with  members  of  al  Qaeda’s 
movements and intentions. 
 
2.4. Religious Extremists and Their Effect on Geopolitics 
 
Al Qaeda is an organization of terrorists with the stated goal of attacking the 
West. These terrorists are motivated by religion as an ideology. The terrorists 
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to commit suicide in the course of their terrorism, which is what happened when 
the terrorists attacked on 9/11/2001 (Doran, 2002).  
 
On September 11, 2001, the terrorists hijacked four airplanes. United Airlines 
Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World Trade Center. American Flight 11 
crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. American Airlines Flight 
77 flew into the Pentagon. United Flight 93 did not make it to its intended target. 
The passengers, having been alerted to the other hijacking events, overpowered 
the  hijackers  and  the  plane  crashed  into  a  field  in  Pennsylvania.  It  was 
speculated that United 93 was heading toward the Capitol or the White House 
(9/11 commission, 2004).  
 
The latest official count of the people who died in the World Trade Center on 9/11 
is 2751. The total number of people who died in the attacks that day was 2975 
("Official 9/11 death toll," 2008), and the American public was horrified.  
 
Prior  to  the  attacks  of  September  11,  al-Qaeda  had  attacked  several  other 
Western targets with varying degrees of success. In August 1998, two American 
embassies were bombed simultaneously. At the embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, the 
bombing killed 12 Americans, 32 other United States employees, and over 200 
Kenyans. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, no Americans were killed, however 11 
individuals were killed and 85 injured (Crenshaw, 2001). In October 2000, the 
U.S.S.  Cole  was  attacked  by  a  boat  retrofitted  as  a  bomb,  17  American 
servicemen were killed, and 39 were injured (Abdul-Alim, 2000).  
 
Al Qaeda was a powerful terrorist network, capable of international terrorism on a 
scale that was of concern to the United States. After the embassy bombings, the 
United  States  retaliated  with  cruise  missile  strikes  against  al  Qaeda  training 
camps in Afghanistan, and a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Crenshaw, 2001). 
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Al-Qaeda has a pre-history which is often conveniently overlooked. This has to 
do  with  the  fact  that  starting  with  the  Carter  administration,  agencies  of  the 
United States government gave financial support and arms to the mujahedeen to 
fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Schneider & Schneider, 2002). 
 
There  is  some  disagreement  over  the  structure  of  al  Qaeda,  whether  it  is  a 
coherent international terror organization, or merely a loose, informal affiliation of 
like-minded terrorist operatives (Burke, 2004). Mr. Gunaratna in hearings before 
a United States Congressional committee stated that al Qaeda was organized 
according to a charter published in Al Jihad, a publication printed in Peshawar, 
Pakistan, in March 1988 (Terrorism, Al Qaeda, 2003). Mr. Gunaratna quotes the 
publication as claiming that “al Qaeda is the vanguard, ‘the pioneering vanguard 
of the Islamic movements.’” This vanguard, according to Mr. Gunaratna, would 
inspire other Islamic movements to also attack Western interests.  
 
This manifesto was attributed to Dr. Abdullah Azzam. Burke (2004) quotes Dr. 
Azzam  as  calling  in  1987  for  al-qaeda  al-sulbah,  “a  vanguard  of  the  strong.” 
These are identical quotations, but are interpreted differently by the two scholars. 
Burke makes the assertion that the term “al Qaeda” was coined after the 1998 
U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, in order that American laws could be 
applied to the perpetrators of those bombings. Burke explains that in 2004, Israeli 
intelligence services would refer to the Muslim extremists as “jihadi international” 
instead of “al Qaeda” for the reason that Israeli intelligence considered the jihadi 
movement  to  be  decentralized  and  not  to  have  coherent  leadership  (Burke, 
2004). 
 
The amorphous nature of the terminological and definitional semantics makes 
President Bush’s discussion of “al Qaeda in Iraq” either logical or disingenuous, 
depending on the viewpoint of the receiver of the rhetoric of identification.  
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Due to the fact that al Qaeda is a distributed organization, with semi-autonomous 
operational units, the order of priorities of the aims of al-Qaeda likewise is not 
necessarily coherent.  
 
Marc  Sageman  explained  to  Congress  that  bin  Laden  has  been  crucial  in 
operationally defining the direction and subject of the attacks of these affiliated 
groups. It was bin Laden’s fatwa in 1996 which changed the focus from the “near 
enemy” to the “far enemy.” This involves the concept of corrupted states. As an 
example, Muslim extremists had been at war with their own government in Egypt.  
The government of Egypt was considered to be jahiliyya. Jahiliyya refers to the 
barbaric state of ignorance which existed before the prophet’s revelations. Once 
the prophet imparted the knowledge contained in the Quran, Islamic states would 
need to, according to the Salafists, impose Sharia law to be a proper Muslim 
state (Terrorism, Al Qaeda, 2003). 
 
The 9/11 discussion had as its initial focus the terror network headed by Osama 
Bin Laden. Yet, it was with the help of the Taliban that bin Laden’s network was 
able to flourish and train (Terrorism, Al Qaeda, 2003). 
 
Mamoun Fandy, testifying before the same committee, made the observation that 
there were other Islamic terror groups which were coordinating with each other to 
carry  out  attacks  internationally.  The  attacks  occurred  over  a  wide  swath  of 
territories, with multiple countries of origin. 
 
In some scholarly efforts to try to understand the structure and characteristics of 
terrorist organizations, comparisons have been made between al Qaeda and the 
Sicilian mafia and pirates of the 17th century. Structurally and functionally, these 
organizations are similar, even if their motivations are not. For instance they:  
 
…have  some  attributes  in  common:  their  cellular  and  networked  structures  extending 
across national boundaries; their high levels of energy, fed by sentiments of revenge; 
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licit  and  illicit  commerce,  and  their  tendency  toward  extraordinary  violence  in  some 
historical  moments,  provoking  a  determined,  and  generally  publicly  supported, 
“crackdown.” (Schneider & Schneider, 2002, p. 776). 
 
This would then be a hook for the counter-terrorists to take a page out of the 
enforcement  efforts  used  against  the  mafia.  The  use  of  the  organizational 
structure against organizations such as these would entail the types of signals 
intelligence at which the United States is proficient, in the form of intercepted 
communications,  wiretaps  and  surveillance.  Additionally,  in  mafia  cases  there 
would always seem to have been an informant of some type, or some testimony 
on the inside. In the case of the al-Qaeda, there wouldn’t seem to be much need 
for testimony, just locational and organizational information as assassination is 
the preferred method of justice. 
 
Other scholarship involves an attempt to ascribe and understand some type of 
root cause for Islamic terrorism. One of the common themes has to do with the 
concerns  of  anti-globalist  sentiment.  Market  capitalism  has  transformed  the 
world. The organization of transactions based on market capitalism is that the 
transactions are based on contracts.  Economic historians have identified two 
main types of exchange, those based on markets and clientalist exchange. 
 
Markets  and  market  forces  are  well  known  to  Westerners,  as  that  is  the 
economic system to which the United States and the global trading community 
adhere. Clientalist structures are mostly recognized as tribal or clan-centric. The 
members of the community are clients of the tribal leader or head of the clan. 
These structures manifest themselves as kingdoms or caliphates at the nation-
state  level  of  organization,  and  thus  are  thought  by  Western  standards  to  be 
almost medieval or feudal in nature. 
 
There is a difference in organization of the communities based on these types of 
systems,  wherein  clientalist  communities  are  hierarchically  organized.  All 
societies  have  some  combination  of  market  and  clientalistic  characteristics,     85 
 
however the liberal democracies have advanced market-based economies, and 
few states have predominantly clientalist economies, so this fact might be a key 
difference in the cultural differences which might lead to the feelings of ill-will.  
 
As  Mousseau  (2002)/2003)  notes,  the  in-groups  in  clientalist  societies  with 
mineral wealth can spread that wealth around to maintain and gain more loyalty 
and to keep power. For societies without mineral wealth, underdevelopment and 
economic displacement results in increasing the social and civil ills. The market 
economy  appears  to  be  a  Western  or  American  invention  and  therefore  the 
resentment inherent in the society at the economic and social ills is projected on 
the Western market system and the West in general (Mousseau, 2002/2003, p. 
17). 
 
The  United  States  government  is  focused  on  the  language  of  war  in  the 
discussion of the “Global War on Terror.” From a counter-terrorism perspective it 
is this rhetoric of war and concern for operational security which makes U.S. 
intelligence services obsessed with signals intelligence. 
2.5. Technologies of Surveillance 
 
The type and amount of surveillance an individual may be subject to on a daily 
basis varies depending on the types of activities in which the individual engages. 
The presence of technologies of surveillance, insofar as these technologies are 
used in daily life, has been introduced previously. These technologies include 
Internet and email surveillance, telephone and cell phone surveillance, and the 
surveillance engendered by optical monitoring of public spaces. These types of 
monitoring and surveillance are relatively mundane and need little explanation. 
 
Additionally,  the  technologies  can  be  divided  into  content-based  and  location-
based monitoring. That is, the Internet and phones (used only as phones and not     86 
 
as a locational beacon) are of little use for monitoring an individual without the 
content which is transmitted across the network. If someone is moving around 
and not talking on the phone or using the Internet, how would those conducting 
the surveillance know where the individual might be? 
 
The technology of location is demonstrated by the location-assisting technology 
in  cell  phones  and  the  monitoring  that  cameras  provide.  These  technologies 
present slight problems in the ease of tracking. Not everyone has a cell phone. 
For  those  who  do,  even  though  cell  phone  tracking  takes  a  fair  amount  of 
processing power for triangulation, the exercise of tracking that individual, and all 
individuals with cell phones, is trivial. As of 2006, those who do have cell phones 
generally  keep  their  cell  phones  on  or  about  their  persons  ("The  cell  phone 
challenge," 2006), so tracking them using these beacons is a simple matter.  
 
For good results in tracking individuals, those doing the tracking need some type 
of mechanism such that every individual has some type of beacon. Ubiquitous 
RFID tracking fulfills that need. Anything can be tagged and tracked, even by a 
home user (Cangeloso, 2008). 
 
The most unobtrusive tracking technology, and easiest to use for tracking any 
manner of object, is the RFID tag. Advances in technology have produced RFID 
tags which can be as small as a grain of sand, and therefore can be embedded 
in almost any item. The component which renders the discovery of RFID tags 
unobtrusive is the fact that there is no way for the average individual to know that 
a reader was scanning all of the RFID tags embedded in the items they were 
wearing or carrying (Fishkin, Jiang, Philipose, & Roy, 2004). 
 
Proponents of RFID espouse a vision of the future in which every discrete item is 
tagged. Every aspirin bottle, every shoe, every tire, every car, every belt and 
every  pair  of  jeans  would  have  an  RFID  chip  embedded.  Every  pair  of     87 
 
eyeglasses, purse, backpack, book, pen, pencil, pencil sharpener, package of 
gum  or  breath  mints;  all  of  these  would  be  tagged.  In  this  future,  when  an 
individual walks into a retail establishment, the readers at the doorway would 
enable the sales staff to know every item that is in an individual’s wallet, every 
item  they  were  wearing  and  every  item  they  were  carrying.  With  proper  data 
integration, the salesman at the clothes store could tell the customer that his 
socks were bought several years ago and would the customer like some socks 
with their purchase ("RFID, a vision," 2007). 
 
Under  the  provisions  of  law  regarding  data  collection  and  sharing,  every 
encounter with the reader could be written to a national security database and 
not be illegal under the privacy laws as they stand now. No change to the law 
would  be  required  in  this  eventuality.  This  would  allow  the  trail  of  a  person 
shopping at the mall, for instance, to be followed, in real time if necessary. In this 
way,  the  government  would  be  able  to  track  every  person,  and  know,  for 
instance, if a person stopped into a book store, did or did not buy something and 
then went to the military surplus store. The few minutes spent looking at the 
latest  gadgets  at  Radio  Shack  would  be  noted,  as  well  as  the  stop  at  the 
information kiosk asking for directions to a certain other store.  
 
With  advancements  in  the  technology,  there  could  be  readers  at  multiple 
locations in stores. These arrays of multiple readers would allow those who were 
watching  to  know  near  which  products  the  consumer  stopped  or  loitered. 
According  to  experiments  which  were  conducted  by  IBM  in  Germany,  the 
watchers  would  know  what  products  were  more  interesting  to  consumers,  by 
combining  the  RFID  tracking  with  feeds  from  CCTVs  ("German  consumers," 
2004). The idea is to determine the time a consumer spends looking at some 
item by combining the feed from the RFID readers with some other surveillance 
technologies to help the retailers ("METRO Group," 2003). 
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 Sometimes,  the  surveillance  works  but  is  not  effectively  coordinated  with  the 
agencies that need to receive and act on the information. An example of this 
might be when the United States Agency for International Development gives 
U.S. taxpayer money to individuals and groups tied to terrorists. For instance, 
USAID gave $1 million to an individual who lied to federal agents about his ties to 
a disciple of bin Laden, and $180,000 to a Bosnian group whose president is on 
a watch list and is barred from entering the United States (Tankersley, 2007). 
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CHAPTER 3. TOTAL SURVEILLANCE FOR SECURITY - ASSUMPTIONS 
3.1. Counter-Terrorism 
 
The  reason  given  to  the  American  people  for  the  imposition  of  dramatic  new 
surveillance measures and the limitation of individuals’ rights under the law was 
the need to fight terrorism. The fundamental assumption is that there is not just a 
way to discover known and active terrorists through surveillance, but also a way 
to predict who might become a terrorist and how or when terrorist acts might be 
committed. 
 
There are two components inherent in the problem of counter-terrorism. The first 
is to identify terrorists. The second is the question of what to do with the terrorists 
once they’ve been identified. 
 
The  problem  of  identifying  terrorists  can  itself  be  broken  down  into  two 
components.  The  first  component  is  the  identification  of  those  who  have 
committed terrorist acts in the past. It can further be assumed that those who 
have committed terrorist acts in the past would be plotting to commit terrorist acts 
in  the  future.  The  second  component  has  to  do  with  attempting  to  identify 
terrorists before they become terrorists. This is the predictive aspect of the policy 
of prevention of terrorism.  
 
The  1978  Foreign  Intelligence  and  Surveillance  Act  specified  the  manner  in 
which  eavesdropping  warrants  were  to  be  obtained  for  the  purposes  of 
conducting  surveillance  against  suspected  agents  of  foreign  powers  and 
suspected  terrorists.  In  the  aftermath  of  9/11,  members  of  the  Bush     90 
 
administration claimed that FISA hamstrung the ability of law enforcement and 
intelligence services to conduct surveillance. The reason for the surveillance the 
government wanted to conduct was for the purpose of “preventing” terrorism. 
Preventing terrorism became a top priority of the administration, and five years 
after  9/11,  the  Executive  Branch  published  the  updated  National  Strategy  for 
Combating Terrorism. The original national strategy document was published in 
February 2003. This document outlines the steps that the U.S. government would 
take to combat terrorism (National strategy, 2006).  
 
The White House has published more over-arching guidelines which integrate 
and discuss the strategies in the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel, 
National Strategy for Maritime Travel, and National Strategy for Aviation Security. 
The  elements  of  the  strategies  that  insinuate  themselves  into  a  discussion  of 
privacy  and  surveillance  have  to  do  with  the  identity  intiatives,  and  law 
enforcement and intelligence gathering initiatives.  
 
In  the  rhetoric  surrounding  the  White  House  initiative  to  prevent  and  disrupt 
terrorist attacks, the Executive Branch states that the U.S. “law enforcement and 
intelligence  communities  must  have  detailed  knowledge  of  our  Homeland 
adversaries, including their identities, sources of support, intentions, capabilities 
and modi operandi” ("Prevent and disrupt," 2007, par. 11). After discussion of 
collaboration  without  specifying  collaboration  between  which  entities,  further 
explanation leads to a desire to promote the “implementation of Intelligence-Led 
Policing  by  State,  local,  and  Tribal  law  enforcement  –  after  all,  they  best 
understand their communities, citizens, and current trend lines”  ("Prevent and 
disrupt," 2007, par. 12).  
 
Another strategy for counter-terrorist purposes has to do with tracking money as 
it  moves  around  internationally.  The  United  States  has  been  successful  in 
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moneys  and  international  banking  transactions  in  cases  in  which  the 
organizations host information in the U.S. 
 
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transactions (SWIFT) was one 
such entity. However, the payments processing body announced that it would 
stop processing European banking transactions in the U.S. in 2009 after criticism 
from E.U. data protection officials. SWIFT officials said they had to turn over data 
on European citizens’ banking transfers because the data was stored in the U.S. 
In 2009, E.U.-U.S. transactions would still be hosted in the U.S., and therefore 
subject  to  counter-terrorist  surveillance,  but  a  new  processing  center  in 
Switzerland would handle intra-European payment processing ("SWIFT to stop," 
2007). 
 
Another strategy that counter-terrorism experts promote is the idea of predictive 
data  mining,  much  as  the  example  of  the  partially  assembled  needles.  This 
another example of a strategy that is given and taken on faith, as the problem 
with predicting terrorism is it is a problem with indeterminate boundaries in which 
data  analysts  have  little  experience.  Even  in  commercial  applications,  data 
mining produces an unacceptable percentage of false positives. The example 
given by Jonas and Harper (2006) is what life would be like if a false positive rate 
of 1% or even 0.1% were realized (1% and 0.1% are orders of magnitude smaller 
than  real  percentages  of  false  positives  from  commercial  data  mining).  In  a 
population  of  300,000,000,  the  FBI  would  have  to  investigate  3,000,000  or 
300,000 individuals (Jonas & Harper, 2006, p. 8).  
3.2. Putting the Local Populace Under Surveillance 
 
This  line  of  reasoning  leads  to  the  recommendation  that:  “the  Federal 
Government  will  recommend  priorities  for  State,  local  and  Tribal  homeland 
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formal  intelligence  process  with  requirements  generation  and  tasking  of 
information collection, and analyze and disseminate the information” ("Prevent 
and  disrupt,"  2007,  p.  par.  12).  In  line  with  this  statement  of  philosophy,  the 
Federal  Government  will  direct  state  and  local  law  enforcement  in  their 
intelligence collection efforts throughout the Homeland. 
 
There is a critical issue that needs to be addressed in the domestic intelligence 
community, and that is the criteria used in the development of tasks for local law 
enforcement  in  terms  of  intelligence  gathering.  How  will  information  be 
developed?  What  information  will  trigger  an  investigation?  The  current  set  of 
guiding principles can be discerned from the following:  
 
In  order  to  uncover  terrorists  and  terrorist  activity  against  the  backdrop  of  our  highly 
mobile, dynamic, and diverse society, we must attain domain awareness of the actions, 
events,  and  trends  that  occur  throughout  our  land,  maritime,  air,  space  and  cyber 
domains.  This  is  a  multi-faceted  process.  First,  partners  throughout  the  entire  law 
enforcement community must continue to enhance their baseline understanding of their 
operating environments – the people, the geography, and the daily and weekly rhythm of 
activities and events. By understanding trend lines, we can better identify anomalies and 
deviations that could indicate terrorist activity. ("Prevent and disrupt," 2007, p. par. 11) 
 
The people they are referencing in the document are United States citizens. The 
“anomalies and deviations” could be such actions as political protest or groups 
meeting to discuss how to effect policy change, i.e., legitimate political dissent, 
as the following example illustrates. 
 
“Undercover Maryland State Police officers repeatedly spied on peace activists 
and  anti-death  penalty  groups…”  (Madigan,  2008,  par.  1).  43  pages  of 
documents, much of it redacted, obtained by the ACLU describing the infiltration 
of non-violent groups whose aim was to effect policy change of their government, 
even though there was no evidence of criminal or potentially criminal acts. The 
Maryland State Police conducted surveillance, so far as was discovered, for at 
least 288 hours over 14 months in 2005 and 2006. 
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One individual who had drawn government scrutiny was Max Obuszewski. His 
name  is  currently  in  the  Washington/Baltimore  High  Intensity  Drug  Trafficking 
Area database.  
 
David Rocah, an ACLU attorney, said, “Everything in these logs is a lawful First 
Amendment Activity. For undercover police officers to spend hundreds of hours 
entering  information  about  lawful  political  protest  activities  into  a  criminal 
database is an unconscionable waste of taxpayer dollars and does nothing to 
make is safer from actual terrorists or drug dealers…(Madigan, 2008, par. 6). Mr. 
Obuszewski has devoted his entire life to peace. If there is anyone in the world 
who is further from a terrorist it is hard for me to imagine” (Madigan, 2008, par. 
18).  
 
An ACLU policy counsel, Michael German, who is a former FBI agent and who at 
the FBI was an expert in counter-terrorism, said, “It serves no security purpose to 
infiltrate  peaceful  groups.  It  completely  misuses  law  enforcement  resources” 
(Madigan, 2008, par. 22). Mr. German said that the government has “actively 
encouraged” local police to gather intelligence and compile information that has 
no apparent connection to crime. 
 
Mr. Obuszewski seemed puzzled as to the infiltration, explaining that the groups 
to which he belongs have open meetings and the schedules are publicized. “Why 
would someone come to those meetings and pretend to be someone else? Why 
are  government  agencies  targeting  pacifists?”  he  asked  (Madigan,  2008,  par. 
19). 
 
The answer might lie in details of Pentagon surveillance of anti-war groups. NBC 
News  reported  that  the  Department  of  Defense  was  collecting  information  on 
anti-war  protest  groups  as  “potential  terrorist  threats”  (Myers,  Pasternak,  & 
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The names of the people who participated in meetings were shared with at least 
seven databases, including the NSA, police departments of Baltimore, Baltimore 
County, Annapolis and Anne Arundel County, and the state General Services 
police. The information shared with these agencies and departments were such 
“terrorist-related”  activities  as  setting  up  a  meeting  with  then-Representative 
Benjamin Cardin in 2005 to ask him to support a timetable for withdrawal in Iraq. 
Other information that is stored on these individuals includes, according to Susan 
Goering,  executive  director  of  the  ACLU  of  Maryland  in  a  letter  to  Governor 
Martin O’Malley, “…extensive information about specific individuals and groups, 
including describing their political outlook, and whether they were articulate, [and] 
what political activities they are engaged in…” (Madigan, 2008, par. 27) 
 
The  information  was  developed  as  a  result  of  the  state  police’s  Homeland 
Security and Intelligence Division infiltrating the Baltimore Pledge of Resistance, 
a peace group, the Committee to Save Vernon Evans, who sits on death row, 
and the Baltimore Coalition Against the Death Penalty. The fact that the state 
police has a Homeland Security and Intelligence Division and is infiltrating protest 
groups is evidence of the seriousness with which local and state law enforcement 
are taking their domestic intelligence imperatives. 
 
The state police maintain that they did nothing illegal and they did not curtail 
protesters’  freedoms.  Colonel  Terrence  B.  Sheridan,  superintendent  of  the 
Maryland State Police, went on to say, “Only when information regarding criminal 
activity is alleged will police continue to investigate leads to ensure the public 
safety” (Madigan, 2008, par. 9).  
 
The  endgame  in  this  type  of  surveillance  is  already  appearing  in  the  open 
elsewhere  in  the  industrialized  world.  The  United  States  government,  as  just 
illustrated,  was  maintaining  a  database  similar  to  a  database  in  France 
maintained  by  its  Defense  Department  equivalent.  The  database’s  name  is     95 
 
Edvige. The charge of those in France setting up and administering the database 
is to store data on anyone aged 13 or older who is “likely to breach the public 
order” (Bremmer, 2008, par. 3). The types of individuals whose information is 
stored in Edvige includes anyone active in politics or trade unions, as well as 
those with significant roles in business, the media or entertainment, or social or 
religious institutions.  
 
Herve  Morin,  the  French  Defense  Minister,  publicly  breaking  with  government 
policy, questioned the usefulness and role of the database, asking, “Is it useful to 
gather data such as telephone numbers, sexual orientation and details of taxes 
and assets and so on without knowing exactly what is the point” (Bremmer, 2008, 
par. 6)? 
 
This  illustrates  the  manner  in  which  governments  all  over  the  world  are 
attempting to equate “breaching the public order” with terrorism. This is the same 
manner in which the United States Criminal Code is currently constructed, as 
illustrated earlier, in which civil disobedience, which by definition breaches the 
public order, is equated with “domestic terrorism.” This definition of terrorism may 
not be the definition with which a civil rights activist in the United States would 
agree. 
 
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2006) describes the endpoint in 
the war on terrorism in the following terms:  
 
In the War on Terror, there is also a need for all elements of our Nation – from Federal, 
State and local governments to the private sector to local communities and individual 
citizens – to help create and share responsibilities in a Culture of Preparedness. This 
Culture of Preparedness, which applies to all catastrophes and all hazards, natural or 
man-made, rests on four principles: a shared acknowledgement of the certainty of future 
catastrophes  and  that  creating  a  prepared  Nation  will  be  a  continuing  challenge,  the 
importance of initiative and accountability at all levels of society; the role of citizen and 
community  preparedness;  and  finally,  the  roles  of  each  level  of  government  and  the 
private  sector  in  creating  a  prepared  Nation.  Built  upon  a  foundation  of  partnerships, 
common goals and shared responsibility, the creation of a Culture of Preparedness will 
be among out most profound and enduring transformations in the broader effort to protect 
and defend the Homeland. (p. 21)     96 
 
One  of  the  problems  that  counter-terrorism  operatives  face  is  the  problem  of 
individuals who may be terrorists but have not been identified as such. “New 
recruits, particularly those without criminal records or who are not known to law 
enforcement, can travel with relative ease from country to country and from city 
to city with little notice” (Heyman & Carafano, 2008, p. 14). Theoretically, the new 
powers  the  government  has  granted  itself  will  give  the  counter-terrorists  the 
ability to identify these terrorists who might not have been identified as terrorists 
without the new powers. 
 
It is not apparent that there is any assumption that the “Global War on Terror” will 
ever end. In the literature of those who would defend the taking of powers from 
the people, there is an assumption that the government will return those powers 
to the people when the crisis has passed. In the history of the United States in 
which extraordinary powers have been assumed during times of war and national 
emergency, some of the rights taken from the people were returned, and some of 
the  additional,  extraordinary  powers  assumed  by  the  government  were 
relinquished at the end of the conflict. Even in the case of the Sedition Act of 
1918, the law was repealed, although it was passed again (after World War I was 
over) and remains in effect to this day. What is important to note, however, is the 
observation that “Unfortunately, history has shown that it is exponentially harder 
to wrench power away from the government than it is to give it power in the first 
place” (Branum, 2001). 
 
This particular war may be slightly different, in that there may be no relaxation of 
the surveillance regime as President Bush declared the war on terror to be “a 
task that does not end” (Bush, 2001). The sentiment that the war on terror will 
never end has been echoed by other members of the Bush administration at 
various times. President Bush’s first national security advisor, in a speech at a 
U.S. Institute of Peace Conference, compared the war on terror to the war on 
crime. His sense was that the United States could only win against terrorists "in     97 
 
the sense that we can win the war on crime. We can break its back so that it is a 
horrible nuisance and not a paralyzing influence on our societies" (Scowcroft, 
2002).  The  Secretary  of  Defense  at  the  time  of  the  9/11  attacks,  Donald 
Rumsfeld, in response to a question of what the endpoint of the war on terror 
would look like, said, “I think trying to stamp [terrorism] out in every single locale 
all across the globe in perpetuity sounds like a pretty big task to me” (Rumsfeld, 
2001).  
 
Some  surveillance  activities  are  decidedly  low-tech,  and  local  police  are  also 
emboldened by the knowledge that federal laws permit all manner of information 
gathering in the context of terrorism investigations. In some cases, local police, 
even if not specifically tasked with gathering information by a federal intelligence 
agency, attempt to use the federal laws as cover for gathering information not 
normally available to local police under traditional rules of police investigations. 
Michele Reutty, a librarian, relates the story of the police attempting to access 
library records to identify a patron by the book the patron was carrying, who was 
under investigation for saying something inappropriate to a girl in front of the 
library.  
 
As the police repeatedly asked for the information on who had checked out which 
book,  Ms.  Reutty  asked  that  they  follow  proper  legal  procedure  and  get  the 
proper  subpoenas.  As  the  police  tried  and  failed  to  follow  legal  procedures, 
pressure was brought to bear on the librarian. She was threatened with the loss 
of her job. At a board meeting the powers that be were upset that the story had 
gotten national attention and that the borough clerk and the police department 
were getting calls supporting Ms. Reutty’s position that the police get the proper 
subpoena before she would turn the information over to them. In this particular 
instance, the incident catapulted her into a new job and provided the impetus for 
libraries throughout New Jersey to develop a policy for librarians to follow when 
the police arrive with requests for patron records (Reutty, 2007).      98 
 
Knowledge of terrorists’ and potential terrorists’ movements is of use to counter-
terrorists and law enforcement, and this type of surveillance is best accomplished 
with  a  regime  in  which  individuals  can  be  identified  and  tracked  with  some 
degree of accuracy. The 9/11 Commission recommended that driver’s licenses 
should be more reliable as indicators of individuals’ identities (9/11 commission, 
2004). 
 
A good link between the identity the individual has on file with the government 
and the items which are chipped, i.e., have RFID embedded, provides a useful 
way to track those individuals. Tracking is easier if one of the chipped items is a 
government issued ID card. An illustration of successes in the Global War on 
Terror attributed to the new powers the government granted itself comes from a 
government report. This 2004 report prepared by the U.S. Department of Justice 
(Report from the field, 2004), details the effects the use of the powers granted in 
the  PATRIOT  Act  had  in  the  disruption  and  prevention  of  terrorist  attacks, 
specifically, the case of the “Lackawanna Six.” 
 
The Lackawanna Six had traveled to an al-Qaeda camp outside Kandahar in 
Afghanistan, a Taliban stronghold. According to the Justice Department report, 
the government was tipped off to the presence of home-grown terrorists by an 
anonymous letter. The report also made much of the intelligence “wall” that kept 
law  enforcement  personnel  investigating  agents  of  foreign  powers  and  those 
investigating  common  criminals  from  communicating  when  the  investigation 
began in the summer of 2001, saying, “…there were times when the intelligence 
officers and the law enforcement agents concluded that they could not be in the 
same room during briefings to discuss their respective investigations with each 
other” (Report from the field, 2004, p. 3).   
 
The  PATRIOT  Act  and  other  laws  which  followed  were  desired  by  the  law 
enforcement and intelligence communities for years prior to the attacks of 9/11.     99 
 
In May 1995, a report was written for the Attorney General and the Director of 
Central Intelligence in response to the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) and 
Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce  International  (BCCI)  prosecutions  in  the  early 
1990’s. The report stated that, “Greater cooperation between law enforcement 
and  intelligence,  and  better-focused  participation  by  LEA’s  in  proposing 
intelligence requirements, will lead to better use of existing resources” (Report to 
the Attorney General, 1995, p. 15).  
 
The origin of these problems was the “Wall” memo was written by the Attorney 
General at the time, Janet Reno, on July 19, 1995 in response to the report. 
Among  the  restrictive  provisions  in  the  memo  concerned  contact  between  a 
Foreign Intelligence (FI) or Foreign Counter-Intelligence (FCI) Investigation in the 
circumstance  in  which  no  Foreign  Intelligence  Surveillance  Act  (FISA) 
surveillance or searches were being conducted, which stated that, “The FBI shall 
not contact a U.S. Attorney's Office concerning such an investigation…” (Reno, 
1995, Sec. B.2). 
 
With the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the two teams of investigators were able 
to  communicate  and  the  case  ended  with  five  of  the  Six  pleading  guilty  to 
providing  material  support  to  al-Qaeda  and  the  sixth  pleading  guilty  to 
“conducting transactions unlawfully” with al-Qaeda. The prison sentences were to 
between seven and ten years for these offenses (Report from the field, 2004). 
 
Other  successes  due  to  the  removal  of  the  “wall”  include  the  cases  of  the 
“Portland  Seven.”  In  this  case,  Jeffrey  Battle,  one  of  the  conspirators,  had 
discussed the terrorist plot he was working on with an undercover informant.  
 
Others in the cell had traveled to Pakistan to take up arms with al-Qaeda against 
the  United  States  and  coalition  forces.  When  they  were  unsuccessful  in  their 
quest,  they  returned  to  the  United  States.  The  FBI  was  empowered,  through     100 
 
sections  218  and  504  of  the  PATRIOT  Act,  to  put  these  individuals  under 
surveillance while a case was being built, and then capture them before they 
could commit any terrorism. Six were sent to prison, receiving sentences of three 
to 18 years each, and the last, Jaber Elbaneh, was killed by Pakistani troops in 
Pakistan according to the 2004 report. It appears that the report was inaccurate, 
however, in that the latest news has Jaber Elbaneh at large in Yemen, and on 
the FBI list of “most wanted terrorists” (Temple-Rastin, 2007a). 
 
Other  successes  detailed  by  the  government  included  the  successful  arrests 
and/or prosecutions of Sami Al-Arian and co-conspirators in a case of Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad (PIJ), defendants in the “Virginia Jihad” case, in which the terrorists 
were  associated  with  an  Islamic  extremist  group  known  as  Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LET) and the cases of Mohammed Ali Hasan Al-Moayed and Mohshen Yahya 
Zayed, both Yemeni citizens, for their involvement with al Qaeda and HAMAS 
(Report from the field, 2004). 
 
Additional successfully prosecuted cases involved racketeers using charities as 
front  groups  for  support  for  Chechen  rebels,  an  al  Qaeda  related  drugs-for-
weapons  plot,  and  a  spying  case  involving  an  agent  of  the  former  Iraqi 
government. In all of these cases, the PATRIOT Act was cited as making the 
difference  between  success  and  failure  in  investigating  and  prosecuting  the 
cases (Report from the field, 2004). 
 
Finally, cases in which the PATRIOT Act has figured prominently involve money 
transfer  and  laundering,  including  cases  involving  the  Columbian  rebel  group 
FARC,  an  arms  dealer  and  operators  of  unlicensed  money  transmitting 
businesses. Additional successes have been achieved in seizing the money and 
property of terrorists and those with whom they did business. The gist of the 
report,  however,  had  more  to  do  with  the  success  of  tearing  down  the 
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with  the  successes  of  surveillance  or  data-mining  initiatives  purchasing  the 
government a greater quantity of convictions (Report from the field, 2004). 
 
The  parallels  with  anti-terrorism  activities  in  the  most  surveilled  Western 
democracy, Great Britain, are substantial. The British have the type of camera 
surveillance build out that that law enforcement in the United States would like to 
have (Hope, 2008; Temple-Rastin, 2008b). The Fusion Center concept is based 
on and builds on the Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) model, which according to 
Rollins  (2008)  in  his  Congressional  Research  Service  report  for  Congress, 
“…was gaining favor in the United States following the dramatic drop in crime in 
Kent,  England,  where  it  was  originally  developed…”  (pp.  15-16).  Due  to  the 
international  nature  of  information  sharing  among  intelligence  and  law 
enforcement communities of cooperating countries, initiatives and experiences 
from Great Britain and the United States cross the Atlantic and therefore create 
elements of common experience. 
 
The  subway  bombings  in  Britain  on  July  17,  2005  were  examples  of  the 
importance  to  the  government  of  surveillance  of  their  citizens.  Three  bombs 
exploded in the London subway system at 0720 BST, and one on a bus at 0947, 
killing  51  innocent  people  plus  the  four  bombers  ("Image,"  2005).  The 
Intelligence  and  Security  Committee  report  released  in  March,  2006  put  the 
death toll at 52 as one additional injured person died from wounds.  
 
The Prime Minister made a statement on July 11th of that year to say that he 
knew of “no intelligence specific enough to have allowed then to prevent last 
Thursday’s attacks” (Report into the London, 2006). With this dismissive wave of 
his  hand,  the  Prime  Minister  removed  emphasis  on  the  question  of  how  the 
government can prevent terror attacks and why the attacks were not prevented.  
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The report quotes from a speech by Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller to the Dutch 
security forces at the Hague, reported in Lord Butler’s Review of Intelligence on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003-2004), as follows:  
 
The Agencies cannot know everything about everyone, nor can they intercept and read 
every communication (which in any event would be a gross violation of human rights.) 
There will always be gaps in the Agencies’ knowledge. (p. 7) 
 
The implication is that if the intelligence agencies could intercept and analyze all 
of  everyone’s  communications,  then  terrorism  could  be  prevented.  The  report 
goes  on  to  discuss  the  enormous  volume  of  information  generated  in 
investigating terrorism, how the U.K. security forces have foiled other plots but 
didn’t foil this one, and the question of the manner in which intelligence is to be 
prioritized.  
 
One of the bombers was known to have traveled to Pakistan in 2003 and at the 
time  the  report  was  issued,  there  was  no  clear  connection  to  international 
terrorists  in  terms  of  external  direction  and  planning  (Report  into  the  London, 
2006, p. 12). It was later established that the bombing was masterminded by Abu 
Ubaida al-Masri (an alias) of Pakistan and top al-Qaeda leader ("Top Al Qaeda 
Leader Abu Ubaida al-Masri Confirmed Dead in Pakistan," 2008).  
 
The  Security  Service  had  previously  had  contact  with  two  of  the  bombers, 
Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer, the bombers being on the periphery of 
other  investigations  (Report  into  the  London,  2006,  p.  14).  Yet  the  Security 
Service was absolved of responsibility for supposing to have known to prevent 
the attacks. The fact that these bombers had been identified from surveillance or 
terrorist activities and they were not prevented from committing terrorism has had 
no effect in blunting the force of argument of those who would sell the idea of 
ubiquitous  surveillance  as  a  terrorism  prevention  solution,  regardless  of  the 
empirical evidence that the logic may actually be questionable. 
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London is one of the cities most monitored by closed-circuit TV, and investigators 
worked for four days going over the camera data from the 3,000 cameras in the 
London  subway  system  to  try  to  find  evidence  of  the  suicide  bombers’ 
movements (Milcent & Cai, 2006). After the fact, as illustrated by the rhetoric 
recounted above, it was not claimed that the surveillance could have prevented 
the  attack.  Yet  the  government  calls  for  more  surveillance  under  a  theory 
advanced by the government that more surveillance could prevent future attacks. 
 
Currently, the British are looking to legalize building a database that will contain 
all of everyone’s communications. The reasons given involve the ability to stop 
terrorism before it happens (Prince, 2008). The data in the United States already 
exists, in ISP record retention and phone records, and now with the new FBI 
guidelines,  these  are  de  facto  government  databases  as  the  FBI  can  access 
them with National Security Letters with no judicial oversight, and the FBI needs 
no probable cause to open an investigation on anyone. Therefore, the data is 
freely available to the FBI, if it so chooses, for any purpose at any time for any 
reason (Jordan, 2007; Johnson, 2008). 
 
The question becomes, how much surveillance is enough? Who should be put 
under  surveillance?  The  answer  in  the  United  States  is  to  monitor  everyone. 
Monitoring and tracking everyone is also the answer in Britain. The British are 
building a huge DNA database, to contain the most personal type of biometric. 
They have populated it with data from everyone over the age of 10 who has been 
arrested. This includes those who are not charged, and also includes those who 
are charged but found innocent. There are now 4.5 million genetic samples in the 
British DNA database (Townsend & Asthana, 2008). The FBI is also building a 
massive biometric database (Nakashima, 2007). 
 
There is a call in the United States to install a video surveillance system similar in 
size and scope to that in Great Britain. On the Fourth of July, 2007, National     104 
 
Public Radio broadcast a story about American police chiefs who want the type 
of  surveillance  power  that  the  British  have.  There  are  enough  surveillance 
cameras in Britain, 4,285,000 at last estimate that Scotland Yard can track the 
movement of every single car in the country from one end of the country to the 
other (Hope, 2008). Current capabilities allow that the system can store the data 
for two years. 
 
Miami Police Chief John Timoney used to believe that the surveillance powers a 
network of cameras that vast represented was too intrusive and that, “…I was 
opposed  to  it”  (Temple-Rastin,  2007b,  par.  6).    Not  any  more.  Now  he  and 
William Bratton, police chief in Los Angeles, feel these are the tools needed by 
law  enforcement  to  fight  terrorism.  There  was  no  mention  of  the  predictive 
capability that these cameras might give police, but Bratton was impressed with 
the idea that not just individuals but groups could be identified after the fact as 
they went places to commit terrorism (Temple-Rastin, 2007b, par. 12).  
 
Civil  libertarians  are  exaggerating  the  problems  with  this  type  of  surveillance, 
Chief  Timoney  contended.  Barry  Steinhardt  of  the  ACLU  pointed  out  that  the 
amount of money spent on taking pictures of streets and highways and using 
those pictures to track people and vehicles would be better spent on investigating 
and  apprehending  terrorists.  Mr.  Steinhardt  is  also  concerned  about  potential 
abuses  such  as  tracking  innocent  people  and  the  police  using  the  camera’s 
abilities  for  other  than  its  intended  purpose,  such  as  “looking  for  attractive 
women” as opposed to tracking everyone. But Chief Timoney feels that “most of 
these concerns have been dealt with.” (Temple-Rastin, 2007b) 
 
While it may be true that police have misused the resources at their command for 
personal  purposes  in  the  past,  the  amount  of  information  aggregated  in  the 
databases created after 9/11 is immense. In the past, where the police might 
have  had  lists  of  drivers  license  numbers  and  home  addresses,  the  current     105 
 
generation of information aggregation and correlation systems, such as Seisint’s 
Matrix,  store  and  can  connect  much  more  in  the  way  of  social  networking 
information (O’Harrow, p.121), thereby putting additional individuals at risk for 
police abuse. 
 
In the case of Collier County, Florida, it was a lucky break that allowed a problem 
like that to be “dealt with.” Terri Lucas in the Fingerprinting Department at the 
Collier County Sheriff’s Office was fired for unauthorized access to the DAVID 
system, the database for driver and vehicle information, when she looked up her 
ex-boyfriend’s current girlfriend. The break in the case came when the current 
girlfriend notified police. Lucas said she looked up “a ton of people…for fun…We 
used it like a yearbook.” The department plans to start running audits against 
“unusual activity” so that these types of problems can be dealt with (Spinetto, 
2008). 
 
An interesting aside in the matter of the London bombing case was the attempt to 
convict three men for helping to scout locations and training with the bombers, as 
well as being connected to the apartments in which the home-made explosives 
were  mixed.  The  government  used  cell  phone  tracking  data  and  surveillance 
footage for travel around London on December 16 and 17, 2004, to show that the 
accomplices went to the London Eye and Natural History Museum. Prosecutors 
said the itinerary “bore a striking similarity” to the bombers’ travels on the day 
they blew up the train cars and the bus (Stobart & Rotella, 2008, par. 9). The 
buried  lead  is  that  the  cell  phone  tracking  data  existed  for  the  suspects. 
Therefore, everyone’s tracking data is saved all the time, and is possibly held 
indefinitely. It’s all up to the cell phone company. 
 
An example of an unsuccessful prosecution because of government lies in the 
United States was the case of one of the “sleeper cell” prosecutions. This story 
made the news when Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the arrests of     106 
 
four  Muslim  men  in  Detroit.  Unfortunately  for  the  sleeper  cell  narrative,  the 
charges were dropped quietly when Richard Coventino, prosecutor of the case, 
was  indicted  for  attempting  to  enter  false  evidence  into  the  record,  and 
concealing other evidence (Wolf, 2007, p. 10). 
3.3. Infiltration 
 
One of the tactics the FBI has been instructed to (re-)adopt is that of infiltration. 
FBI informants infiltrating, spying on, and in some cases agitating and inciting 
otherwise peaceful, lawful, protest organizations was one of the strategies that 
was decried in the Church Committee hearings and subsequently outlawed. A 
fact of relevance in the wake of the Church Committee Hearings and the fate of 
the Intelligence Oversight Board that was set up in response to the findings of 
lawlessness  in  the  law  enforcement  and  intelligence  community  is  that  in  the 
recent past, the powers of that board have been severely limited by President 
Bush (Savage, 2008).  
 
President Ford created the Intelligence Oversight Board as a response to the 
1975-1976  investigation  by  Congress  into  domestic  spying,  assassination 
attempts and other intelligence agency abuses. President Ford’s executive order 
creating the board was effective March 1, 1976. Almost 32 years to the day of its 
creation,  President  Bush  limited  its  powers  with  an order  issued  February  29 
(Bush, 2008), in a move which the timing of was termed “purely coincidental” by 
the White House.  
 
One major change to the board’s operation was that in the past, the board was to 
inform the President and the Attorney General when an intelligence activity was 
thought to have been “unlawful or contrary to executive order” (Savage, 2008, 
par  9).  Now,  the  board  is  not  to  refer  anything  to  the  Justice  Department 
independently,  and  only  to  inform  the  president  if  other  officials  are  not     107 
 
“adequately” addressing the problem. Also, the board no longer has oversight of 
each  agency’s  general  counsel  and  inspector  general,  and  instead  of  each 
inspector general being required to file a report with the board each quarter, each 
agency director has the discretion to report law-breaking to the board at those 
directors’ discretion, with no schedule for notification (Savage, 2008).  
 
Weakening the Intelligence Oversight Board was merely the latest in a series of 
actions throughout Bush’s terms that have limited and weakened restrictions on 
intelligence  agency  activities.  Another  change  allows  the  NSA  to  gather 
information about Americans by using other agencies to collect the information. 
Assassinations, which were once prohibited, are sanctioned (Savage, 2008, par. 
11-12;  Yoo,  2006,  p.49).  Wiretap  laws  and  policies  have  been  significantly 
weakened. Congress had a law on the books requiring that the full House and 
Senate  intelligence  committees  be  briefed  about  spying  activities,  but  the 
administration has determined that only the committee leadership needs to be 
briefed. And executive orders were once thought to be in force until rescinded, 
yet the Bush administration has secretly authorized members of the intelligence 
community  to  ignore  certain  executive  orders,  without  actually  rescinding  the 
orders (Savage, 2008). 
 
One of the operations to which the creation of the Intelligence Oversight Board 
was a reaction was COINTELPRO. The Counter Intelligence Program was an 
FBI  operation  which  used  agents  and  informers  to  infiltrate  and  discredit  civil 
rights groups, anti-war groups and other groups whose interests were inimical to 
the established power structure. For example, on April 22, 1970, the FBI was 
there when 20 million Americans participated in Earth Day. Agents in 40 cities 
were  ordered  to  spy  on  Earth  Day  gatherings  and  report  on  individuals  and 
groups which planned and participated in the Earth Day events. The goal of the 
FBI was to link the individuals and groups in attendance to organizations which     108 
 
were  targeted  for  “surveillance,  infiltration  and  disruption”  (Cole  &  Dempsey, 
2002, p. 7). 
 
That Earth Day, the FBI in Denver was diligent about recording Senator Gaylord 
Nelson’s utterances, and had written down each of the slogans on the signs that 
protesters carried. In general, however, the FBI ended up investigating civil rights 
activists,  Vietnam  War  protesters,  women’s  liberation  advocates  and  other 
protest  groups.  Some  of  the  more  innovative  FBI  tactics  included  spreading 
misinformation  about  groups,  inciting  illegal  activity  and  generally  trying  to 
discredit  the  groups  and  in  general  bring  discouragement  to  the  members  of 
those groups (Cole & Dempsey, 2002). 
3.4. Surveillance and Interdiction on the Internet 
 
In the U.S. strategy for combating terrorism, one of the venues in which the war 
on terror is to be fought is the Internet. The United States’ policy is clearly stated, 
in  that,  “We  will  seek  ultimately  to  deny  the  Internet  to  the  terrorists  as  an 
effective  safehaven  (sic)  for  their  propaganda,  proselytizing,  recruitment, 
fundraising, training and operational planning” (National strategy, 2006, p. 17). 
An example of success in that arena is illustrated by the fact that someone, the 
government would not say who, took down various al-Qaeda sites prior to the 
anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.  
 
Al Qaeda had been using five main online forums to deliver their messages. All 
five of these were taken off-line on September 10th, 2008. The next day only one 
was  back  up  and  others  were  scrambling.  The  anniversary  message  did  not 
appear until September 19th, and by then it was not as effective for the terrorist 
group. This was a serious blow to al-Qaeda’s propaganda effort, as they had 
been trumpeting the appearance of a video in the weeks prior to the seventh 
anniversary of the World Trade Center attacks.      109 
 
U.S. intelligence sources would not say if the U.S. government was behind the 
attacks, although some speculated that it might have been an independent effort 
by Web “vigilantes.” Erich Marquardt, of the Combating Terrorism Center at the 
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, said, “The downside of knocking jihadist 
Web  sites  offline  is  that  you  lose  the  ability  to  monitor  jihadist  activities” 
(Knickmeyer, 2008). Clearly then, even the most “obvious” anti-terror strategies 
may have a downside. 
 
In this particular case, monitoring the Web site for information about that which 
the jihadists are thinking is different than tracking American citizens’ movements 
as they go about their daily routines, and thus has value and is a wise use of 
resources.  And,  unlike  the  average  American  who  might  join  a  protest 
organization or social justice group, some terrorists have more in common with 
common Internet criminals than social activists. 
 
Thus, a dimension to terrorists’ capabilities, and one which makes the lack of 
security  of  the  states’  Real  ID  databases  a  critical  problem,  is  the  fact  that 
terrorists use traditional criminal means to raise money to conduct operations. 
This means that terrorists will use identity theft and credit card fraud as methods 
of raising money. Throughout the IT industry it is accepted that any database that 
can be accessed remotely can be compromised through regular hacking as well 
as  by  tricking  individuals  who  have  access  to  a  system  into  divulging  their 
credentials or other means of access (Granger, 2001). 
 
One example of cybercrime by terrorists to raise money is the theft of data by a 
group of three men. Tariq al-Daour, 21, Waseem Mughal, 24, and Younes Tsouli, 
23, pleaded guilty in Britain in the summer of 2007 to charges related to inciting 
terrorism, specifically to using the Internet to incite murder. What they were really 
guilty  of,  however,  was  a  series  of  cybercrimes  involving  stolen  credit  cards 
numbers taken from victims in phishing attacks (Krebs, 2007).      110 
 
Phishing is the practice of sending emails to random individuals with a link to a 
site that looks to be a legitimate site, but in fact steals the credentials that the 
victim might input at a legitimate site, but due to the phishing, input at the bogus 
site. For instance, someone might get an email with a link to a site purporting to 
need  information  to  “verify”  their  account  status,  or  avoid  “cancellation”  of  a 
service  ("Phishing  explained,"  n.d.).  Attacks  that  are  not  strictly  technical  in 
nature,  in  that  they  require  tricking  a  person,  are  called  “social  engineering” 
attacks (Granger, 2001).  
 
In the case of the three terrorists who pled guilty in Britain, one of the individuals 
who fell prey to the “social engineering” attack was Linda Spence of New Jersey. 
She entered information into a counterfeit eBay site, and subsequently her credit 
card was used for $2,000 in fraudulent charges to a business in Portugal. The 
bad guys in this particular case used 72 or more stolen credit card accounts and 
registered  more  than  180  World  Wide  Web  domain  names  at  95  hosting 
companies  in  the  United  States  and  Europe.  These  sites  were  then  used  to 
spread jihadist propaganda and terrorism information (Krebs, 2007). 
 
Another issue that has Western security experts concerned involves applications 
that would normally be considered tools strictly for hackers and criminals, which 
are available on the Internet. When these tools are modified and crafted to suit 
the ambitions of terrorists, however, there is an added dimension of danger.  
 
The “electronic jihad” site, Al-jinan.org, was a terrorist site taken off line in the 
summer of 2007. It illustrates the problems of security on the Internet in an age of 
terror, as well as the ability of terrorist sites to avoid detection, even in plain sight. 
 
Al-jinan.org  has  an  application  for  download  named  “Electronic  Jihad.”  The 
purpose of the computer program is to attack Western sites by using what is 
known  as  a  denial-of-service  attack  (DoS).  DoS  attacks  are  most  well-known     111 
 
currently in the form of distributed denial of service attacks, (DDoS), which are 
generally attributed to botnets. Botnets have been in the news as botnets consist 
of regular individuals’ and organizations’ computers which have become infected 
with  malevolent  software  or  malware,  which  allows  them  to  be  controlled  by 
criminals. Under the criminal control they can launch DDoS attacks (Glenn, 2003, 
p. 3).  
 
DoS  (and  DDoS)  attacks  attempt  to  take  a  target  Web  site  off  line  by 
overwhelming  the  bandwidth  or  server  resources  with  legitimate  looking 
requests, such as for Web pages. When the volume of these requests is too 
great  per  unit  time,  the  Web  site  is  unreachable  for  legitimate  users  (Glenn, 
2003, p. 2).   
 
The software at al-Jinan.org was not particularly effective for the purposes for 
which  it  was  written.  Security  experts,  were  looking  at  future  attempts  by 
terrorists to craft applications for similar purposes with better technique. Jordan 
Wiens,  senior  security  engineer  for  the  University  of  Florida  put  it  best, 
expressing concern as to what might happen if “if they ever get their act together” 
(Greenemeier, 2007, par. 8).     112 
 
CHAPTER 4. THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE REAL ID ACT 
4.1. What is the Real ID Act? How did it come into existence? 
 
The Real ID Act was passed as part of Public Law 109-13, with the full title of 
“Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War 
on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, 
and for other purposes.” The Act has the short title “Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 
2005” ("Real ID Act," 2005). 
 
The Real ID Act is Division B of the Act. Title I concerns barring terrorists entry to 
the  United  States.  Title  II  is  “Improved  Security  for  Drivers’  Licenses  and 
Personal Identification Cards” ("Real ID act," 2005). The Act was signed into law 
by President George W. Bush on May 11, 2005 (Bush, 2005). In the President’s 
signing statement, there was no mention of the Real ID provisions of the bill, 
which meant that the White House would enforce all of the provisions of that part 
of the Act.  
 
The  Real  ID  Act  started  out  as  H.R.  418,  entitled,  “To  establish  and  rapidly 
implement  regulations  for  State  driver’s  license  and  identification  document 
security  standards,  to  prevent  terrorists  from  abusing  the  asylum  laws  of  the 
United States, to unify terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility and removal, 
and to ensure expeditious construction of the San Diego border fence.” The bill 
was then appended as Division B to H.R. 1268, which bears the title of the Public 
Law which was eventually passed ("H.R. 418," 2005).      113 
 
The  original  Real  ID  Act,  as  H.R.  418,  was  sponsored  by  Representative  F. 
James Sensenbrenner and introduced on January 26, 2005. At that time, he was 
Chairman  of  the  House  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  ("Congressman 
Sensenbrenner, “ n.d.).  
 
There are several aspects to the Real ID Act which deserve consideration. The 
wording of the Act is vague on the manner in which the goal of the Act is to be 
achieved. The goal of the Act is that licenses are to be made more secure, and 
the rule-making fell under the purview of DHS. There was contention regarding 
the rules and whether RFID was to be used. The current rules do not specify 
RFID as the vehicle for the machine-readable format. However, critics, among 
them  State  Representative  Jim  Guest  of  Missouri,  contend  that  the  bar  code 
format  currently  specified  could  be  changed  by  DHS  by  fiat  to  RFID  with  no 
meaningful input nor oversight . 
4.2. What is a Real ID? 
 
A  Real  ID  is  a  driver’s  license  that  conforms  to  the  rules  issued  by  the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 6 CFR Part 37, the Federal Register 
of January 29, 2008, pp. 5271-5340, entitled, “ Minimum Standards for Driver's 
Licenses  and  Identification  Cards  Acceptable  by  Federal  Agencies  for  Official 
Purposes;  Final  Rule.”  All  of  the  following  descriptions  of  what  the  Real  ID 
consists and procedures for issuing the ID, including the format and description 
of the actual document are contained in the Final Rule. 
  
The rules are constructed to dictate to the states that on a series of dates, the 
Federal government will no longer accept state-issued IDs that don’t conform to 
the Real ID rules. For instance, states must have applied for a waiver (extension) 
on conforming to the federally mandated standard by March 31, 2008, which all 
of the states did. As of December 31, 2009, if a state has not complied with the     114 
 
terms of the Material Compliance Checklist and applied for another extension by 
October 11, 2009, the federal government will not accept those states’ citizen’s 
IDs for federal purposes. And on May 11, 2011, the federal government will not 
accept IDs from states determined to not be in compliance with Real ID. Then on 
December 1, 2014, those born after 1964 must have a Real ID, and December 1, 
2017, the final group, everyone, will have been checked and verified. Anyone 
without a Real ID will not be allowed to board an airplane, go into a nuclear 
power plant, enter a federal building, or “such other purposes as established by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security” (Minimum standards, 2008, p.5273). One 
can only guess as to what the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
might  dictate,  and  dictate  is  the  correct  word,  as  there  is  neither  judicial  nor 
legislative oversight for implementation of this Act, as State Representative Jim 
Guest notes (Ferguson, 2007, par. 9). 
 
Quite  possibly,  most  people  will  not  be  inconvenienced  much  by  not  being 
allowed to visit a nuclear power plant. However, the rules make for the interesting 
situation of an American citizen possibly being denied the ability to petition the 
Federal Government for redress of grievances if they don’t have their Real ID 
with them. Considering that 20 percent of all ID instruments are lost each year 
(Schneier, 2007, par. 7), it would be inconvenient to actually have gotten it then 
have it stolen the night before the big court case.  
 
The  states  shoulder  the  responsibility  for  ensuring  the  validity  of  source 
documents which verify the identity of the individual and have rules for document 
retention. Documents are to be scanned and stored in computer storage, which 
creates another target-rich environment for hackers. 
 
The ID card itself must have, according to current rules, a 2D bar code as the 
machine readable zone (MRZ). This will contain a copy of the information printed 
on the driver’s license, and shall include the holder’s full name and address, date     115 
 
of  birth  and  gender,  the  card’s  number,  and  the  person’s  signature.  A  digital 
photograph is also mandated, although at the current time it can be color or black 
and white. The 2D bar code format is the PDF417 format in use by many law 
enforcement agencies today, and without encryption. This allows for easy access 
to the information by law enforcement and anyone with a bar code reader (airline 
boarding passes have 2D bar codes). 
4.3. Is Real ID an Unfunded Mandate? 
 
Some of the tension between the states and the federal government has to do 
with the “voluntary” nature of the provisions of the Act and whether it is indeed 
something with which the states are to voluntarily comply, or if compliance can 
be considered to be mandatory. If it is not voluntary, as some critics contend, due 
to the draconian penalties for non-conformance by the states, then it becomes an 
unfunded  mandate.  The  states  contend  that  the  expense  of  administration  to 
comply  with  the  Act  is  onerous  and  that  the  Act  amounts  to  an  unfunded 
mandate.  United  States  Senator  Kahikina  Akaka  (D-Hawaii)  said,  “The  Act 
places a significant unfunded mandate on states…” (Understanding the Realities 
of REAL ID, 2007). James Harper of the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank in 
Washington, D.C., in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, also 
described  the  Real  ID  Act  as  an  unfunded  mandate  (Real  ID  Act  Hearings, 
2007).  
 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, mandates were a popular topic of study. 
At  that  time,  state  officials  were  vocal  in  their  dissatisfaction  with  federal 
mandates that were not funded with commensurate federal aid or grants to the 
states (MacManus, 1991). 
 
Intergovernmental  tension  is  fueled  by  the  imposition  of  imperatives  on  lower 
levels  of  government  by  levels  of  government  above,  without  the  necessary     116 
 
funding to achieve the mandated condition (Leckrone, 1997). The imposition of 
unfunded mandates is not necessarily uniquely federal to state in nature. The 
intergovernmental tensions were felt in the state to county hierarchy to such a 
degree that by 1990, with the addition of Florida and Wisconsin, ten states had 
constitutionally  mandated  reimbursement  provisions  and  eight  states  had 
statutory  requirements  to  reimburse  local  governments  for  state  mandates 
(MacManus, 1991). By 1998, totals had grown to 12 states with constitutional 
and 13 with statutory provisions regarding mandates (Nobles, 2000). 
 
In 1995, the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act (UMRA) was signed into law, which 
had  as  its  stated  purpose,  “…to  strengthen  the  partnership  between  federal, 
state, local and tribal governments by ensuring that the impact of legislative and 
regulatory  proposals  on  those  governments  are  given  full  consideration  in 
Congress and the Executive Branch before they are acted on” (Leckrone, 1997, 
p. par 4). 
 
In hearings conducted in May of 2007 by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pennsylvania) 
both quoted the DHS estimate of costs to the states for compliance as $23 billion 
(Real ID Act Hearings, 2007, pp. 2-3). In September of 2007, that estimate was 
revised down to $11 billion over five years (Lipowicz, 2007).  
 
At a press conference announcing the final rules for Real ID, Michael Chertoff 
continued to put pressure on states to comply. Secretary Chertoff threatened that 
if  individuals  are  carrying  ID  from  states  which  did  not  comply  nor  intend  to 
comply with the Real ID Act, those individuals would not be allowed to fly on 
commercial airlines, nor to access federal buildings (Chertoff, 2008b).  
 
A selling point for Real ID as the Secretary tells the story is that the adoption of 
Real ID will help ameliorate the illegal immigration problem. His contention is that     117 
 
illegal aliens use Social Security Numbers of citizens, thus presenting a fraud 
and identity theft problem (Chertoff, 2006b, p. par. 12) and that the use of Real 
ID will solve that problem. Secretary Chertoff also made the case for expanding 
the  scope  of  use  for  Real  ID  for  employment  purposes,  by  integrating  the 
information that employers checked against Basic Pilot/E-Verify with the Real ID 
distributed database. Basic Pilot, now rebranded as E-Verify, is a program of 
cooperation between the Social Security Administration and the Immigration and 
Custom  Enforcement  department  of  DHS  which  allows  employers  to  check 
Social Security Numbers to see if they match the names that applicants provide 
(DHS Basic Pilot /E-Verify Program, 2008). Secretary Chertoff asserts that Basic 
Pilot does not indicate if that Social Security Number is possibly being used in 
multiple employment situations, but that if the database used for identification 
were used in conjunction with the Real ID database, having been referred for 
action  through  DHS,  this  would  protect  people  from  identity  theft  (Chertoff, 
2006b, pp. par.16-19). 
 
Other  mandates  to  the  states  for  compliance  with  the  Real  ID  Act  include 
deadlines for compliance, and privacy and data security considerations. States’ 
rights  adherents  and  civil  libertarians  observe  that  national  identity  cards  are 
anathema to the citizens’ sense of the role of the federal government. Even as 
DHS  has  pushed  the  deadlines  back,  the  Secretary  of  the  Department  of 
Homeland Security foretells of severe punishment for the residents of the states 
that do not comply with the Act. The same punishment was to be meted out to 
states that missed even the deadlines for requesting extensions for compliance 
dates.  
 
In the final rules as DHS released them, states had until May 11, 2008 to either 
comply with the Real ID Act or request a waiver for extension of the deadline. 
After  that  date,  individuals  from  states  that  were  not  in  compliance  nor  had 
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airports and upon entering federal facilities. This would entail pat-down searches 
(Singel, 2008a) and the need for DHS to perform some type of verification to 
assure the identity of those individuals. This type of situation would also cause 
delays,  which  Secretary  Chertoff  hypothesized  would  translate  into 
dissatisfaction of the citizens with their non-compliant state governments, and 
thus promote compliance (Chertoff, 2008b, pp. par. 57-58).  
 
Privacy advocates claim that the Real ID Act’s inclusion in the Tsunami Relief 
and Defense Appropriations Bill was done stealthily and the time frame was such 
that it was only a matter of days before the vote that those civil libertarians who 
would oppose the Act even knew it was included, limiting their ability to respond 
and attempt to remove the Real ID portion from the larger bill. Twelve Senators 
went so far as to write a letter to then-Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist urging that 
the Real ID portion of the Act not be included in the larger appropriation bill, but 
to no avail ("Twelve Senators urge Frist" 2005). 
 
In addition to the features of the Real ID cards described earlier, there is another 
component to compliance with the Act. Concurrent with the issuance of the cards 
with the 2D bar codes, the individual’s identity information would be stored in a 
database  in  each  state.  This  data  would  be  stored  in  a  format  such  that  the 
databases for each state could communicate for lookup purposes with each other 
state,  and  such  that  all  states  would  have  database  formats  that  would  be 
interoperable between all other states ("Real ID draft," 2007). The states would 
be required to store electronic images of the source documents for 10 years or 
paper copies of the source documents for seven years ("Real ID Act," 2005, p. 
49). 
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4.4. Timing and Implementation Complications 
 
Real ID Advocates, including Michael Chertoff and in the testimony to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Janice Kephart of 9/11 Security Solutions, LLC, suggest 
that the driver’s license provisions in the Real ID Act is superior to the driver’s 
license  provisions  in  the  2004  Intelligence  Reform  Act.  The  Senators  at  the 
hearing, on being concerned about the fact that the Real ID Act was pushed 
through  in  an  authorization  bill  without  hearings,  asked  what  made  Real  ID 
superior in the security requirements for driver’s licenses to those in Public Law 
108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which 
had gone through the hearing process and was considered to be in line with the 
9/11 Commission recommendations ("Intelligence reform," 2004).  
 
A close reading of Section 7212 of Public Law 108-458 of 2004 reveals that the 
most  significant  difference  regards  the  mandate  for  a  national  distributed, 
searchable  database.  The  Intelligence  Reform  Act  does  not  require  such  a 
database, whereas the Real ID Act requires that database to be implemented 
("Real ID act," 2005, p. 50). The database requirement is known in the Act as the 
“Driver  License  Agreement”  (DLA).  Another  difference  is  the  Real  ID  Act’s 
requirement  to  cross-check  the  individual’s  identity  against  the  database  of 
Social Security numbers ("Real ID act," 2005, p. 49). The DLA does not extend 
only to the states and federal government, but also to “…those provinces and 
territories in Canada and those states in Mexico that join the DLA and comply 
with its provisions. While it’s not specifically stated, other countries could join the 
DLA,  which  would  mandate  reciprocity  of  information  on  potentially  a  global 
scale.” (Ferguson, 2007) 
 
Another significant difference between the driver’s license provisions in the Real 
ID Act and those in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
exists.  This  is  that  the  rule-making  falls  solely  under  the  purview  of  the 
Department of Homeland Security. This scuttles the provisions of the 2004 Act     120 
 
which had the states and the federal government working together to arrive at 
standards for driver’s license security. 
 
There was confusion when the law was passed as to what mechanism would be 
used for the machine readable format of the Real ID card. Many in the industry at 
the  time  thought  that  RFID  would  be  the  front-running  technology  (Ferguson, 
2007), as passports were being redesigned and issued with RFID chips starting 
on August 14, 2006 (Ezovski & Watkins, 2007, p. 16).  
 
The  entire  story  of  the  Real  ID  Act  is  unusual  for  many  reasons.  One  would 
expect that there would be consensus in the passage of a law which would help 
keep the American public safer. It appears, however the Real ID Act is something 
that is being forced on the people of the United States, as demonstrated in the 
threatening stance taken by representatives of DHS. 
 
Secretary Chertoff did nothing to dispel the notion that DHS was using heavy-
handed tactics in dictating to the states the manner and timing with which the 
Real ID Act was to be implemented. In an editorial published soon after the final 
rules were released, dismissing criticism of the manner in which the rules were to 
be  implemented,  he  wrote,  “A  good  example  is  the  spurious  claim  that  we’re 
ushering  in  a  national  identity  card.  What  we  are  actually  doing  is  setting 
standards that will let the states keep issuing their own ID cards.” (emphasis 
added) (Chertoff, 2008a) The implication is that even though this is not a national 
ID card, that if the states do not follow the mandate, they would not be able to 
continue to issue their own ID cards.  
 
Throughout the process of attempting to get the Real ID initiative off the ground, 
there has been confusion regarding the deadlines and with what parts of the law 
states were to comply at what time.      121 
 
On  September  10,  2007,  Secretary  Chertoff  told  the  Senate  Committee  on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that the states were originally given 
a deadline of October 1, 2007, to comply even though the final rules had not 
been issued yet at that time. The date was moved back for states requesting a 
waiver to the end of 2009 (Lipowicz, 2007). But adding to the confusion was the 
fact that in the meantime, May of 2008 was set as a deadline for having all states 
either come into compliance with Real ID, or apply for a waiver. In November 
2007, Secretary Chertoff revealed a new timetable, which would have changed 
the states’ target of 2013 for having 245 million U.S. driver’s licenses comply with 
Real ID in such a way as to make the target date 2018 for drivers older than 40 
or 50 (the drivers’ age break point hadn’t been determined at the time) to get 
Real ID compliant licenses (Hsu, 2007b).  
 
At that time, Timothy Sparapani, senior legislative counsel for the American Civil 
Liberties  Union,  noted  that  DHS  was  continually  weakening  the  program  to 
attempt to gain compliance. Sparapani said, “DHS is doing back flips in order to 
get states to say they are complying with Real ID” (Hsu, 2007b). 
 
Secretary Chertoff and DHS had set a compliance date for the states of May, 
2008, even before the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) had been issued. 
The NPRM appeared in the Federal Register on March 9, 2007 ("Real ID draft," 
2007).  Yet  in  February  of  2007,  Michael  Chertoff  testified  to  the  Senate 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and said he was “pretty 
adamant”  about  a  May  2008  deadline.  Senator  Susan  Collins  (R-Maine)  was 
considering  sponsoring  an  amendment  giving  the  states  more  time.  She 
observed, “It has been two years since the Real ID Act passed, and yet we don’t 
have  detailed  regulations  or  guidance  from  the  department  setting  forth  the 
standards that the states are going to have to follow” (Hudson, 2007, par. 5). 
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Secretary Chertoff made the point that privacy and security were paramount and 
said, “I do want to make it clear that one of the reasons it’s taking awhile is we 
have actually done quite a bit of consultation even in the preliminary stage with 
state officials and privacy advocates and other folks” (Hudson, 2007). Secretary 
Chertoff never enumerates who the privacy advocates and “other folks” might be. 
A  reasonable  person  might  presume  that  because  the  program  is  a  security 
program  and  security  of  the  data  and  the  computers  holding  the  data  is 
important,  the  “other  folks”  might  be  computer  and  information  security 
professionals. 
4.5. The Race/Ethnicity Field 
 
Secretary Chertoff left the door open for the inclusion of biometric identifiers – 
beyond  the  digital  photo  requirement.  Each  driver’s  license  will  have  at  a 
minimum  a  digital  photograph  as  the  biometric  identifier.  As  the  Secretary 
indicated at the press conference upon release of the final rules for compliance 
with the Act, DHS was not opposed to other biometric identifiers being included 
on the ID (or in the database), “We have nothing against a fingerprint. Some 
states have fingerprints, some states don’t” (Chertoff, 2008b). 
 
The Act does not specify that a race field be included, nor filled. In addition to the 
digital photograph, the Act mandates the individual’s full legal name, date of birth, 
gender, driver’s license number, address and signature ("Real ID act," 2005, pp. 
Division B, Title II, Sec. 202, (b)). The Act mandates that the machine-readable 
portion  contain  common  data  elements.  This  is  of  special  concern  for  civil 
libertarians as there is a race field in the specification for the machine-readable 
portion of the Real ID that DHS has picked for implementation. At the time Jim 
Harper spoke to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs,  subcommittee  on  Oversight  of  Government  Management,  the  Federal 
Workforce,  and  the  District  of  Columbia  on  March  26,  2007,  the  Notice  of     123 
 
Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) that DHS promulgated for the implementation of 
Real ID specified the machine readable portion to consist of a 2D barcode, the 
PDF417 standard. The NPRM, being the period in which interested parties and 
the public could comment, was an opportunity for Jim Harper of the Cato Institute 
to highlight the fact that there is a race field in the format specified by DHS. The 
specified  format  DHS  proposed  in  the  NPRM  is  the  2005  AAMVA  Driver’s 
License/Identification Card Design Specification, Annex D (Harper, 2007).  
 
Critics of the Act suggest that there is rarely a field which is specified which will 
be  left  blank.  Harper  notes  that  DHS  does  not  require  all  of  the  fields  to  be 
developed in the standard, and certainly doesn’t specify that the race field be 
developed – but also that “DHS has done nothing to prevent or even discourage 
the  placement  of  race  and  ethnicity  in  the  machine-readable  zones  of  this 
national ID card.” (Harper, 2007, p. 212) Mr. Harper was adamant in his objection 
to the inclusion of a race field, urging DHS to mandate that the field not be used, 
stating on the record:  
 
Avoiding  race-  and  ethnicity-  based  identification  systems  is  an  essential  bulwark  of 
protection  for  civil  liberties,  given  our  always-uncertain  future.  In  Nazi  Germany,  in 
apartheid  South  Africa  and  in  the  recent  genocide  in  Rwanda,  horrible  deeds  were 
administered  using  identification  cards  that  included  information  about  religion,  about 
tribe, and about race. Implementation of the REAL ID Act, which would permit race to be 
a part of the national identification scheme, would be a grave error. (Harper, 2007, p. 
212) 
 
In the final rules, DHS responded to concerns about the race field being included 
and possibly used – but did not specifically indicate that the race field was not to 
be used. In the response to a comment regarding the use of a race field in the 
final specification, DHS wrote: 
 
Race is not a data element contemplated in this rulemaking and the reference in the 
NPRM to the AAMVA standard was not intended to include race as a data element in the 
MRZ for REAL ID. (Minimum Standards, 2008, p. 5305) 
 
However, the next paragraph states:  
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The final rule sets the minimum standards to include, but recognizes the authority of the 
individual States to add other elements such as biometrics, which some currently include 
in their cards. (p. 5305)  
 
This is not a repudiation of the inclusion of a race field. In the response to the 
next  comment,  DHS  again  attempts  to  downplay  the  data  element  of  race, 
without specifically prohibiting the states from using that field, stating: 
 
DHS disagrees with the notion that the standard selected should be rejected because it 
includes coding for race. DHS has never stated that race should be encoded on the 
license,  and  specifically  stated  in  the  proposed  rule  that  it  was  not  incorporating 
wholesale the card data elements currently required by the AAMVA. (p. 5305) 
 
According to the specification, at D.12.3.2, the Race field (k), Data Element DCL, 
the  race  field  is  already  an  optional  element.  All  of  the  fields  in  D.12.3.2  are 
optional,  as  the  “required”  fields  are  listed  in  Section  D.12.3.1,  “Minimum 
mandatory data elements.” ("Personal identification," 2005), so the last sentence 
in  the  final  rules  is  questionable  either  in  its  accuracy  or  pertinence.  If  DHS, 
which mandates every part of the Real ID implementation, down to the exact 
date of each step of compliance, were to state that the race field would not be 
used, it would not be used. The rules specify what documents to accept, how and 
how long they are to be stored, what the machine readable zone will incorporate, 
what databases individuals’ identities will be verified against and what type of 
photograph to use. If the Department of Homeland Security mandated that the 
race field was to not be used, it would not be used.  
 
Alternatively:  
 
…white people would carry the designation “W”; black people would carry the designation 
“BK”; people of Hispanic origin would be designated “H”; Asian or Pacific Islanders would 
be “AP”; and Alaskan or American Indians would be “AI.” (Will Real IDs, 2007, p.175) 
 
By not prohibiting its use, it is left to the individual states to use that field and it 
will be part of the MRZ for all citizens of whatever states elect to use it, if not 
tomorrow then the next day.      125 
 
4.6. The 2D Barcode and its Security 
 
For instance, Randy Vanderhoof, Executive Director of the Smart Card Alliance, 
an industry trade group which, among other activities, organizes the trade shows, 
such as the annual Smart Cards in Government Conference, wrote to express 
disappointment in DHS’s choice of a 2D bar code, i.e. the PDF417 specification 
during the NPRM phase of the rulemaking process. He wrote, of the proposed 
specification: 
 
This is where the document and DHS recommendation fall short. The core reason for the 
REAL ID legislation in the first place was supposed to improve security, not the least 
expensive  solution  for  storage  and  transmission  of  data  that  states  could  agree  on. 
(Vanderhoof, 2007, par. 2) 
 
A glance at the Standards for U.S. License Technology table underscores the 
point  –  as  44  states  and  the  District  of  Columbia  are  using  2D  bar  code 
technology. The states that are not are California, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, 
Texas and Wyoming ("Standards," 2008). An interesting aside is that Wyoming is 
the home state of Vice-President Dick Cheney, and that is the only state that 
uses no magnetic stripe, 1D or 2D bar code technology. 
 
As  a  leading  light  in  the  industry,  the  Executive  Director  of  the  SmartCard 
Alliance also writes that DHS in the NPRM phase of rulemaking did not address 
the  issues  of  tampering,  counterfeiting  or  duplication  of  documents  for  a 
fraudulent  purpose,  even  though  the  opening  summary  of  the  proposed  rules 
stated  that  these  issues  would  be addressed  (Vanderhoof,  2007).  In  the  final 
rule, in Section 37.15, DHS pushes the responsibility for these action items off 
onto the states, with the caveat that the states must provide DHS with written 
reports specifying the manner in which these goals will be. At the same time, the 
regulation  specifies  that  the  information  will  be  considered  SSI,  or  Sensitive 
Security Information, which “must be handled and protected in accordance with 
49 CFR part 1520” (Minimum standards, 2008, pp. 5334-5335).     126 
 
Therefore security and anti-tampering information falls under the purview of the 
Transportation Security Administration, as Title 49 is Transportation in the Code 
of  Federal  Regulations,  and  two  important  effects  are  immediately  felt.  Only 
persons with a “need to know” will receive the information (1520.11) and there is 
no release of the information under the Freedom of Information Act (1520.15 (g)) 
("49 C.F.R. Part 1520," 2004) This puts the information as to how the Real ID’s 
are to be safeguarded against tampering outside the possibility of any type of 
independent  review  by  members  of  the  public,  industry  or  academia.  It  also 
means that those who know what the safeguards are supposed to be, even if 
they find those safeguards deficient, cannot take the information to the public, 
and force a security solution through publicity.  
 
It is sometimes argued that “security through obscurity” is useful. Security expert 
Eugene Spafford, Ph.D., director of the Center for Education and Research in 
Information Assurance and Security and an Association of Computing Machinery 
(ACM) Fellow (Cooper, 2001), has written on the subject and has come to the 
conclusion that prevails in the computer security field, which is that it does not 
work (Spafford, 2008). It may work for awhile, and depending on the importance 
and determination of the adversary, it may work indefinitely. (Think of the case of 
some obscure custom computer program written for a small office which runs on 
a  computer  not  connected  to  a  network  and  compare  that  to  security  for  a 
database (or distributed database) holding millions of credit cards, or better yet, 
names, dates of birth and permanent addresses.) However, if the target is of 
value, attackers will attempt to compromise the security of the system. 
 
The  motivation  of  the  entity  compromising the  security  of  whatever  system  is 
being attacked must then be examined. This motivation will dictate how widely 
the  knowledge  of  the  vulnerability  and  exploit  will  be  disseminated.  The 
continued security of the system depends on how widely the knowledge of the 
vulnerability and exploit is disseminated. Some attackers may want to keep the     127 
 
exploit  to  themselves,  assuring  repeated  success.  In  the  case  of  Real  IDs, 
success  would  be  measured  by  forging  Real  IDs  and/or  modifying  the 
database(s).  Some  attackers  may  publish  their  discoveries  of  security 
vulnerabilities, allowing for wholesale destruction of the security of the system. In 
the  meantime,  secrecy  regarding  the  insecurities  of  the  system  will  adversely 
affect the public, which is every American citizen and those citizens of the North 
American  Union  who  live  in  states  that  are  part  of  the  trans-national  Driver’s 
License Agreement (DLA). 
 
There exists at least one inconsistency between the Real ID specification which 
DHS published in its final rules and the format as the PDF417 standard is written, 
as well as inconsistency within the format. One inconsistency has to do with the 
use of the null data elements for unknown or unavailable data. In the FAQs on 
the  AAMVA  site  for  the  format,  the  question  has  to  do  with  the  reading  of 
paragraph  D.12.3,  which  states  that  for  optional  data  elements  were  the 
information  is  not  available,  “NONE”  should  be  inserted  into  the  field  and  for 
mandatory data elements, “unavail” should be recorded in that data field. The 
question  concerned  the  situation  in  which  the  field  is  shorter  than  the  null 
identification element, possibly causing the shortened ‘N,” “NO,” or “NON,” or “u,” 
“un,”  “una,”  “unav,”  “unava,”  or  “unavai”  to  be  mistaken  for  some  other  code 
("AAMVA card," 2008, pp. 'Bar Code Format, 2.'). The FAQ answer indicates that 
the  matter  is  under  study.  This  diverges  from  the  DHS  rule  which  states  in 
Section 37.17 (a) that if an individual has only one name, the single name should 
be placed in the “last name or family name” field, leaving the first and middle 
name fields blank. The rules specifically prohibit the use of “place holders” such 
as “NFN, NMN and NA.” (Minimum standards, 2008, p. 5335) In this case the 
DHS place holders do not match the AAMVA PDF417 standard. 
 
Bruce Schneier, a security expert, well-renowned in the information security field 
and an expert who comments on all matter of security issues, testified in the May     128 
 
2007  hearing  before  the  Senate  Judiciary  Committee  and  made  some 
observations on the general security of the Real ID, and how trustworthy those 
cards  would  be.  In  his  statement  to  the  committee  he  pointed  out  several 
problems with the supposed security of Real ID. He noted that the ID could be no 
more secure than the documents used to procure the trusted ID. This meant that 
if a terrorist or criminal could not bribe a DMV clerk, the bad guy would try to 
forge  source  documentation  or  bribe  a  clerk  at  some  agency  which  would 
produce the source documents for the ID (Real ID act, 2007, pp. 234-235).  
 
Schneier  testified  to  the  committee  that  other  problems  could  result  from  the 
existence  of  shadow  databases.  These  databases  would  be  written  to  by 
commercial  entities  every  time  the  Real  ID  would  be  used  in  a  commercial 
context, just as driver’s licenses are now. Schneier brought up the case of lost 
Real IDs. With the knowledge that 20% of all identity documents are lost per 
year, he warned that any parallel or separate system for re-issuing lost IDs would 
also  be  susceptible  to  abuse.  Another  issue  is  that  of  a  terrorist  or  criminal 
impersonating  a  law-abiding  citizen.  In  this  case,  the  question  of  the  identity 
documents is similar, and in that instance the terrorist or criminal would be able 
access more easily the restricted spaces that the use of Real ID was supposed 
to protect. The poignant observation from Bruce Schneier: “And if you think it’s 
bad  for  a  criminal  to  impersonate  you  to  your  bank,  just  wait  until  a  terrorist 
impersonates you to TSA.” (Real ID act, 2007, p. 237).  
 
The more trusted a form of identification, the greater access the identification 
gives.  Those  who  would  forge  an  ID  will  be  able  to  access  more  and  better 
information and physical spaces when they forge a more trusted ID. In the United 
Kingdom, a country in which national identification cards have been issued and 
databases centralized, there is debate over the wisdom and efficacy of issuing 
national ID cards. A report from the London School of Economics takes issue 
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ID.  The  report  indicated  that  as  ID’s  become  more  secure,  those  who  would 
break the security and forge cards are becoming more resourceful:   
 
Even  as  the  cards  are  promised  to  more  secure,  attacks  become  much  more 
sophisticated. Most recently, Russian security agents arrested policemen and civilians 
suspected  of  forging  Kremlin  security  passes  that  guaranteed  entrance  to  President 
Vladimir Putin’s offices. (Rotenberg, 2006, p.128) 
 
The purpose of Real ID is to be the most trusted ID and DHS envisions that it will 
be used for employment verification, and for all of the uses driver’s licenses are 
used for now. With the convenience of bar code, for now, and possibly RFID in 
the future, it will be used for all manner of transaction. Even as the government 
attempts  to  anticipate  forgery  and  forgers,  as  Bruce  Schneier  explained  in 
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the new twenty dollar bill was 
forged before it even hit the streets (Will Real ID, 2007, p. 234). With this being 
the  case,  and  with  the  large  numbers  of  ID  cards  which  would  have  to  be 
replaced when enemies forge Real IDs, there has to be acceptance of the fact 
that  the  criminals  and  terrorists  with  the  most  resources  will  be  most  able  to 
breach the security of the Real IDs. And if this is the case, then the purpose of 
the Real ID cannot be for preventing terrorism, except of the lowest level, most 
casual  kind.  The  people  who  will  be  using valid  Real  IDs  will  be  law  abiding 
citizens, and they will be the individuals that the nationwide surveillance system 
will track.  
4.7. Computers, Databases and Security 
 
One of the most intrusive and disturbing aspects of the implementation of the 
Real ID Act is the requirement that all states’ databases be searchable by every 
other state and the federal government. This creates a situation which is more 
insecure than creating a large centralized database in terms of safeguarding the 
data, but with the level of intrusiveness of a national ID database in that the data 
is all in one place (logically or virtually, as opposed to physically) through the     130 
 
ability  to  search  distributed  databases  from  multiple  locations  and  entities.  In 
computer parlance, to say it is logically in one place means to the computer’s 
logic, it doesn’t matter if it is physically all in one computer system located on one 
sub-basement. The computer’s logic, with the connections that the computers 
make with each other, and the speed of access and the speed with which the 
data can be moved from one computer to another, to the computer, the database 
is one “logical” entity. Just as the university computer and the Yahoo computer 
and your computer at home are not in the same place, if you didn’t know that, 
you might think that they were. 
 
Almost everyone in contemporary society has an idea of what a computer is and 
what it can do. Computers are good at doing the same thing over and over, as 
opposed to doing something unique each time it is called upon to do something.  
 
A database system can be thought of as a computerized record-keeping system. 
The foundational building block in the construction of a database is a “record.” A 
record is a set of data, of which an example would be the set of data stored in the 
2-D barcode mandated in the rules for Real ID. When it becomes necessary to 
organize these records, they are stored in a database (Date, 1995). 
 
Records have structures defined by the database designer(s), and each of these 
groups of records with the same structure is stored in a “table.” A database can 
have many tables, and data fields in some tables may provide the links to other 
tables. These other tables may have records with different structures and may be 
filtered and sorted in different ways than the original table, but have information 
taken from the other tables (Date, 1995). In the example of Real ID, and the state 
DMV databases that make up the foundation for the distributed database, each 
record would be keyed to an individual. The key field in a record is a unique 
identifier and is the field on which the records are sorted. There are occasions 
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purposes, the operation of the database should be transparent to the end user. In 
other words, when the policeman or the coat check girl scans your Real ID, they 
don’t need to know how the database is designed, or that the local database they 
are creating of their encounter with you is first checking a statewide database for 
your  information,  then  the  database  in  your  home  state  (assuming  those  are 
different)  and  then  their  marketing  databases  and  then  whatever  watch  list 
databases the FBI or CIA or other member agency of the intelligence community 
dictate  must  be  checked.  They  just  know  that  when  they  scan  the  machine 
readable zone that your picture and date of birth and home address and quite 
possibly race come up, so that they know it is you (according to the computer) 
who  they  are  stopping  randomly  or  to  whom  they  are  giving  your  coat.  For 
purposes of each state’s database, it is hoped that each individual will have a 
unique  driver’s  license  or  ID  number  (or  alphanumeric  identifier).  But  the 
policeman and the coat check girl don’t need to know how the databases are 
designed or link, nor do they want to know. So then, after your time and location 
have been logged into these multiple databases so NSA can run an algorithm 
against your movements to see if you are doing terrorist things, you might be 
able to go on your way. Then again, if you are traveling over the same ground a 
criminal or terrorist traveled, in the same order, you might have some explaining 
to do – to the computer at the police station. 
 
As each new individual is assigned a driver’s license number, the data is entered 
and a number of record-keeping functions occur. The mechanics vary between 
implementations, and this is where the real world meets the world of computer 
science.  The  idea  of  the  Real  ID  act  is  to  produce  a  system  in  which  each 
individual would have only one driver’s license or ID card, regardless of state, at 
a time. Various mechanisms are to be employed, including checking against a 
database of Social Security numbers, various immigration databases, a system 
which is not up yet with vital events (such as births and deaths), etc. The trick for 
normalizing  the  data  has  to  do  with  names,  numbers  associated  with  birth     132 
 
certificates  in  various  jurisdictions,  and  the  data  in  these  other  databases. 
Informally, normalizing the data refers to the process of combining or discarding, 
depending on the desired result, information from duplicates entries in databases 
in well-defined ways (Date, 1995). 
 
Once the data is in the database, stored in fields that are organized into records 
in tables, users are going to want to query the database. Generally, Structured 
Query Language (SQL) with possibly some variation is used. Also, users with the 
correct  privileges  and  access  rights  to  a  database  can  change  or  input  data. 
When one table has a field in a record which is changed, it is useful to have other 
tables with the same fields, whatever the record and table format, change also so 
that the data is consistent. 
 
A relational database management system (RDBM) updates all of the associated 
tables  when  a  field  that  appears  in  more  than  one  table  changes.  The  term 
relational  refers  to  the  fact  that  data  fields  in  certain  tables  relate  to,  or  are 
informally correlated with, the same data fields in other tables, just in a different 
record construct. 
 
Modern  (RDBMSs)  have  graphical  front-ends,  so  that  users  can  construct 
queries without too much trouble. For the average user of the Real ID database 
system,  however,  the  swipe  of  the  2D  barcode  will  automatically  query  the 
database. The mechanism should be such that the state the Real ID is registered 
with will be first to be queried. 
 
For more advanced users, who want to correlate data from the card swipe with 
other data either from that database or in others, the query capabilities would be 
much  enhanced.  In  the  commercial  world,  data  aggregators  such  as  Axciom, 
ChoicePoint and LexisNexis use extensively correlated databases such that they     133 
 
can query across several sources of information and find intersections, quickly 
and easily (Behar, 2004).  
 
Then there is Seisint. Even pre-9/11, correlative power of commercial databases 
was well-developed. O’Harrow (2005) tells the story of Hank Asher discovering 
the  power  of  the  database  technology  he  helped  build.  Two  days  after  9/11, 
Asher was at his house with Bill Shrewsbury, a special agent with the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement socially, when it struck him to see if he could 
profile the terrorists using the tools he had at his disposal. He narrowed the list of 
suspicious characters, according to the data, to 419 before he called a friend of 
his, Tim Moore, commissioner of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement 
(O'Harrow, 2005, pp. 98-100). Ultimately, he produced a list 1,200 people who 
looked interesting. Five of those were evildoers who crashed airplanes into the 
World Trade Center. This number was achieved after knowing the attack had 
occurred, and this analysis produced a 99+% false positive rate (Jonas & Harper, 
2006).  So  in  this  case,  it  was  not  predictive  data  mining,  but  data  mining  in 
hindsight.  Naturally  law  enforcement  was  very  interested  and  for  weeks 
afterward, law enforcement accessed those databases at no charge, and most 
probably are paying premium prices to access that information today. 
 
At the end of the process, DHS envisions a system in which each person in the 
real world is associated with only one identifier in the computer’s database, so 
that  all  the  vital  information  about  that  person  can  be  linked  to  in  other 
databases, or, depending on the semantics, linked to in the relational database 
management system (RDBMS). The idea of constructing a network of databases, 
a distributed database, in which the information could be accessed quickly, is the 
foundation for Acxiom’s business model. One of John Poindexter’s aides at the 
Total Information Awareness Office wrote that, “Ultimately, the U.S. may need 
huge databases of commercial transactions that cover the world or certain areas 
outside the U.S. Acxiom could build this mega-scale database” (O’Harrow, 2005,     134 
 
p.61). Acxiom officially suggested a different approach so as not to alarm the 
public,  which  was  to  “use  networks  to  link  those  data  systems  together” 
(O’Harrow, 2005, p.61). 
 
In terms of the massive distributed database that the Real ID Act would create, 
Bruce Schneier in his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee was being 
generous when he testified that, “Computer scientists don’t know how to keep a 
database of this magnitude secure” (Real ID Act Hearings, 2007, pp. 235-236). 
The fact is that computer scientists are struggling to come up with a theoretical 
model for keeping a computer secure, let alone a network or database of any 
size. There are issues that range from the inherent insecurity of the underlying 
operating systems and the network protocols they use to communicate over a 
network, to the fallible humans that maintain and access the data the computers 
store.  
 
Unauthorized  access  can  mean  many  things.  At  the  minimum  it  can  mean 
individuals  who  have  access  to  the  system  and  data  for  specific  purposes, 
looking at data at which they are not supposed to look. An example of this type of 
unauthorized access would be an IRS employee, with legitimate access to the 
system storing tax returns, looking up the tax returns of celebrities when there 
was no legitimate job-related reason to do so, as John Snyder was convicted of 
doing (Coombes, 2008).  
 
It can also mean some actor or organization gaining access when the system 
security  was  set  up  to  stop  those  actors  or  organizations  from  accessing  the 
system or data. Examples of this type of unauthorized access can be found in the 
description of any database breach, an example of which would be the TJX data 
breach in which at least 45.7 million credit and debit card numbers were stolen 
(Abelson, 2007). 
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Data breaches in commercial, educational and government databases, and other 
losses  of  data,  are  in  the  news  constantly.  It  is  patently  absurd  to  think  that 
somehow  the  data  in  the  database  that  the  Real  ID  Act  mandates  would 
somehow be more secure. If anything, the data will be much less secure, due to 
the pressures on the administrators to keep their data available. 
 
As  the  director  of  the  Center  for  Education  and  Research  in  Information 
Assurance and Security (CERIAS) said in 1989, “The only truly secure system is 
one that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete and sealed in a lead-lined 
room with armed guards – and even then I have my doubts” (Spafford, 2006). 
Not much has changed since then to give the industry hope that things are more 
secure. Events have indicated that systems have more valuable information to 
steal and are breached on a regular basis. 
 
Almost any week, the news provides an example of the enormity of the problem 
of keeping information secure. There is a database of database breaches kept by 
the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. By its count, from January 2005 to January 
2009,  the  number  of  compromised  records  containing  personally  identifiable 
information is 251,154,069 ("A chronology," 2009). 
 
4.8. States’ Resistance 
 
Several states have resisted the imposition of the Real ID Act and its provisions 
on their procedures and processes for issuing driver’s licenses. This resistance 
has taken various forms. For example Missouri State Representative Jim Guest 
sponsored a bill which would have made Missouri actively non-compliant with the 
Real ID Act in Missouri’s 94th General Assembly ("House bill no. 1716," 2008). 
The bill specified, among other provisions directly challenging the Real ID Act’s 
specifications:      136 
 
 
The department of revenue shall not amend procedures for applying for a driver’s license 
or identification card in order to comply with the goals or standards of the federal Real ID 
Act of 2005, any rules or regulations promulgated under the authority granted in such act, 
or  any  requirements  adopted  by  the  American  Association  of  Motor  Vehicle 
Administrators for furtherance of the Act. (Section 3) 
  
The  bill  never  made  the  calendar  for  passage  in  that  Missouri  congressional 
session ("HB 1716," 2008). 
 
Representative Guest and others felt that the Real ID Act was an infringement on 
privacy, so they appealed to the original values of the Founders. Representative 
Guest  said,  “We’re  supposed  to  be  a  government  of,  by  and  for  the  people. 
Government’s role is to protect citizens’ freedom. In this case they’re not doing 
that. [The Real ID Act] is a direct frontal assault on the freedom of citizens when 
[the U.S. government] wants us to carry a national ID” (Ferguson, 2007b, p. 16). 
 
Another example of resistance involves the state of Montana. In January of 2008, 
Montana  Governor  Brian  Schweitzer  (D)  wrote  a  letter  to  DHS  saying  that 
Montana was not complying with the Act and had no intention of doing so. He 
urged  the  governors  of  17  states  that  had  given  indications  of  resisting  the 
federal  government’s  Real  ID  mandate  to  join  with  Montana  and  force  a 
showdown regarding the May 11 deadline DHS set for compliance or for states to 
apply for a waiver (Schweitzer, 2008). Georgia was one of the states which had 
been strongly opposed to the Real ID rules.  
 
DHS spokesperson Laura Keehner was nonplussed when the possibility that all 
the  Georgians  traveling  through  Atlanta-Hartsfield  airport,  the  world’s  busiest 
airport,  would  have  to  go  through  secondary  screening.  “That  will  mean  real 
consequences for their citizens starting in May if their leadership chooses not to 
comply. That includes getting on an airplane, so they will need to get passports” 
(Singel, 2008a). 
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The issue of states resisting DHS’s Real ID-mandated requirements stems also 
partly  from  the  fact  that  there  had  been  cooperation  between  the  state  and 
federal government in attempting to set rules for driver’s license issuance prior to 
passage of the Real ID Act. Governor Schweitzer specifically took umbrage to 
the fact that with the passage of the Real ID Act, the rule-making was unilaterally 
and precipitously given over to DHS. The Governor urged in his letter that states 
rally around the passage of S. 717 and H.R. 1117, acts which would reinstate “a 
negotiated  rulemaking  process  that  was  on  track  to  improve  ID  security” 
(Schweitzer, 2008). He sent that letter to the governors of Colorado, Georgia, 
Idaho,  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  Oklahoma,  South  Carolina,  Arizona,  Hawaii, 
Illinois,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  North  Dakota,  Pennsylvania,  Tennessee  and 
Washington (Singel, 2008a).  
 
In March of 2008, it was revealed that DHS granted a waiver to Montana, in 
essence stating that Montana’s governor’s letter was tantamount to a request for 
a waiver (an extension in the time to comply with the Act.) Governor Schweitzer 
said in reply, “I sent them a horse and if they want to call it a zebra, that’s up to 
them. They can call it whatever they want, and it wasn’t a love letter” (Singel, 
2008b, par. 5). Additionally, on the issue of how the government was going to 
keep the information secure in this distributed database, the governor said, “They 
tell  us  it’s  safe.  Tell  that  to  the  passport  people”  (Singel,  2008b,  par  8).  The 
reference  to  the  “passport  people”  involved  unauthorized  access  to  passport 
information  perpetrated  by  contractors  at  the  State  Department.  These 
contractors were accessing the passport information databases for information 
regarding  past  travel  of  political  candidates  (Jones,  2008).  Presumably  there 
were fewer people authorized to view the passport database information than 
would be authorized to access the Real ID database collection, so the conclusion 
that Governor Schweitzer was drawing was that if an entity comparatively small 
such as the State Department could not guarantee the safety of the data in the     138 
 
passport control database, how could anyone assume that the data held in the 
Real ID database would be safe from unauthorized access? 
 
Replying  to  the  governor  through  the  press,  Assistant  Homeland  Security 
Secretary Stewart Baker said, “We’re not in the business of asking states to say 
Uncle.  We’re  in  the  business  of  trying  to  improve  driver’s  license  security” 
("States Challenge Homeland Security's ID Deadline," 2008).  
 
This type of flip rhetoric is also the type of rhetoric that the states, and specifically 
Governor Schweitzer, objects to. The Governor wrote: 
 
Secretary Chertoff’s remarks yesterday [January 17, 2008], albeit about WHTI, not Real 
ID,  reflect  DHS  continued  disrespect  for  the  serious  and  legitimate  concerns  of  our 
citizens. I take great offense at this notion we should all simply “grow up.” (Schweitzer, 
2008) 
 
Other  examples  of  that  type  of  rhetoric  in  Secretary  Chertoff’s  utterances 
included  the  statement  at  the  final  rules  press  conference  in  response  to  a 
question about putting so much trust in a single piece of identification, “…under 
that theory we should eliminate passports and let people come across the border 
using a note written by their third-grade teacher” (Chertoff, 2008b, par. 84).  
 
During  the  same  press  conference  Secretary  Chertoff  basically  described  the 
driver’s  license  itself  as  useless  for  identification  purposes.  According  to 
Secretary Chertoff, if a state did not adhere to the new Real ID specification it 
would  “…send  a  message  to  people  that  basically  says  a  driver’s  license  is 
useless, it has no identification value, and it’s the kind of thing you can pick up at, 
like, an amusement park when you pay a few bucks and they do some kind of 
funny identification” (Chertoff, 2008b, par. 75) This type of statement would serve 
to  rankle  Governor  Schweitzer,  in  that  the  Governor  makes  the  point  that 
Montana  driver’s  licenses  are  already  more  secure  than  the  Real  ID  Act 
standards  call  for,  and  in  a  more  timely  manner.  As  the  Governor  said,  “We     139 
 
already have an ID system they are hoping to get to in seven years” (Singel, 
2008b). 
 
Elected officials in other states have expressed misgivings about Real ID. The 
Idaho  Senate  in  March  2007  passed  Joint  Memorial  3,  after  the  House  had 
unanimously passed it, which was a resolution to refuse to comply with the Real 
ID Act. Governor Mark Sanford of South Carolina urged his legislators to resist 
compliance, noting that it would cast the state $25 million to comply initially, and 
an extra $11 million per year thereafter (Zalud, 2007). 
 
Some states are headed in the direction of compliance with the Real ID Act. 
According to Secretary Chertoff, at the time the final rules were released, 40 
percent of individuals lived in states which were starting to come into compliance 
with the Real ID Act (Chertoff, 2008b). Some states were moving further, issuing 
an  identity  instrument  commonly  known  as  the  enhanced  driver’s  license. 
Vermont is one such state and will start issuing these IDs starting in early 2009 
("Vermont issues," 2009).  
 
This  Enhanced  Driver’s  License  would  ease  the  cross-border  movement  of 
individuals under the terms of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI). 
Starting  in  2008,  United  States  citizens  who  traveled  to  Canada  or  Mexico 
needed passports or some type of WHTI compliant document to have crossed 
the border back into the United States. For travel to and from Canada, Mexico 
and  other  countries  that  are  part  of  the  WHTI,  Vermont  and  the  states  of 
Washington and Arizona are working with DHS to enhance the security of their 
driver’s  licenses  ("Proposed  ‘enhanced’  licences,"  2007).  These  Enhanced 
Driver’s  License  and  identification  cards  (EDL/IDs)  would  contain  RFID  chips, 
similar  to  the  chips  contained  in  U.S.  passports.  Holders  of  these  enhanced 
driver’s licenses can produce them when needing to produce a WHTI-compliant     140 
 
document, or government-issued photo ID and proof of citizenship to cross the 
border (K.C. Jones, 2007b). 
4.9. Increased Scope of Use 
 
Secretary Chertoff and other spokespersons for DHS have had it both ways in 
the  rhetoric.  There  is  an  insistence  by  the  department  that  it  is  for  federal 
purposes, that it is a way to make people safer on airplanes, in nuclear power 
plants, and in federal buildings. The idea being that if the person who the ID says 
is holding it has made it to the door of the conveyance or building, then it is ok for 
them to pass through that doorway. But it is not enough for a person to have the 
ID to pass through the doorway. Security personnel frisk the person anyway; to 
inventory and inspect the contents of the citizen/subject’s purse, wallet, computer 
bag, and pants pockets. Security will conduct this search, if not by physically 
turning those items or pockets inside out, then with machines that look through 
the fabric, record the images and display those images for the guards to conduct 
a visual inspection. Simultaneously, there is insistence from the Department of 
Homeland Security that there will be other uses for the ID, probably employment 
verification for a start. So the question again becomes, how is the Real ID Act a 
measure to stop terrorism more than it is a measure to facilitate the tracking of 
law-abiding citizens in their daily lives?  
 
Security experts, editorial writers, think tank operatives and others agree that the 
Real ID will be used for more and other purposes beyond its originally stated 
purpose. Schneier in his testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
(2007)  raised  the  issue  of  the  commercial  databases  which  will  add  Real  ID 
culled information or spring up around Real ID information. So every time the 
Real ID is swiped, which will be often, the information will end go to many places. 
In many cases, the rhetoric of DHS is an attempt to turn these uses into selling 
points for adoption. Jim Harper, of the Cato Institute, agreed with and quoted     141 
 
Anne Collins, Registrar of Motor Vehicles for the State of Massachusetts, as she 
predicted that uses of the Real ID card will go far beyond the Congressional 
intent. In the words of Ms. Collins as reported to the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary (2007), “If you build it they will come” (p. 174).  
 
One needs only to look to China to see a parallel endpoint which may be of some 
concern  to  a  society  that  has  grown  used  to  freedom.  China  has  the  usual 
surveillance camera apparatus, in the city of Shenzen, some 20,000 cameras 
with  computerized  software  to  direct  the  cameras,  and  a  facial  recognition 
backend to track who is out on the street (Klein, 2008).  
 
China’s residency cards issued to residents starting in August 2007 contain a 
chip, and information, such as the citizen’s name, address, ethnicity/race, work 
history, police record, medical insurance information and status, landlord’s phone 
number,  educational  background  and  reproductive  status.  In  the  future,  credit 
histories, subway travel balances and petty cash allotments will be added. Just 
like a student ID card at a major university, the users will be able to make small 
purchases  with  these  national  ID  cards.  Michael  Lin  of  Public  Security 
Technology, the company that makes the cards, said, “If they do not get the 
permanent card, they cannot live here, they cannot get government benefits, and 
that  is  a  way  for  the  government  to  control  the  population  in  the  future” 
(Bradsher, 2007).  
 
Some  predict  for  the  Real  ID  card  such  trivial  (compared  to  safeguarding 
airplanes  from  terrorists)  uses  as  keeping  track  of  “club  membership, 
employment, library usage, even health and credit information” (Healey, 2008). 
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4.10. Possible Role of RFID in Future Real ID Implementations 
 
RFID has applications across a variety of products. For tracking uses, an RFID 
chip has the advantage of holding enough information that each item can have a 
unique identifier (Strickland & Hunt, 2005). That means that when an RFID tag is 
read, and it is correlated with the owner of the item tagged, the association can 
be made between the person and that RFID chip. Whenever the tag is read, the 
date, time and location of that encounter can be logged into a database. If an 
individual has multiple items with RFID tags, the tag can be associated with an 
individual with a high degree of certainty. These encounters can then be used to 
track the individual’s movements. The individual could be identified by identifying 
the tags in any subset of the items the person owns. 
 
There is also the concern that there will be a requirement to tag humans with 
RFID. Chips have been implanted in pets and livestock for years. The company 
CityWatcher.com,  a  video  surveillance  company  in  Cincinnati  requires  as  a 
condition of employment that its workers have an RFID chip implanted (Williams, 
2007).  
 
A Wisconsin law banning forced implantation of RFID chips in people took effect 
in  June  2006  (Songini,  2006).  North  Dakota  passed  a  similar  law  in  2007. 
(Songini, 2007). The California Senate passed a bill in 2007 banning employers 
from requiring that employees have chips implanted. The law took effect January 
1, 2008 ("California RFID," 2007; del Barco, 2008).     143 
 
CHAPTER 5. THE REAL ID ACT AND THE THREAT TO FREEDOM 
The Real ID Act in its currently envisioned form is a threat to privacy and freedom 
in American society. The cost-benefit ratio in the implementation of the act, even 
in a perfect implementation under the current rules, is poor and is outweighed by 
the good the money spent on implementation could do if spent on more effective 
surveillance.  More  effective  surveillance  might  consist  of  surveillance  of 
individuals who were indicated by other intelligence to possibly be terrorists, as 
opposed to surveillance of all American citizens on the chance that one of them 
might  turn  into  a  terrorist  without  exhibiting  other  indications  of  terrorist 
inclinations. The current rules themselves are a less than perfect implementation 
of the intent of the Act. Even if DHS mandated a more secure implementation, 
the insecurities inherent in the sprawling computer system the web of databases 
represents, would be impossible to implement securely. And a less than perfect 
implementation of a more secure specification would still be insecure. 
 
Adding to the problems of this type of system is the panoply of threats that are 
faced by all computer networks and database systems. These include malware 
of all types, unauthorized access and insider abuse.  
5.1.  Insecurities in the Current Implementation 
 
The information on the cards can be read by any 2D barcode scanner. These 
types of scanners will be employed in all manner of business to read the cards as 
they  are  presented  and  populate  innumerable  databases,  each  operated  by 
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problem  from  the  security  at  the  state  level  of  the  driver’s  license  issuing 
agencies.  
 
There is no encryption mandated to protect the data on the cards. There is a 
mandate that DHS will certify states’ IT systems as to the security of the data that 
gets queried with an authorized use of the card. This is a specious guarantee as 
there is no oversight or third-party security review, so the public is to trust the 
federal government as it audits the states’ IT systems. Federal agencies have the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) audit those agencies every year and 
every year the results are bad. It would be safe to assume that the states are 
less adept at securing their systems as they have less expertise. 
5.2.  The Problem of Privacy in a Surveillance Society 
 
The problem of privacy of information about oneself as an American citizen is a 
problem which can be broken down into two parts. The first has to do with what 
information the government should be entitled to under the theory of security, 
and the second has to do with what information commercial interests should be 
allowed to store, maintain and sell. This includes contentless data such as where 
an individual is at any given time, or what they are wearing, as well as data with 
content, such as what an individual says, and to whom they say it.  
 
The  second  question  involves  enumerated  rights.  Speech  and  assembly  are 
enumerated rights, and it was assumed that in American society, one can travel 
to speak and assemble. The questions of freedom of assembly and anonymous 
association  are  directly  tied  to  tracking  technologies,  inference  tracking  as  it 
applies to phone calls, emails and Internet traffic. 
 
To  reclaim  some  sense  of  privacy  of  information  as  the  situation  is  currently 
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and much money is being made from the sale and transfer of the information. 
Free market advocates might maintain that the best way to keep a company from 
buying  and  selling  transaction  information  would  be  for  consumers  to  not  do 
business with companies that have lax or non-existent privacy policies. Froomkin 
(2000) advises that individuals not fill out surveys and warranty cards, and that 
they  limit  the  amount  of  personal  information  they  hand  over  to  commercial 
entities when possible (p.1464). However, the inertial effect of the market that 
exists, and the amount of money involved in the data trade make it unlikely that 
any wholesale change in the way corporations buy, sell and handle data can be 
expected  to  materialize  in  the  direction  of  more  privacy  for  individuals  in  the 
manner in which their data is bought or sold by corporations.  
5.3. We’ve Got the Wrong Guy 
 
Getting the wrong guy is something that authorities are loathe to have to admit. 
There are numerous examples of individuals under the traditional criminal justice 
construct  who  are  convicted  of  crimes  they  didn’t  commit.  These  errors,  or 
miscarriages of justice, occurred in the framework of a criminal justice system 
under which the Fourth Amendment and other procedural safeguards existed, 
and judicial oversight was accepted as having been exercised. Miranda rights, 
prohibitions against torture of suspects, due process protections, open courts, an 
appeals system: these are all constructions assumed to be in place on these 
occasions in which justice has been misapplied or miscarried.  
 
In the world of secret courts with secret evidence and predictive data mining to 
identify those who might be terrorists in the future, intuitively, the implications are 
fairly  serious  in  cases  in  which  data  is  misapplied  or  the  wrong  individual  is 
flagged for scrutiny. Without the Constitutional protections afforded by the rule of 
law  and  with  secrecy  implied,  any  mistakes  might  never  be  identified  nor 
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It  is  easy  to  hypothesize  examples  in  which  the  wrong  individual  could  be 
implicated  by  remote  tracking  surveillance.  Consider  a  crime  where  the 
neighbor’s teenager had a copy of the victim’s car key. The teenager has this key 
from a time when he ran an errand for the family and had the key copied. The 
teenager drives late at night with his friends to a deserted place near a power 
plant to use drugs and drink. Let’s suppose that the victim’s work cell phone had 
been left in the car. The tracking computer will see the personal phones at the 
car owner’s house, but all the other tracking surveillance markers will indicate 
that the worker was nefariously casing the power plant. These markers would 
include highway RFID readers identifying the RFID chips in the car’s tires along 
the highway, the OnStar records of GPS positioning, and the work cell phone 
locational tracking records. If anything untoward were to happen at the plant, 
which is considered critical infrastructure by definition, and even possibly if not, 
that joyride might bring the police to the victim’s house. At that point, the victim 
would hope that the teenager had brought a cell phone on that ride also.  
 
Similar situations could occur due to the confluence of external events with the 
mis-identified person talking to the “wrong” person, surfing to the wrong Web site, 
ordering the wrong thing, going to the wrong series of strip malls in a certain 
order (let’s say that the malls have a rocketry store, a store with chemistry sets, 
and a UPS Store). If one watched the “wrong” shows on television or read the 
“wrong” books, one might come under increased scrutiny. Most of the time, there 
would be little follow-up. Ideally, the national security apparatus would verify that 
the person was not a threat to the government and then leave them alone.  
 
During the manhunt for the D.C. sniper, Hank Asher used his Matrix system to 
attempt to identify the sniper based on the victims’ residences, attempting to find 
some commonality to tie the murders together to help solve the crime. Asher 
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own theory, figuring the sniper had geographical ties to the area. By using his 
Matrix system, Asher came up with the name of a man:  
 
“So I ran a profile of the distance of every one of the murders, and I came up with a guy 
that  lived  like  a  hundred  feet  from  one  of  them,  five  hundred  feet  from  another,  two 
thousand feet from another. I mean, the glove fit,” he [Asher] said. “And I sent that up to 
them [law enforcement] and I can’t imagine what that poor fellow…”  
 
“Hopefully he was cleared easily with alibis and excuses,” he said. “But I thought I had 
caught him.” (O’Harrow, 2005, p.118) 
 
There have been situations in which NSA passed along useless intelligence to 
the  FBI.  During  a  period  of  illegal,  warrantless  wiretapping,  the  NSA  was 
developing leads for the FBI. These leads were the raw intelligence of phone 
numbers  with  which  possibly  suspicious  people  had  had  communication. 
Specifically mentioned as being passed from NSA to FBI were phone numbers of 
babysitters  and  local  pizza  parlors,  numbers  of  non-co-conspirators.  One  FBI 
official  said,  “After  you  get  a  thousand  numbers  and  not  one  is  turning  up 
anything, you get some frustration” (Bamford, 2008, p. 267). Diverting resources 
in this manner, to following up leads of dubious quality based on the mere fact of 
a phone call having been made, is a poor use of resources if the goal is anti-
terrorism.   
 
The obvious problems arise from the mis-identification and mis-classification of 
American  citizens  in  these  national  security  and  law  enforcement  databases. 
O’Harrow (2005) relates the story of Stephan Nash and the Denver police. Mr. 
Nash  was  active  in  an  organization  named  CopWatch,  which  attempted  to 
expose police brutality and lawlessness with regard to dealings with minorities in 
the  city  of  Denver.  He  was  also  an  activist  in  other  legitimate  political 
organizations. It was only through an insider passing on information to Nash and 
the ACLU that the domestic spying activities of the Denver police came to light.  
 
The Denver police had been spying on civilians for years and the records were 
paper-based. In 2000, the city wanted to upgrade to computerized databases,     148 
 
and contracted with Orion Scientific, a company that took software developed by 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and extended it for 
use by domestic intelligence agencies.  
 
What  the  city  of  Denver  did  not  do  was  invest  in  training.  Supervisors  were 
allowed to make up the rules for categorizing the subjects of surveillance as the 
data  was  entered.  The  easiest  category  to  put  many  of  the  spied  upon  was 
“criminal extremist.” Mr. Nash and his wife were so labeled, as well as an elderly 
nun  who  worked  with  the  poor  Indians  in  Chiapas  and  a  Colorado  University 
professor who spoke at a rally against police brutality (O'Harrow, 2005, pp. 274-
277) 
 
Meanwhile, these actual and potential abuses are minimized by law enforcement, 
policy  makers  and  the  media  as  an  adjunct  of  the  government.  The  current 
reportage treats privacy abuses as unusual, portraying these as man bites dog 
stories. The prevailing frame is always, “If it saves even one life, then it is worth 
it.” In acquiescing to the government’s declaration of extraordinary powers and 
suspension of habeas corpus in general and for American citizens as “enemy 
combatants”  (Levy,  2003;  “Jose  Padilla,”  n.d.)  and  allowing  the  creation  of  a 
separate legal system (“Military Commissions Act of 2006,” 2006; “ACLU: Military 
Commissions Act of 2006,” n.d.), citizens have demonstrated acceptance of this 
abuse.  American  society  moved  away  from  the  Founding  Fathers’  guiding 
principle  of  jurisprudence,  which  is  credited  to  William  Blackstone,  that  of 
“innocent until proven guilty.” In the famous quote, “Better that ten guilty persons 
escape than that one innocent suffer” (Volokh, 1997, p.174; Blackstone, 1893, p. 
*358) is found the abhorrence of arbitrary detention and show trials with rigged 
verdicts that the American Revolutionaries rejected in their bid for freedom from 
the King’s and his functionaries’ whims and fairness in the legal process. The 
lack  of  substantive  debate  in  the  mainstream  media  and  the  framing  of 
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in  the  legal  realm  is  consistent  with  the  Propaganda  Model  as  advanced  by 
Herman and Chomsky (1988).  
5.4. Abuse of Trust 
 
All of the data in one place--that is the scenario that evildoers like to see. That is 
the essence of one-stop shopping. That is what the Real ID distributed database 
will be. Sometimes the evildoers are seemingly trustworthy individuals. The three 
letter agencies also seem to have trouble identifying who might be a security risk 
and who is not a risk. 
 
Nada Nadim Prouty, 37, who started life in Lebanon, was a former employee of 
the FBI and CIA. In November, 2007, she pleaded guilty to conspiracy to defraud 
the U.S. government. She allegedly fraudulently acquired U.S. citizenship, and 
then is said to have used her position at the FBI to access data about family 
members who are alleged to have connections to Hezbollah. 
 
Prouty entered the U.S. from Lebanon in June 1989 on a non-immigrant student 
visa, stayed past the expiration of her visa, and then paid a U.S. citizen to marry 
her on August 9, 1990. In April 1999, she was hired as a special agent of the FBI, 
was granted a security clearance and worked out of the Washington field office 
investigating crimes against U.S. persons overseas.  
 
In August 2000, Prouty’s sister married Talal Khalil Chahine. Chahine is now a 
fugitive hiding out in Lebanon, according to DOJ and is wanted in connection with 
tax evasion in the matter of a concealed $20 million, some of which was diverted 
to Lebanon. 
 
In June 2003, before leaving the FBI to join the CIA, Prouty accessed the FBI’s 
Automated Case System and queried her name, her sister’s name, and that of     150 
 
Chahine. She resigned the CIA in November 2007 and offered to help the CIA on 
matters involving national security (Gross, 2007).  
 
The conclusion that can be drawn is in two parts. In the first part, it is obvious 
that organizations which are supposed to be good at screening their applicants 
end up letting individuals into the organization with questionable ties. Once in the 
organization,  an  individual  like  Prouty  can  access  sensitive  information.  The 
implication  for  the  Real  ID  data  is  that  in  organizations  with  less  rigorous 
screening, such as police departments, there is a greater likelihood that people 
who  should  not  be  trusted  with  American  citizens’  data  will  be.  The  second 
component  involves  the  inherent  insecurity  of  the  data  to  insider  abuse  in 
general. 
5.5. Abuse of Power 
 
An audit of 10 percent of the FBI’s national security investigations since 2002 
revealed that the FBI had violated the law or agency rules on more than 1,000 
occasions. The sample size and the numbers indicate that the FBI had illegally 
collected  information  several  thousand  times.  The  majority  of  the  incidents 
involve  phone  companies  and  Internet  Service  Providers  (ISPs)  furnishing 
information the agents were not authorized to collect (J. Solomon, 2007).  
 
A report issued in March of 2007 by the Justice Department did not uncover the 
extent  of  the  illegality  revealed  in  June,  but  did  include  Attorney  General 
Gonzalez and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller admitting that the FBI broke the law 
in  collecting  information  improperly  under  the  PATRIOT  Act.  The  Attorney 
General even left the door open to the possibility of pursuing criminal charges 
against FBI agents and lawyers who broke the law (Jordan, 2007). 
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There are numerous instances of police and various others who have accessed 
law  enforcement  databases  with  citizens’  personal  data  in  an  unauthorized 
fashion ("If you have nothing…", 2008). One instance involved Officer Theresa 
Shover of the DeKalb County Police Department accessing the Georgia Crime 
Information Center database, a database that is supposed to be classified, to get 
information on her ex-husband’s girlfriend. She then created flyers with the ex-
husband’s  girlfriend’s  picture  and  captions  labeling  her  an  adulteress, 
homewrecker, etc., and sent these to the woman’s family, friends, past employer, 
et  al.,  with  social  networking  information  gained  from  the  database.  More 
astonishing  was  the  fact  that  she  was  suspended  and  not  charged  criminally 
("Officer suspended," 2008). 
5.6. Insecurity of Information and the Power of the Database 
 
There  are  instances  in  which  sensitive  and  even  classified  information  is  not 
secure. This augurs poorly for the security of the Real ID database.  
 
One instance of sensitive information being exposed on the Web comes from the 
architects commissioned to design the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Berger Devine 
Yaeger Inc. of Kansas City exposed the master drawings for the embassy, which 
will sit on 104 acres in Baghdad, on its Web site in May, 2007.  
 
The State Department asked the firm to remove the drawings from their site. 
After  that  request  had  been  issued,  a  spokesman  for  the  company  said  that 
anyone who was interested could just look the site up on Google Earth. 
 
Al  Jazeera  had  reported  bombings  of  construction  equipment  and  that 
construction  personnel  had  been  injured.  With  the  drawings  and  the  Google 
Earth information, however, it would be an easy job to match the construction 
phases with the observed activity (Jones, 2007).     152 
 
Even beyond information that is sitting in databases that can be accessed from 
many  points  by  many  entities,  such  as  that  which  the  Real  ID  distributed 
database represents, there are problems securing data in supposedly the most 
secure  environments.  In  2007,  various  problems  surfaced  at  Los  Alamos, 
including the leaking of classified data over the Internet, a laptop with sensitive 
documents stolen from a vacationing staffer in Ireland, and the transmission of 
unencrypted information through email (Barry, 2007). 
5.7.  Government is not the Solution, Government is the Problem 
 
There  may  be  some  ways  in  which  the  data  and  privacy  problems  can  be 
addressed. Vehicle registration information is kept precisely and even pre-9/11 
was made available in the aggregate to various industry and trade groups ("U.S. 
automobile registrations," 2001). There is no compelling need to ship raw data 
which  would  link  individuals  to  the  data  elements  in  various  databases  to 
commercial and governmental entities. The data should be aggregated as a way 
to anonymize data.  
 
There should be encryption used for the data being written to and read from the 
Real  ID  cards.  The  databases  should  have  the  data  in  them  encrypted.  The 
federal government is moving toward whole disk encryption since the VA data 
loss affair. Every Web browser has encryption built in for credit card transactions, 
among others. There is a system of certificates so that entities can be verified as 
to their identity against the certificate authority’s certificate. Some certificates use 
a  cryptographic  algorithm,  MD-5,  which  has  exhibited  weakness,  and  which 
allows  forgers  to  create  fake  certificates  (MD5  Weakness  Allows  Fake  SSL 
Certificates To Be Created, 2008). The problems with MD-5 are solvable, in that 
certificate authorities (CAs) can use a more secure algorithm such as SHA-1 and 
therefore  a  fairly  secure  certificate  implementation  can  be  achieved.  When     153 
 
vulnerabilities  are  discovered  in  SHA-1  are  discovered,  then  another  more 
secure algorithm will have been developed. 
 
States  have  been  selling  their  citizens’  personal  data  to  data  aggregators  for 
years. An example of this practice is the state of Minnesota, which sold driver’s 
license information to over 5,000 outside groups. Attorney General Mike Hatch 
noted that, “The name, address, height, weight and driver’s license number of 
every Minnesota driver can be accessed over the Internet by anyone willing to 
pay for it. If you don’t thank that’s shocking, the threat is brought to you by state 
government.” (Scheck, 2006, par. 3) 
 
There  are  situations  in  database  inquiries,  in  which  database  queries  can  be 
constructed  to  destroy  privacy,  and  there  is  active  research  in  the  computer 
science community into ways to guard against those types of series of database 
queries which would reveal information which should remain private.  
5.8. Conclusions 
 
The  net  effect  of  total  surveillance  serves  to  chill  individual  freedom  and 
expression,  thereby  enforcing  conformity  and  denying  the  benefits  of 
participatory democracy. The Hawthorne effect was observed by Elton Mayo at 
the Western Electric Hawthorne plant in Illinois in a series of experiments on 
worker  productivity.  Although  Jones  (1992)  conducted  a  reexamination  of  the 
original study, it is still conventionally accepted that people behave differently 
when  observed.  Jeremy  Bentham’s  Panopticon,  which  revolutionized 
architectural  and  organizational  design  of  prisons,  factories,  schools  and 
orphanages, was based on the idea that control could be achieved by watching 
those who were to be controlled without the observed knowing whether or not 
they were being observed. This tended to make the subject population believe 
they were under surveillance at all times. Froomkin (2000) describes this effect in     154 
 
passing  (p.  1463)  as  a  privacy  issue.  Strub  (1989)  takes  this  theme  further, 
reading Orwell’s 1984 through Bentham and arriving at a disconcerting end.  
 
With the FBI and law enforcement agencies now free to infiltrate peaceful social 
justice  and  groups  expressing  legitimate  political  dissent,  the  chilling  effect  of 
suppression  of  citizens’  voices  in  the  political  process  is  inevitable  (Johnson, 
2008;  Madigan,  2008).  When  anonymity  of  association  is  deprived,  people 
cannot join and support causes that align with their policy and political views. 
That was the point of Justice Douglass’ opinion in Laird v. Tatum. People act 
differently  and  make  decisions  differently  when  they  believe  they  might  be 
watched.  In  Bamford’s  (2008)  discussion  of  the  Aquaint  computer  he  notes, 
“Such a system would have an enormous chilling effect on everyone’s everyday 
activities--what will the Aquaint computer think if I buy this book…” (p.327). 
 
And that is the point. In Mexico, legitimate political figures are wiretapped and 
surveilled at all times. Guanajuato state governor Vicente Fox, later president of 
Mexico, had his phones tapped. An opposition Senator had seven years of his 
life recorded in wiretaps and physical surveillance (Bamford, 2008). “The system 
the  Bush  administration  wanted  for  Mexico  was  similar  to  its  warrantless 
eavesdropping operation in the U.S.” (Bamford, 2008, p.227). 
 
When a person has to think twice before saying something, because the unseen 
monitors are listening; when people are afraid to buy a book because they might 
get flagged in a database as a subversive; when people are afraid to go get a 
cup  of  coffee  at  a  coffee  shop  because  musicians  might  be  singing  about 
something not perfectly aligned with government policy; one could say they are 
observing the hallmarks of an unfree society, maybe something along the lines of 
East Germany or the Soviet Union under communism, or China today. There are 
those that would go so far as to say the type of society being described in a total 
surveillance regime is Orwellian (Strub, 1989).     155 
 
There are also those who expound the virtues of conducting surveillance against 
all  of  the  citizens  all  of  the  time.  There  are  advantages  associated  with  total 
surveillance. Crime might be reduced significantly. Missing people would not be 
missing  for  long.  No  illegal  alien  or  unregistered  car  would  exist  within  the 
boundaries of the surveillance perimeter. There would be no object for which an 
accounting could not be made. No copyrighted work would be used without the 
proper  royalties  being  credited.  And  of  course,  the  purpose  given  for  the 
surveillance would be completely and actually achieved, terrorists would never 
be  able  to  plot  their  evil  deeds,  nor  carry  them  out,  or  when  they  did,  their 
associates would be hunted down expeditiously. 
 
The average citizen may have little to fear at present because the government is 
awash in data and cannot possibly process all of the data on every citizen all of 
the time. This puts the threat to the average citizen as a “potential” threat to 
freedom, as opposed to an “actual” threat to freedom. If that is the case, only 
when someone makes the wrong move and gets on a list, the all-seeing eye of 
the  state  will  then  be  trained  on  that  individual.  The  No-Fly  List  is  a  perfect 
example.  The  No-Fly  List  has  a  million  names  representing  approximately 
400,000  people  (obviously  each  terrorist  has  on  average  2.5  names).  Many 
Americans are on that list when they should not be. Wolf (2007) contends that 
the list is a way to inconvenience individuals who disagree with administration 
policies (p. 95). She hypothesizes that that is why she and Ted Kennedy are on 
the list. Others on the list cannot even remotely be considered a terrorist treat.  
 
In other cases, the power of databases over people’s lives when a mistake is 
made can be considerable. In some of the cases of mistaken identity, there is no 
recourse for the party who was harmed. O’Harrow (2005) relates the story of the 
widow of a senior Postal Service executive. She was born to the son of a slave, 
and as a child she took cover on the floor of her father’s business from gunmen 
angry at the fact that black aviators were allowed to fly in combat in World War II.     156 
 
Routinely the TSA would make the same “mistake” over and over. Every time 
she flew, she was detained until minutes before her flight. Then she would have 
to run to make the flight. Repeated letter writing and other attempts at remedies, 
including a letter from the FBI saying she was not a terrorist, did not help the 
matter.  TSA  workers  ignored  the  FBI  letter  and  she  was  told  there  was  no 
recourse in that she would never get off the list (pp.230-231). 
 
As the Real ID is used to track American citizens who have committed no crime, 
writing  their  daily  activities  into  databases,  there  are  more  chances  for  an 
innocent person to do something that will trigger an investigation. There are more 
chances for “mistakes.” As the processing power of the computers analyzing the 
data grows, more people will be flagged. And more “mistakes” will be made. The 
surveillance  apparatus  will  be  fed  with  data  from  the  tracking  of  law-abiding 
American citizens swiping their insecure, unencrypted Real ID at the health club, 
the airport, the doctor’s office, the library, the clothing store (to make sure they 
are who their credit card says they are) and the supermarket.  
5.9. The Rhetoric of the Global War on Terror 
 
The United States has set out in its long-term goals for combating terrorism the 
ideal  of  “freedom  and  dignity  that  comes  when  human  liberty  is  protected  by 
effective  democratic  institutions”  (National  strategy,  2006,  p.  1).  Later  in  the 
statement, the USA PATRIOT Act is held up as a reform that promotes security 
while “also protecting our fundamental liberties” (p.4). In the long-term approach 
section of the strategy for winning the war on terror, the long-term goal is stated 
as “Advancing effective democracy.”  
 
The  rhetoric  in  the  National  Strategy for  Combating  Terrorism  for  fighting  the 
Global War on Terror is replete with references to the concept of participatory 
democracy  for  other  countries.  “But  elections  are  not  enough.  Effective     157 
 
democracies…  are  responsive  to  their  citizens,  submitting  to  the  will  of  the 
people” (National strategy, 2006, p. 9). Yet the reality regarding the Real ID Act, 
which has been opposed by as many as 38 states at one time, indicates that the 
federal government will try to do what it will, regardless of the citizens’ wishes. 
 
There should have been made here a case that Real ID will not lead to greater 
security in cases of attempting to protect the public and the state from the truly 
bad people, the “evildoers” as President Bush characterized them. The idea is 
flawed, but the implementation is further flawed. In the words of Bruce Schneier, 
it  is  “security  theater”  (Schneier,  2007).  And,  as  Schneier  also  noted  in  his 
testimony to the Senate, it is a “lousy security trade-off,” which will cost at least 
$20  billion  and  the  taxpayer  “won’t  get  much  security  in  return”  (Real  ID  Act 
Hearings, 2007, p. 237). Also, it must be assumed that knowledgeable people 
understand that this bit of security theater is not effective when the public isn’t 
buying it. Yet there must be a reason that DHS and those who are pushing this 
idea are pushing so hard. There can only be two possibilities, or a combination of 
the two. 
 
Either the stakes in contractual arrangements are so high, and there is so much 
money to be made, that the call of profits greatly outweigh the public interest, or 
the secondary uses of the technology are actually primary. In understanding the 
believability of the rhetoric of DHS, one must consider that the agency pushing 
this on the American public, and the Mexican and Canadian public, and then the 
world  public,  had  on  their  payroll  an  individual  who  staged  a  fake  news 
conference. FEMA convened a “news conference” about the California wildfires 
that was carried on some cable channels. FEMA announced the staged event 15 
minutes before it was to start, and real reporters could dial in to listen but not ask 
questions.  The  individuals  in  the  room  who  were  asking  the  questions  were 
FEMA employees posing as reporters. The day it happened was one of the last 
days on the job for the FEMA director of external affairs, John “Pat” Philbin. Mr.     158 
 
Philbin moved on to his new post as head of public affairs at the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (Hsu, 2007a). 
 
Great Britain is in a similar situation vis-à-vis the Global War on Terror. It has 
been  struck  by  terrorism,  most  notably  in  the  attack  on  the  London  subway 
system.  The  British  Intelligence-Led  Policing  model  has  been  adopted  by  the 
United  States.  Law  enforcement  wants  the  surveillance  abilities  that  Britain’s 
national  network  of  closed  circuit  TV  cameras  represents.  Yet  Sir  Ken 
Macdonald,  who  left  his  post  as  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  made  the 
statement that “the expansion of technology by the state into everyday life could 
create  a  world  future  generations  ‘can’t  bear’”  (Hope,  2008,  par.  1).  Sir  Ken 
warned about the “Big Brother” state. He also warned Members of Parliament: 
 
It is in the nature of State power that decisions taken in the next few months and years 
about  how  the  State  may  use  these  powers,  and  to  what  extent,  are  likely  to  be 
irreversible. They will be with us forever. And they in turn will be built upon. So we should 
take very great care to imagine the world we are creating before we build it. We might 
end up living with something we can’t bear. (Hope, 2008, par. 15-16) 
 
Bamford’s (2008) book concludes with the following warning:  
 
More than three decades ago, when the NSA posed a fraction of the privacy threat it 
poses today with the Internet, Digital communications, and mass storage, Senator Frank 
Church, the first chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, investigated the NSA 
and issued a stark warning: 
 
That capability at any time could be turned around on the American people and 
no  American  would  have  any  privacy  left,  such  [is]  the  capability  to  monitor 
everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn’t matter. There would 
be no place to hide. If this government ever became a tyranny, if a dictator ever 
took  charge  in  this  country,  the  technological  capacity  that  the  intelligence 
community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny, and 
there would be no way to fight back, because the most careful effort to combine 
together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was done, is 
within  the  reach  of  the  government  to  know.  Such  is  the  capability  of  this 
technology. 
 
There is now the capacity to make tyranny total in America. Only law ensures that we 
never fall into that abyss--the abyss from which there is no return. (pp. 344-345)     159 
 
5.10. Epilogue 
 
Joe and Jane Doe read some of the books listed in the reference section of this 
work. They paid with cash, thinking it would raise one less flag in the national 
database,  although  they  knew  that  if  an  investigator  were  to  investigate  the 
identities  of  individuals  who  might  have  purchased  various  books,  the  digital 
camera  feed,  keyed  to  the  bar  code  scanner  entries  for  the  book  purchases, 
would give them away. The investigator could get the pictures, sound and cash 
register data without ever leaving the Office of National Intelligence as it would 
be sent over the Internet. They could have borrowed the book from the library, 
but they would have had to produce a library card and be tied to the book that 
way, and then their fingerprints would be in one more place--on the pages of the 
books. “Proof” that they read the books. 
 
They wondered if the video-conferencing capability on the HDTV was turned on 
and maybe someone or some computer was watching and recording them. Not 
wanting to take a chance, they went into the bathroom and ran the water in the 
sink before they had a discussion. They discussed possibly joining some type of 
privacy group online, but decided against it because they were afraid that might 
trigger a flag in the national database. They discussed whether they should join a 
privacy or social action group that had actual meetings, but decided against it 
because  they  were  afraid  they  might  be  put  into  the  database  as  criminal 
extremists  by  government  watchers.  They  debated  writing  a  letter  to  the 
newspaper but signing the letter with a fake name. Using their real names might 
trigger a red flag in the national intelligence database. That sounded ok until they 
realized that if it triggered a red flag in the national intelligence database and the 
letter had no fingerprints, or if the name didn’t check out, then it would be worse, 
especially when the secret dots on the paper tying their printer to the printed 
copy would give them away. Then they decided that based on what they knew 
from Herman and Chomsky, that it probably wouldn’t be published anyway.     160 
 
They decided that their safest option would be to do nothing. They turned the 
water  off  and  went  back  to  sitting  in  front  of  the  HDTV,  just  in  case  it  was 
watching them. Then it would see that they were doing nothing of a terroristic 
nature.  They  watched  as  the  HDTV  and  databases  served  targeted 
advertisements to them. In their minds they reviewed their actions during the day, 
sure  they  did  nothing  that  would  trigger  a  red  flag  in  the  national  database 
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